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Abstract 
 
 
Japanese women are having fewer children than ever before. There have been 
many quantitative studies undertaken to attempt to reveal the reasons behind this. 
The Japanese government has been concerned about the future economic decline 
of the country, and has been encouraging women to have more children. Although 
the Japanese government has been supporting women financially, it has not 
focused on gender equality, making it more difficult for women to be able to 
pursue their chosen careers. Japanese women have greater access to higher 
education than ever before, yet the Japanese patriarchal social structure still 
compels women to rely on men and all but eliminates their independence. The 
Japanese male-dominated society is resistant want to change. Family ties are still 
very strong, and women are expected to take care of the household and do unpaid 
work, while men work outside the home and earn a paid salary. In the labour force, 
women do not enjoy the same level of equality and opportunity as their male 
counterparts, as it is naturally marry, have children, and take care of the family. 
The system is skewed in favor of the males. Women are not able to pursue the 
same career path as men; even from the start, women are often considered as 
candidates for potential wives for the male workers. In the course of this research, 
I conducted a total of 22 interviews of single and married Japanese women. I set 
out to explore and discover the causes behind why Japanese women are choosing 
to postpone marriage and have fewer children, as well as touching upon the much 
deeper issue of gender inequality due to the Japanese patriarchal social structure. 
Women cannot live how they want to and only for themselves; they must always 
put their families first. This study reveals the struggles of Japanese women and 
how many are confused, and how some resist the patriarchal system. Many 
women waste their education, careers, knowledge and experience, all in the name 
of maintaining family ties and the patriarchal social structure.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Since I first became interested in low fertility rates in Japan, it has become a very 
topical issue. As the economic decline of Japan has deepened into a crisis, the low 
fertility rates there have been studied by those in many fields: scholars in the 
fields of economics, health, demographics, statistics, social sciences, and politics 
have all focused their attention on low fertility (Katayama et. al., 2006). Many 
theories and research studies seem to blame the problem on women becoming 
better educated, the rise of female independence causing damage through the 
influence of individualization and westernization, often involving negative 
opinions of contemporary Japanese women (see Shirawakase, 2005). I have 
started to wonder about the argument that giving women access to higher 
education is to blame if they choose to have fewer or no children. Why is it that 
when men have access to higher education, it has not discussed as a factor 
affecting low fertility? For instance, the possibility is not discussed that educated 
men might believe they have to take more responsibility for raising children, so 
they would like to have fewer children.  
 
It is very interesting that Japanese women’s ideal number of children is higher 
than the actual number of children they have (OECD, 2012). If, in theory, 
Japanese women are willing to have more children, why are they choosing not to 
do so? Can the onus for low fertility really be placed on women? Why is the 
burden and responsibility for having children placed solely on women? Why do 
Japanese men share none of the blame of low fertility? In Japan, there have been 
many quantitative studies on low fertility. I wanted to challenge these findings 
using qualitative research, to reveal Japanese women's individual attitudes toward 
fertility decisions, because there are gaps in the quantitative research findings 
about low fertility. At first I was focused on low fertility rates; however, I have 
found since I started my research that it is not that simple. The research uncovered 
much deeper issues than I had expected, related to the male-dominant social 
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structure, gender inequality and gender discrimination. 
I begin in Chapter 1 by posing the question, ‘What is low fertility?’, and by 
comparing differences and similarities in this phenomenon in Europe and East 
Asia. Introducing the concept of gender inequality, from being single to after 
married life, helps to demonstrate that the reality of gender inequality is rooted 
further and deeper in Japanese society than one might expect. 
  
In Chapter 2, I explain why I chose to conduct qualitative research, and my 
strategy of trying to make my interviewees comfortable enough to want to talk to 
a researcher, and my decision to conduct pre-interviews before the main 
interviews. I will discuss how I chose participants for my research and the 
difficult task of scheduling around the busy schedules of my respondents, and how 
I handled pre-interviews and interviews. In Japan the cultural etiquette that had to 
be observed. I gathered data and struggled through the process of transcribing.  
 
In Chapter 3, I explain gender inequality. Patriarchal social structure forces 
women to take unpaid jobs, offers less responsibility for paid work, less job 
security, and less interest in helping women gain financial independence. This 
means women have to rely on men. From childhood, males and females in Japan 
are treated and raised differently from each other; different behaviours and 
language become natural. Even if women try to fight back against this inequality, 
it is very difficult to change. Gender inequality denies women the opportunity to 
keep a job; young women are welcome, but after reaching a certain age, the 
expectation is that they will marry and have a child. All of this makes it difficult 
for women to stay active in the labour force, so women are pushed into part-time 
work. 
 
Chapter 4 covers Marriage and Family Values. Marriage is an important, major 
step for Japanese women and men because of strong family ties. I discuss the 
pressure women face to marry, the disadvantages they struggle with in their 
relationships with their in-laws, and pressure to have children. Children often face 
discrimination as a result of divorce, so women are avoiding divorce. Another 
14 
 
reason for avoiding divorce, even in an unhappy marriage, involves embarrassing 
their family. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses Economic Resources, including working women who must 
fund their children’s education without any outside help. Women face 
discrimination in the workplace. Women are expected to be young and beautiful, 
but even that does not guarantee that they will be able to keep a job. There is still 
a large gender-based pay gap; in Japan, the longer one works for an employers, 
the more one is entitled to promotions and higher wages; however, women lose 
more time off than men, and even if they only work part-time, women can barely 
keep a job. It seems women are in charge of financial matters, however the men 
are really in charge, leaving women to seek out part-time work, even if they 
would prefer to work full-time, because domestic duties represent an unpaid job 
that women are still expected to do.  
 
In Chapter 6, I explore Care and Welfare Policies. The Japanese government has 
been developing welfare support for women, focusing on financial support for 
raising children but not concentrating on gender equality. The Japanese policies 
and support system encourages women to become part-time workers or 
housewives rather than women are able to keep their career. Therefore Japanese 
women still do the majority of unpaid care work, which widens the inequality gap 
between women and men even more.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. Past quantitative research suggests that Japanese 
women stay at home because they prefer to take care of children. I argue that 
qualitative research has revealed information that quantitative studies have failed 
to uncover. Since the system was made to benefit the male-dominated patriarchy, 
many of them were forced to leave their jobs. The strong patriarchal social 
structure maintains these gender roles, but weakening its grip might allow 
husbands to share in the responsibilities of unpaid housework and child care, 
which might enable Japanese women to make more individual fertility decisions.  
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Chapter 1: Fertility in Context 
 
 
 
Japanese Fertility in Context 
 
Over the last 50 years, the total fertility rate
1
 (TFR) has been decreasing in Japan 
as well as in most other wealthy developed countries in the world (Caldwell, 
1992; 1999; MacDonald, 2000; Mason, 1992). As of the 21
st
 century, half of the 
countries in the world are below the 2.08 TFR replacement level necessary to 
sustain current population levels (Morgan and Taylor, 2006: 375; Caldwell, 1992). 
In Europe, as soldiers returned following the end of World War II, economies 
recovered and people became optimistic again; fertility rose sharply as a result 
(Easterlin, 2000). From 1946 to 1964, fertility rates were well above the norm, as 
western and northern Europe experienced a 'baby boom' (Sobotka, 2004), which 
compensated for lower birth rates during the Depression and the war (Easterlin, 
2000). After a time, however, women began postponing having children, which 
affected the TFR. Things had changed in industrial and post-industrial countries, 
and the cost of having and raising children was on the rise (Morgan, 2003: 592; 
MacDonald, 2000; Ogawa, et., al, 2009). One of the factors involved was the 
conflict between women's obligations at work and at home (Morgan, 2003). In 
most cases, once the TFR in a country has dropped below TFR replacement level, 
it rarely goes back up and above replacement level (Bongaarts and Bulatao, 2000; 
Atoh, 2008; MacDonald, 2000; Morgan, 2003; Morgan and Taylor, 2006). Italy, 
Spain and Japan have had extended periods of time below TFR replacement level, 
but Spain may have a chance to stabilise its TFR due to immigration to the 
country (Morgan and Taylor, 2006: 11). I chose to include some European 
countries' TFR in Table 1, because Italy and Spain have experienced low TFR and 
are characterised as more patriarchal societies, while Scandinavian countries and 
                                                 
1 The definition of Total Fertility Rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman if 
she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with the current 
age-specific fertility rate. The calculation of total fertility rate is the sum of the age-specific birth rates (5-year 
age cohort between 10 and 49) for female residents of a specified geographic area (nation, state, county, etc.) 
during a specified time period (usually a calendar year) multiplied by 5. 
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the U.K. have been more stable. TFR lower than 1.5 is defined as a ‘super low 
fertility rate’ (Morgan and Taylor, 2006). In East Asia, there are numerous such 
extreme cases, with Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all experiencing 
super low fertility rates. 
 
Table 1: Total Fertility Rates 
 
 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Denmark 1.77 1.80 1.85 1.85 1.89 1.84 1.88 
Hong Kong 1.03 0.96 0.98 1.02 1.06 1.04 1.11 
Italy 1.26 1.32 1.35 1.37 1.42 1.41 1.41 
Japan 1.36 1.26 1.32 1.34 1.37 1.37 1.39 
Norway 1.85 1.84 1.90 1.90 1.96 1.98 1.95 
South Korea 1.47 1.08 1.12 1.25 1.19 1.15 1.23 
Spain 1.23 1.34 1.38 1.39 1.46 1.39 1.38 
Sweden 1.55 1.77 1.85 1.88 1.91 1.94 1.98 
Taiwan 1.68 1.12 1.12 1.10 1.05 1.03 0.89 
UK 1.64 1.79 1.85 1.88 1.91 1.94 1.98 
 
       Source: OECD Factbook in 2010-2011: Total Fertility Rate.  
       http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-factbook-2010/total-fertility-rates-table_factbook-2010-table6-en  
       Databook of International Labour Statistic 2012, http://www.jil.go.jp/english/estatis/databook/ 
       Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive, Yuan, R.C.O. (Taiwan) in 2012. 
       http://eng.dgbas.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=2 
 
 
Recently Scandinavian countries’2 total fertility rate has been stable (Atho, 2000; 
Thuya, 2004). Even though Sweden’s TFR is low, it is seen as being stable, 
especially after 2006; in 2000 the TFR was only 1.55. Many researchers and 
scholars have noted how successful Sweden has been in increasing and stabilising 
its TFR (see Hoem, 1993; Bernardi and Kertzer, 2007; Inglehart and Norris, 2003; 
Nagase, 2001; Thuya, 2004; Ato, 1999; 2000). In 2012, TFR in East Asia 
experienced a slight increase South Korea's TFR rose to 1.30, Taiwan's to 1.20, 
and Japan's rose to 1.41. However in East Asian countries, the TFR has remained 
at a very low level. In Japan’s history, two years showed an especially shocking 
change of TFR, and those years (1966, 1990) are highlighted (see Figure 1). 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Scandinavia comprises Denmark, Norway and Sweden.  
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Figure 1: Total Fertility Rate between 1950-2010 in Japan 
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 Sources: The Japanese National Institute of Population and Social Research; NIPSR (2012) 
     http://www.ipss.go.jp/pp-fuken/j/fuken2002/shusho.html 
 
Before and during the Asian Pacific War, Japanese women were encouraged to 
bear and raise as many children as they could in order to strengthen the country 
(Sato and Iwasawara, 2006; see Chapter 2). Several researchers have identified 
three distinct periods of fertility in post-World War II Japan. After the end of the 
war, the number of children women were having gradually started to decrease 
(Sato and Iwasawara, 2006; Lafleur, 1990). Abortion was legalised in Japan in 
1948, which contributed to the decline in fertility with a steep rise in the number 
of abortions (Rehterford and Ogawa, 2004:1). From 1947-1957, fertility declined 
by more than half. Fertility leveled off from 1957-1973, and from 1973 onward it 
started declining again (Rehterford and Ogawa, 2004: 1), which is often referred 
to as the “baby bust.” In Japan also there was a brief baby boom right after World 
War II, similar to that experienced in western countries when soldiers returned 
home, but the TFR still sharply declined from 4.54 children per woman in 1947 to 
2.04 in 1957.  
 
Highlighted in red in Figure 1, in 1966, the TFR in Japan dramatically decreased. 
This decrease was referred to as Hinoeuma. This sudden downward spike, which 
returned to normal levels the following year, happened because 1966 was the 
“Year of the Fire Horse”, or Hinoeuma (Rehterford and Ogawa, 2004: 1). Many 
couples superstitiously believed that having a girl during that year would be 
unlucky, so they avoided having any children in 1966 (Rehterford and Ogawa, 
18 
 
2004). According to Itabashi (2007), regarding the Hinoeuma, there was an old 
belief that girls born in a year which fell on a 60 year cycle (which had begun 
around 1666) would become too strong, cause trouble, and destroy men. It was 
thought that women born on such a year would not be able to find a husband. For 
example, Itabashi explains that many women who were born in 1906 eventually 
committed suicide (2007). In 1934, many single women who had been born in 
1906 were gathered and transported to China for Japanese men working on a 
railway there. The average age of those women was 28 years old, 8 years more 
than the average age of marrying at that time. They willingly chose to travel to 
China, hoping to find husbands (Itabashi, 2007). Over 60 years later, in 1966, 
Japanese people still held this negative belief and women tried to avoid becoming 
pregnant that year. One woman who happened to be born that year is the 
emperor’s son’s wife, and people started to regard this belief as mere superstition.  
 
Between 1971 and 1974, there was a second baby boom in Japan, and the TFR 
was 2.14 in 1972 and 1973. But the TFR has not exceeded 2.0 since 1975, and has 
gradually continued to decrease over the years. It continued to drop throughout 
the time the Japanese ‘bubble economy’3 occurred, from the late 1980s to the 
beginning of the 1990s. The TFR dropped to 1.57 in 1989 and 1990, known as the 
‘1.57 Shock’ (Ato, 1999) which highlighted in blue Figure 1. The TFR decline is 
still ongoing since the ‘1.57 shock’ in 1990. This was the turning point to talk 
about the low fertility rate in Japan, because the TFR had already been less than 
2.0, which means that people began to acknowledge that one family had fewer 
than 2 children, which was very shocking news for Japan. In 2005, the TFR of 
Japan was 1.26 (OECD Factbook, 2011-2012). Since then it has been increasing 
slowly and steadily (see Figure 1); in 2012, the TFR was 1.41 in Japan. However, 
in the 1966 ‘Hinoeuma’, the actual number of children born was 1,360,974; 
during the 1990 ‘1.57 shock’ 1,246,802 were born. But in 2012, only 1,050,806 
children were born, the lowest number of actual children on record (Ministry of 
Health Labour and Welfare; MHLW 2012).  
 
                                                 
3
 Japan’s economy dramatically increased between 1986–1990; this era of prosperity was called the bubble 
economy (Otsu, et al, 2004, 1137).  
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Lower fertility rate results in declining populations with an increasing number of 
older people, in turn resulting in a diminished work force, which has negative 
economic consequences (Morgan, 2002). According to economists and population 
researchers, a low TFR may damage the balance of population between the 
younger and older generations and most countries are understandably worried 
about the weakness of their economies in the future (Ogawa and Retherford, 
1996: 703; Greenhalgh, 1995; MacDonald, 2000; Morgan, 2002; Morgan and 
Taylor 2006; Grant, et. al, 2004; Kawamoto, 2001). This economic weakness is 
one of the most pressing concerns associated with Japan's low TFR (Ogawa and 
Retherford, 1996). Not only has the population in Japan been decreasing, but 
people are living longer due to advances in medical technology, which in turn 
affects the economy by creating heavier taxes to support the older generations 
with pensions (Ogawa and Retherford, 1996). There have been many findings 
from quantitative and demographic research on low fertility in many countries. 
Morgan and Taylor (2006) categorised seven already known findings about the 
causes. Morgan and Taylor draw on statistics from Europe, Asia, Oceania and 
North America. It often points out three long term low fertility countries; Spain, 
Italy and Japan. Their interest is not only demographic and economic, but it also 
focuses on cultural and ideological changes. Their seven findings can be applied 
to the root causes of Japan’s low fertility.  
 
 
1. Postponing Having Children  
 
 
Women consider postponing children to be a matter of choice, while researchers 
refer to these decisions as 'shifts in timing' in having children, which directly 
relate to the perception of a 'time limit' (Morgan and Taylor, 2006: 383). Shifts in 
fertility timing, however seemingly insignificant in the short term, lead to much 
larger timing gaps over the long term. A sustained increase in shifts over a long 
period of time is untenable for a society (Morgan and Taylor, 2006). The length of 
time for which women and men chose to remain single has been increasing, 
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because they are choosing to take more time to pursue their education and prefer 
to enjoy their single lives (MacDonald, 2000; Atoh, 2008). Those with a higher 
degree have more employment options, causing them to focus on their careers for 
a time before they eventually starting a family (MacDonald, 2000). The time 
when women start to consider having children or are ready to have children is 
later than before, narrowing the time limits for child bearing and negatively 
impacting the TFR.  
 
 
2. Shorter Window of Time for Childbearing 
 
 
The number of children a woman might have in her life is heavily dependent upon 
her age at the first birth (Mathews, Brady and Hamilton, 2009). For example, if a 
woman has her first child when she is 16, then theoretically, if her child follows 
the same path, she would become a grandmother at the age of 32, and could 
possibly still have more children herself. However, if a woman delays having her 
first child until the age of 32, and her child has her own child at a later age, the 
window of time is much smaller. This shorter window of time for childbearing 
means that couples might not even have a second child, resulting fewer children 
being born (Morgan and Taylor, 2006: 383; Bongaarts, 2002). One issue that was 
mentioned was the physical and mental rigours of trying to raise children as 
middle age approaches in Japan (MHLW, 2010). Another factor is in Japan limited 
time and opportunity because of working long hours culture (Segawa, 2000). 
There is a much smaller frequency of men and women having sex in Japan, 
compared with many other developed countries (see Chapter 3). Among married 
couples who do not have sex more than once a month (sex-less couples), the top 
reason for Japanese men was that they were too tired due to the demands of their 
job (24.6 %); for Japanese women, it was because sex was too troublesome 
(18.8 %) (MHLW, 2009).  
 
 
21 
 
3. Overall Life Course  
 
Fertility decisions are shaped and affected by the overall life courses of women 
and men. Factors that affect couples’ life courses and fertility decisions include 
mental and physical health conditions, economic and social reasons, and 
individual choices (Morgan and Taylor, 2006: 383; Friedman, Hechter and 
Kanazawa, 1994). In the past, having children was simply a given, but now it is 
more acceptable than before if women and men in developed countries do not 
wish to have children, explore different options and pursue a different life course 
(Morgan and Taylor, 2006). For example, in the U.K. about 40 % of women and 
men choose to remain single, which is more acceptable than it was 50 years ago, 
when marriage was seen as a natural way to ensure financial security (Morgan and 
Taylor, 2006). According to the NIPSS, as of 2012, there are eight times as many 
Japanese men who have never married than there were 30 years ago.
4
 The 
younger generation's values have changed (Suzuki, 2008); however, Japanese 
women are not expected to have children without being married (Atho, 2008). 
  
 
4. Financial Costs and Time Costs  
 
There are direct and indirect financial and time costs for women of raising 
children (Morgan and Taylor, 2006: 384). At one time, it was believed that 
children would contribute economically to a family (Coldwell, 1982; 1991; 
Sechikawa, 2013), but today children are regarded as a financial burden rather 
than an asset, due to educational and time costs (Morgan and Taylor, 2006 ; Croix 
and Doepke, 2003). Expenses for raising a child are exceptionally high in Japan, 
and in addition to the obvious increased food and educational costs associated 
with raising more children, a second child means that parents must provide more 
living space, possibly even moving into a bigger place to live in order to 
accommodate an extra person (Morgan and Taylor, 2006). There are not only 
financial concerns, but also time costs to consider, especially for women. Raising 
                                                 
4 Japanese single men’s age between 45 to 49 and age between 50 to 54 who are never married and add take 
average and at age 50 are single, which is the ratio.  
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children takes up most of women's time, causing them to miss out on career 
opportunities. The time cost of raising each additional child is also high, 
especially for women who suspend or resign from their careers in order to devote 
the necessary time toward their children, which has negative financial 
consequences (Morgan, 2004). Each subsequent child widens the gap between the 
time when the woman ends her previous career and the time she eventually tries to 
reenter the workforce.  
 
 
5. Birth Control  
 
As birth control becomes more socially acceptable and legitimate, more women 
can control their own fertility and can strategically and responsibly control their 
family planning. Morgan and Taylor reveal very similar patterns in developed 
countries, but there are differences between Western and European countries and 
Japan regarding attitudes toward contraception. Oral contraception is more often 
used by women, allowing women to control reproduction in many Western 
countries, but not in Italy and Japan (Morgan and Taylor, 2006: 384; see below). 
 
 
6. Ideal Number and Social Ideal Number of Children Decreasing  
 
According to Morgan and Taylor (2006: 384) the ideal number of children has 
gone down in most countries, which can be directly or indirectly related to 
financial issues. In the majority of countries, the ideal number and the social ideal 
number of children is two. In Japan, however, the ideal number of children is still 
high (3 children average) compared with western countries, even though people 
are choosing to have fewer children (Morgan and Taylor, 2006: OECD, 2012). In 
Japan surveys have shown that the ideal number of children has not changed for 
two decades (Lutz, 2005). Yet, the actual number of children is falling.  
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7. Responsibility to Have an Affordable Number of Children  
 
Large families are less acceptable than before. Today, it is seen as irresponsible to 
have many children because the high cost of raising children is a disadvantage for 
parents; such households have become increasingly rare (Morgan and Taylor, 
2006: 384). Many countries have been struggling to pay out benefits. In the U.K., 
those who are jobless and with more than three children could face penalties and 
have their benefits slashed. U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron has said that 
these people must either stop having children or get a job, because additional 
children strain the national benefits system ever further (Shipman, Daily Mail 24 
June 2012). In Japan, the situation is totally different; women are encouraged to 
have more than one child, and women with three children receive substantial extra 
government benefits (Ato 2006; Ida 2011).  
 
Much quantitative research on the attitudes of Japanese women toward fertility 
has been carried out, but there is conflicting information. Some quantitative 
studies have found that women want to have two to three children (Ato, 2006; 
OECD in 2012), while other studies have said that the number of women who 
intend to have only one child is increasing (Ida, 2011). Other studies suggest that 
the drop in fertility rates has many causes, including women choosing to remain 
childless and a rise in the number of women who live in childless households in 
developed countries (Nakata, 2001: OECD, 2012). It is difficult, however, to 
discern which is accurate from this body of research and how it has impacted the 
Japanese fertility rate. Exactly what affects the intentions of women’s fertility 
decisions has remained unclear, and very few studies have been done on 
individual levels of fertility decision making (Hayford, 2009).  
 
I argue that Morgan and Taylor’s demographics and other quantitative studies 
have yet to discover why women are choosing to have fewer children, or choosing 
not to have any children, in Japan. Morgan and Taylor’s findings are very useful 
to understand what causes low fertility in general, but there is a limitation in using 
quantitative research. Chang and Song (2010: 549) note that in their demographic 
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research, resistance to the patriarchal culture is reduced and it would be better to 
understand more; more qualitative research is needed to learn about the 
experiences shaping people's lives. Japan's fertility rate has been low, but the 
number of children desired by women seems to be fairly high; it has not been 
made clear why women who wish to have more children are having fewer 
children. Japan’s low fertility is often seen as a result of giving women access to 
higher education; individualism is also seen as a negative factor hindering the 
TFR (MacDonald, 2000; Thuya, 2000). In Japan, family ties are still important 
and individualism is viewed negatively as a 'selfish' trait. It is not legal for 
husband and wife to have different names, supposedly because each retaining 
their own name would cause confusion for their children (see Masuhara, 1997).  
 
 
Gender Inequality in Japan 
 
Hierarchy and Patriarchy 
 
Japan remains a hierarchal and patriarchal system: women obey men (Ochiai, 
2001: 2008, Sechiyama, 2013, Tokuhiro, 2010). The Samurai hierarchy 
established the ie family system (Ueno, 2009: 63; Harrington, 1995), which 
remained an important part of Japanese culture from the Edo Era (1603-1876) 
until World War II, and it was strictly hierarchical, prioritizing family members by 
age, gender and birth order (Ochiai, 2008: Takuhiro, 2010; Rebick and Takenaka, 
2006). Ie seido was based on a Confucian belief presuming a patriarchal head of 
the family who also served as the conscience guide of the family, especially 
among the warrior (samurai) class and some rich families (Takuhiro, 2010: 17; 
Sechiyama, 2013), which comprised less than 10% of the population and 
developed over 600 years (Ueno, 2009: 63; Hendry, 2010). Most of the population 
during the pre-Meiji period were commoners living in autonomous communities 
where the rules were far more relaxed regarding marriage, name, premarital sex, 
divorce and remarriage than they are today (Ueno, 2009; Hendry, 2010). 
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5
In pre-Meiji Japan, whatever a person of the samurai class was given as a reward 
from the emperor would belong to the whole family, or ie, not just to the 
individual (Hendry, 2010). That system designated the male leader of the 
household to have control over and responsibility for his family and property 
(Ochiai, 2008). During the Meiji period (1868-1912), Japan began a period of 
economic and political modernization (Williams, 1992), though this created some 
conflict with the traditional ie family system. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, 
Japan modelled its laws after French law, drawing some criticism for adopting 
western ideals of a family built around close relations between husband and wife, 
or between parents and children; this eventually became the central ideal of the 
Meiji Civil code (Ochiai, 2000). After the adoption of the code, the concept of the 
‘ie’ gained importance, as the population was encouraged to show respect to the 
emperor and to their parents (Ochiai, 2000). Since the Meiji period, the ie has 
been associated with the cultural identity of Japan (Ochiai, 2000). Within the 
family hierarchy, the father was the head, followed by the first son and that son’s 
first son, and finally the women. Mothers and wives are ranked below their own 
children, especially sons (Hendry, 2010).  
 
Throughout the Meiji period, Japanese women were kept at the lowest level of 
society until the end of World War II. Following that, women were given greater 
access to education as part of the modernisation of the Japanese household. 
However, the education was intended to make a woman a 'good wife and wise 
mother', an archetypal figure within the ie family system which helps to support 
institutionalised patriarchy (Sechiyama, 2013; Ochiai, 2008; Tokuhiro, 2010). The 
'ryosaikenbo' (good wife and wise mother) ideology was one of the reasons used 
to justify granting women greater access to education but some women used their 
education to gain greater independence (Takahashi, 2003: 42). The traditions of 
the role of motherhood could be interpreted differently, though it was always 
expected that mothers would, at the very least, have children and care for them 
(Takahashi, 2003: 42). As Japanese women became more educated, it created 
some confusion between studying to be a 'good wife and wise mother' and modern 
                                                 
5 Eras of Japanese History; Edo: 1603-1876, Meiji:1868-1912, Taisho:1912-1926, Showa:1926-1989, 
Heisei:1989-present. 
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education. The pre-modern Confucian ideals state that ‘an ignorant woman is 
virtuous’, under which women were expected to obey their husbands without 
question (Sechiyama, 2013: 78). The ‘good wife/wise mother’ ideology was more 
modern, and also broke from the pre-modern Confucian ideals that ‘An ignorant 
woman is virtuous’ (Sechiyama, 2013: 78). The New Civil Code of 1947 officially 
abolished the ie system, yet it has survived and merely evolved into a more 
modern form (Ronald and Alexy, 2011). The legacy of the ie system is still felt 
today. 
 
The modern ‘good wife/wise mother’ concept was originally meant to be 
integrated into the Confucian philosophy (Sechiyama, 2013: 79). Sechiyama 
(2013) notes that the new role omitted a woman’s obedience to her husband when 
it came to managing the household, and ignorance was no longer a virtue since 
women were also placed in the role of being their children’s first teacher. This was 
a clear break with the feudal ideals, and a nod toward women’s roles in raising 
future Japanese citizens trained to strive for national unity. The ‘good wife/wise 
mother’ concept also spread to China by the early 1990s, having first been 
‘imported’ from Japan early in the 1900s, which is also likely when Korea 
adopted the idea (Sechiyama, 2013: 66-73).  
 
Women in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan maintain a family-centric view because 
those countries have normalised ‘individualisation without individualism’ (Chang 
and Song, 2010: 560). A study conducted by Chang and Song (2010) argue that 
Japanese women are reluctantly family-centered, but still put their family’s 
interests before their own. All three countries also have the patriarchal system in 
common. Despite modernization, patriarchy persists in East Asian societies 
(Chang and Song, 2010: 560; Sechiyama, 2013).  
 
This ie system promotes stronger relationships among family members but is 
more restrictive and complicated in matters of marriage and divorce, especially 
for women. Japanese women are expected to act as though belong to their spouses 
or their families, which makes it hard for a woman to make individual decisions 
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herself. They cannot choose what they want for themselves. It is a challenge for 
women to develop their own identities as a partner in a marriage, when the social 
construct of marriage in Japan is not geared toward allowing them to express any 
individuality (Tokuhiro, 2010). Ueno (2009, 2010) explains that as Japan became 
a more modern society, women started losing their rights in the workforce and 
their own sexual independence, their status gradually being restricted to that of 
wife and mother because of ‘ie’ system (see Tokuhiro, 2010). The notion that the 
‘good women and wise mothers’ of Japan are expected to give up their own 
desires in order to marry, have children, and take care of their family seems 
unlikely to change.  
 
Single Life 
 
Today more women are pursuing higher education than ever before. Parents want 
their daughters to have the same educational opportunities as their sons, which 
could either lead to better career opportunities, or more opportunities for their 
daughters to meet men who are educated (Ikenaka, 2003). In Japan in 1950, the 
class system was abolished and replaced by a system based on skill, allowing 
people to be promoted in the work place (Suzuki, 2008). As the economy began to 
grow more, women began pursuing higher education (Shirakawase, 2008). In 
1950, 34.6 % of Japanese men were attending colleges and universities; for 
women, the percentage was 17.2% (Ministry of Education, Cultural, Sport, 
Science and Technology, 2012). By 1966, this education gap between men and 
women had significantly shrunk; the percentage of men attending colleges and 
universities at that point was 28.2%, and the percentage of women attending was 
20.6%. By 2000, the gap had been reduced even further, with 30.8% of men 
attending colleges and universities, compared to a percentage of 25.2% for 
women, and by 2010, the overall percentage of men attending college or 
university was 36.8%, and for women the percentage was 32.2% (see Figure 2). 
More women, however, are attending two-year colleges or vocational schools than 
universities, as opposed to men, the majority of whom attend universities rather 
than colleges. Perhaps this is because more women focus on receiving training for 
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careers such as auxiliary nurses, dental hygienists and kindergarten teachers, 
which they hope to be able to keep after marrying and having children (see also: 
Ono, 2000). Many Japanese women feel that if they have a degree from a 
university, it will be harder for them to pursue and keep a good job and may lead 
to a boring, meaningless, dead-end job (see Chapter 3). 
 
Figure 2: Education Achievements of Japanese Women and Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Statistics Japan in 2010.       
     http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2010/index.htm?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter 
     Ministry of Education, Cultural, Sport, Science and Technology in 2012.  
     http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2010/users-g/wakatta.htm#jump2 
  
 
According to the OECD (2012), a typical Japanese student scored 529 in reading 
literacy, maths and science in the OECD’s Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA). This score is higher than the OECD average of 497, making 
Japan one of the strongest OECD countries in students’ skills. This OECD 
research shows that Japanese students outperform other countries in studying, 
especially Japanese girls. On average in Japan, girls outperformed boys by 14 
points, more than the average OECD gender gap of 9 points. Yet girls tend to 
pursue higher education at the college level, whereas boys tend to enter 
universities.   
 
Parents would like to help their daughters pursue professional and specialized 
degrees in order to be able to compete with men and keep their jobs even after 
they marry, because the patriarchal structure of society makes it difficult for 
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women to keep a job. Women cannot compete at the same level as men because of 
the way the labour system and society are organised (Ikenaka, 1998; Ochiai, 2000; 
Ato, 1996; Steinhoff, and Tanaka, 1998). Parents still hope for a better future for 
their daughters, so they do all they can to provide a good education for them to be 
able to choose what they want to be and what they want to do with their lives. 
Parents are doing all they can for their daughters to open up as many options for 
them as possible. However, they realise that the odds are against them and that 
they will face difficulties in their professional lives when they decide whether to 
struggle to keep their jobs or to quit altogether. It is as if women’s potential 
capacity and ability have been ignored and put aside in the corner. 
  
Young Japanese women and men experience greater enjoyment and stay single 
longer to enjoy their freedom, more than previous generations, possibly because 
they are spoiled by their parents (see Ato, 2001; MacDonald, 2006; Rindfuss, 
1991). The period of time in which women and men choose to remain single has 
been increasing, because they are choosing to take more time to pursue their 
education and prefer to enjoy their single lives. Japanese young people find the 
single life very comfortable, and are staying single as long as they can. Some 
parents want their children to be comfortable and enjoy their single lives, because 
they themselves could not enjoy being single when they were younger. Nowadays 
young Japanese people understand that their parents’ generation had to work very 
hard and did not have enough money during the historical period when Japan was 
developing (Retherford, Ogawa and Mathukura, 2001). Until they are married, 
young Japanese women and men usually live with their parents, who are very 
supportive; many mothers still wash their adult children’s clothes, dishes, and 
make dinner for them, almost like hotel services without payment or very low pay. 
With fewer children at home, parents can take better care of their children 
financially and physically. Many Japanese singles live for free or pay very low 
rent to their parents. Sakamoto (2001) found that 60.4 % of single men and 
women between the ages of 25 and 34 who still live with their parents contribute 
an average of ¥ 35,000
6
 (approximately £273 ) a month to the household, and 
                                                 
6 1 pound is ¥ 128, as of May 10, 2012 
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53.7% of single women and men between the ages of 35 and 44 contribute 
¥ 46,000 (approximately £359). Even if parents collect very low rent from their 
children, parents usually save it for them when they married (Yamada, 1997). 
According to the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research; 
NIPSSR (2000), in all age group the number of single males who live with their 
parents has been increasing. The average percentage is 70. For women, the 
tendency to live with parents decreases between 25 and 29 years old, but after that 
the percentage increases. The research shows that the average percentage is about 
80 for women. Many young Japanese people who have a job and are single still 
live with their parents; they are not completely independent of their parents for 
their fundamental living conditions. Other East Asian countries are similar in this 
regard. According to Ochiai and Molony (2008), this is common for developed 
East Asian countries and is a cultural norm. However, Ting and Chiu (2002:620) 
found in their study that women and men in Hong Kong live with their parents for 
a longer period of time, but their reason is stronger traditional obligations to 
family rather than financial issues, and women feel much more responsibility to 
stay with their parents until they are married. The young generation of Japanese 
people are saving living expenses living with their parents and save up to travel 
overseas during holidays to discover the world, or shop and spend money on 
themselves.  
 
Those with a higher degree have more employment options, causing Japanese 
women to focus on their careers for a time before eventually starting a family. 
Japanese women feel that after a certain point, it is too late to have children, and 
as a result they do not even see the point of marrying, so more Japanese women 
are electing to remain single, even if they desire to marry and have children 
(Segawa, 2000). More single Japanese women are making plans to stay single 
(17.7%) than men (3.3%) (NIPSSR, 2010). According to Nita (2004), before 
especially Japanese women decide to marry, they think of competitive advantages. 
If Japanese women and men cannot think of any advantages to marriage, they 
choose to remain single. Women are frustrated that they are forced to change their 
lifestyle so drastically after marriage or having children when men do not have to 
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in Japan (Yamada, 1998; Sarada, 1999). Women are more financially independent, 
but in Japan, married women are constrained to stay home and be housewives, 
which prevents them from gaining financial independence, leaving them with 
little choice but unpaid domestic work to take care of family and to be a ‘good 
wife and wise mother’ (Ochiai, 2008; Sechiyama, 2013); it is difficult for women 
to keep a job. 
 
 
Women’s Difficulties in Keeping a Job 
 
There have been several interpretations of the ‘ryosaikenbo’ ideology, either 
justifying the conservative, traditional notion, of keeping women at home, or a 
call for women to claim greater independence (Takahashi, 1994). The 
interpretations very depending on the context of the historical period invoked 
alongside the ideology. The 'danson'johi', which attempted to lay out the terms of 
equality between women and men, has not faded entirely out of sight, though the 
context and interpretation of the idea have changed with time. Although Japanese 
women are not looked down upon just for being women, their presence in the 
modern workplace is still viewed negatively rather than positively (Takahashi, 
1994: 42). Gender inequality is a very troubling concern, even the Japanese 
government has been struggling to resolve this (Ochiai, 2001; 2002). They are 
worried that Japanese culture and traditions will change if women gain total 
financial independence. Ochiai (2000) also asserts that Japanese men are worried 
about women gaining financial independence, because in the traditional household 
model, men work only outside the home and do not share any household or 
child-rearing responsibilities. Even in the west with the number of women in the 
workplace increasing, they are still expected to do the majority of housework 
(Shelton and John, 1996; Hass, 1999; Coltrane, 2000).  
 
Today, even when Japanese women are able to do some paid work, they are 
expected to do the same domestic duties and care work regardless (Takahashi, 
1994). A phenomenon known as ‘housewifization’ emerged in the west and in 
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Japan where most married women assumed the roles of primary housekeepers and 
childcare givers (Ochiai, 2008: 3). Ochiai’s (2008: 174) explanation for the three 
causes of ‘housewifization’ can be found in numerous societies, but is almost 
always caused by unemployment, child care, and managing children’s education. 
With women and children removed from the labour force, men had to earn enough 
to support their entire families, thus becoming the core of the work force 
(Sechiyama. 2013: 33). Sechiyama (2013) also believes that the replacement of 
light industry is another factor that drove women from the labour market; the 
introduction of heavy industry was the beginning of modern labour relations and 
roles.  
 
Ochiai (2008: 5) suggests an opposite of this trend, ‘de-housewifization’ has been 
gradually taking place since the 1970s, marked by increased participation of 
women in the workplace in America and northwestern Europe. This led ‘second 
wave ‘feminists to criticize the gender-based division of labour that had become 
commonplace in many countries (men in the workplace, women at home). 
According to Ochiai (2008), the result has been that modern economic 
development first makes housewives out of women, then expects them to 
‘de-housewife’ and re-enter the work force. It became the dominant paradigm in 
Europe and the West as the category of ‘housewives’ diminished and the number 
of divorces and single mothers rose. In Japan, however, ‘de- housewifization’ has 
not yet been fully realised. In most countries less-educated women have a low rate 
of employment, and more highly educated women have a higher rate of 
employment but in Japan there is only a relatively small increase in female 
employment as education improves (Ochiai, 2008). In Japan, educated and skilled 
women participate in the labour force when they are single, but after marrying, 
they still tend to leave their jobs, even if they are professional workers (Takahashi, 
1994). There are more women professionals leaving their jobs in Japan than in 
most other countries (Hertog, 2008; Ogawa, 2004).  
 
Other highly developed East Asian territories, such as Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
have shown signs of ‘de-housewifization’, though even these countries are similar 
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to Japan in several ways. Most people in those countries work in the main 
metropolitan areas, and like Japan, they have a low TFR (Yu, 2009; Lo, 2003). In 
Taiwan, higher divorce rates have been occurring, which fits Ochiai’s theory of 
the process of de-houswifization better than other East Asian countries; however, 
there has not been yet an increase in single mothers compared with other East 
Asian countries (Tokyo University, 2012). Examining changes in female labour 
force participation rates between 1980 and 2005 in Taiwan, Huang (2009) finds 
that changes in the makeup of the population is a driving force behind the changes 
there. Breaking down the changes by education, marital status and family 
structure, a parallel has been found to the changes in women’s participation in the 
workplace. The number of married women with preschool children has fallen, 
explaining the increase in the number of women participating in the labour force 
(Huang, 2009). Huang (2009) also notes that most of the increase in labor force 
participation can be traced to women with higher education.  
 
Figure 3: Japanese, South Korean and Hong Kong women in the labour force by age  
 
Sources: Databook of International Labour Statistics 2012 
The Japan Ministry of Health, and Labour and Welfare 2010 
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/estatis/databook/ 
 
Japanese female employment over the female life course follows an M-shaped 
pattern (Ato, 1996, Ochiai et al., 2008; Tokuhiro, 2012; Sechiyama, 2013) with 
employment rates peaking in the age ranges of the 20s and again in the late 40s; 
those patterns have not changed. Between 1999 and 2009, more women are 
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fighting to get back to a job. Japanese women’s M-shape on the graph seems to 
have a shallow valley between 1999 and 2012 (see Figure 2) which means more 
women are keeping their jobs than before. This M-shape is showing that fewer 
women are becoming housewives (Sechiyama, 2013). However, it is still common 
for women to leave a job when they have a child and return to the labour market 
after their children start school. Depending on which stage of their life they are in, 
women spent time in the workplace and at home, while men are expected to spend 
most of their lives after graduation in the workplace (Takahashi, 1994: 44). This is 
not only related to fluctuations in the labour market, but as part of the modern 
interpretation of the 'ryosaikenbo' ideology (Takahashi, 1994). Women are still 
expected to concentrate their efforts on the home, and men are expected to give 
priority to their jobs. But as women become older, they are expected to take a 
part-time job and maintain the household and raise the children (Takahashi, 1994). 
This M-shaped pattern is similar to one seen in South Korea, where many mothers 
believe that their infant children’s emotional development would be adversely 
affected if they were placed in public nurseries and not raised by their mothers 
(Ochiai, 2008; Chang, 2008). Many Japanese women believe that children’s early 
years are a crucial time for development, so they stay at home during this 
important time and do not regret doing so (Waldfogel, 1998; Yu, 2009: Ochiai et. 
al., 2008). This is because mothers have sole responsibility for raising children, 
resulting in deep emotional relationships between mothers and children, resulting 
in the introduction, in the Taisho period (1912-1926 ), of ‘bosei’ and ‘bosei-ai’ 
into the Japanese language as equivalents of ‘motherhood’ and ‘maternal love’, 
respectively. This was not the case with pre-modern family traditions (Sechiyama, 
2013: 85). The concept of ‘boseishinwa’ (myth of motherhood) has had a major 
effect in setting gender roles in the Japanese workplace and at home (Takahashi, 
1994: 45). This notion of motherhood does not represent the reality of being a 
mother, but idealises the personal connection between a mother and her children 
(Takahashi, 1994: 45). This ‘bosei’ insists that women follow the traditional 
division of gender roles. Another major influence on the propagation of 
motherhood is the myth known as ‘san-sai ji shinwa’, which was the belief that 
the first three years the most critical time for children to develop physically and 
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mentally (Ochiai, 2008). In Japan it was, and still is, believed to be important for 
mothers to take the responsibility of caring for children during those three years 
because of this myth. ‘San-sai ji shinwa’ was popularised thanks to the work of 
British psychologist John Bowlby (1969), who researched attachment theory. 
However those beliefs and myths led more Japanese women to push to stay at 
home to take responsibility for child care. Is it any coincidence that, as more 
women gained greater access to jobs, suddenly those beliefs, studies and myths 
arose in Japan to push women back from the labour force? Since the end of the 
Meiji period, Japanese women have been told to value having children and 
holding down part-time jobs only, the ‘good wife / wise mother’ model again, 
returning them to the traditional motherhood roles of housework and child care. 
But in Japan they need labour power, so after raising children, women should 
return to work part-time or temporary work, but still could not become completely 
independent in the male dominated society. The career trajectories of women in 
both Hong Kong (see Figure 2) and Taiwan follow an inverted U-shaped pattern, 
where women work in the labour force at the beginning of their careers, then 
suspend working during maternity leave, and return to their jobs upon finishing 
their maternity leave (Cheng, 1997: 28). A high percentage of women in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan work through the period of child-bearing, child-raising years in 
their thirties, while the numbers drop significantly for those in their late forties, 
breaking the M-shaped pattern (Sechiyama, 2013: 257). There are two primary 
reasons fewer women in their late forties participate in the labour force. Women 
can retire five years earlier than men, and wealthier women are making the 
decision to be full-time housewives (Sechiyama, 2013). Whether in socialist or 
capitalist Chinese societies, women typically work while they have small children, 
and then retire early (Sechiyama, 2013).  
 
When the labour force was not large enough in Taiwan, a new demand for more 
female workers toppled the traditional barriers to hiring married women and 
changed the entire labor market as a result (Yu, 2005). Employers began to offer 
married women better positions, which changed how those women sought jobs 
(Brinton 1995; Yu, 2005). In a comparative study of women in the Japanese and 
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Taiwanese labour forces. Yu (2009) found that a greater demand for workers in 
postwar Taiwan employers to provide better incentives to convince housewives to 
leave their homes and rejoin the labour force. During this period, however, female 
workers were concentrated in industries with greater demand for low skilled 
labourers, and more highly educated women were uninterested in returning to 
work (Yu, 2009). Now, however, more educated women are staying in the labour 
force in Taiwan, but not in Japan.  
 
In Hong Kong, women pursue higher education because it directly influences their 
career and their ability to keep a job. When they have a higher education, they 
have a better chance of staying in the labour force; less educated women face a 
greater chance of losing a job (Cheng, 1997: 26), a situation similar to that which 
is faced by Taiwanese women (Ochiai, et. al., 2008). South Korea, ranks even 
lower 64 on the GEM (Gender Empowerment Measure) than Japan (rank 54); 
however, South Korea also has more women working full-time after marriage or 
having children when compared with Japan (Ochiai, et. Al., 2008,). In Japan it 
seems more women are keeping a job than in the past, but the news is not entirely 
positive (see Figure 2) because more women are working part-time or in 
temporary work than before (see Figure 3) which means the inequality gap is 
widening. 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of the Japanese population with part-time and temporary jobs, by age 
and gender 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics Japan 2013 
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/ 
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In Japan, women’s monthly wages were ¥ 203,132 (£ 1587), daily wage was 
¥ 10,635 (£ 83), and hourly was ¥ 1,414 (£ 11); compared with men’s average 
monthly wages of ¥ 429,156(£ 3,353), daily ¥ 21,675 (£ 169) and hourly ¥ 2,541 
(£ 20) (Databook of International Labour Statistics, 2012). This data shows that 
Japanese men are earning double the amount earned by women. There are greater 
pay gaps between women and men in Japan, because more Japanese women are 
forced to settle for part-time and lower-skilled jobs when returning to the labour 
force (Yu, 2009). 
 
Most Japanese women who elect to have children end up leaving their jobs and 
giving up their careers, and sacrifice themselves to take care of their children, 
their homes, and their husbands (Magase, 2002 ; Ochiai, 2001). In Japan even the 
most educated women are often forced to accept menial positions when 
attempting to go back to work after a long absence, which underscores the very 
low job security of women (see Chapter 5). Many companies are looking for 
inexpensive manual labor, and Japanese wives can work at these jobs while their 
children are at school and husbands are at work (Broadbent, 2002; Yu, 2009 ; 
Waldfogel, 1998). The Japanese economy is more developed than Taiwan, but 
there is greater gender equality in Taiwan (Yu, 2009; Ochiai, 2008). Working 
women in Taiwan enjoy a higher status than their Japanese counterparts (Yu, 
2009). In Japan, in contrast, many women still choose to take care of their 
families and children after marrying. Yet, in actuality they have no other options at 
all, so it is not so much a choice as a reality that must be accepted: the expectation 
of women to obey the hierarchy and patriarchy originating during the Meiji period 
remains (Sechiyama, 2013: 76).  
 
 
Lack of Support  
 
Steinberg and Nakane (2012: 26) found in their study that, to stabilize the TFR in 
Japan, the country has no choice but to allow more women into the labour force. 
Steinberg and Nakane (2012) argue that Japan must enact policies that will boost 
the number of female career employees; among advanced countries, Japan has the 
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lowest rate of female managers by far. They also argue that Japan must increase 
support for working mothers, such as flexible work hours, better child care 
facilities and longer maternity leave. This would keep more women in the 
workplace even after childbirth (Steinberg and Nakane, 2012; see Chapter 3). 
Many of the European welfare states have had no choice but to launch systems to 
provide for childcare, an area formerly seen as the sole responsibility of parents 
and, more specifically, mothers (Daly, 2002; Michel and Mahan, 2002). Globally, 
men do more paid work than women; however, women participate in more unpaid 
work than men. Men (80% between age 15-64) participate in more paid labour 
than women (60%) (OECD, 2012). 
 
Table 2: Paid and Unpaid Work among Women and Men 
 
 
 Paid 
Work 
(Minute) 
per day 
Gap 
Paid 
Work 
per day 
Unpaid 
Work 
(Minute) 
per day 
Gap 
Unpaid Work 
per day 
Denmark: Women 
Men  
195 
260 
Men More 
65 
243 
186 
Women More 
57 
Sweden : Women 
Men 
241 
322 
Men More 
81 
249 
177 
Women More 
72 
Norway: Women  
Men 
220 
305 
Men More 
85 
225 
152 
Women More 
73 
Spain: Women 
Men 
246 
334 
Men More 
88 
258 
154 
Women More 
104 
UK: Women 
Men 
200 
325 
Men More 
125 
273 
150 
Women More 
123 
South Korea: Women 
Men 
273 
422 
Men More 
149 
227 
45 
Women More 
182 
Japan: Women 
Men 
274 
478 
Men More 
204 
269 
59 
Women More 
210 
Italy: Women 
Men 
182 
338 
Men More 
156 
326 
103 
Women More 
223 
 
Source: OECD Gender Gap: Act Now in 2012 
http://www.oecd.org/gender/closingthegap.htm 
 
Japanese women participate the most in both paid and unpaid work. However, 
similar research conducted by the National Institute of Population and Social 
Security Research (2010) reported that more than 95 % of Japanese women 
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respondents answered that their ideal husbands should be capable of housekeeping 
and child-rearing and regarded these skills as ‘very important’ or ‘important’. 
South Korea is similar to Japan in this OECD research. Italian women do the most 
unpaid work, however they do much less paid work compared with Japanese 
women. In Japan work-life balance and satisfaction ranked in the bottom third of 
participating countries for OECD; Mexico and Turkey ranked lower, and South 
Korea ranked slightly higher. The same phenomenon of low fertility also occurs 
in Spain and Italy, whose population report a better work-life balance but less 
satisfaction. Schlunze, Hyttel-Srensen and Ji (2011: 108) found in their research 
that, compared to Europe, Japanese workplaces are almost entirely 
male-dominated, with little attention paid to the perspectives, personal feelings or 
quality of life of women. In Japan, the male-dominated society provides very few 
protections and rights for women in the work place, such as job security, flexible 
time, maternity leave, supportive environments for child bearing and holidays (see 
Chapter 3, 5 and 6). From a feminist perspective, gender equality in Japan simply 
does not exist when women want to have both a job and a family (Ochiai, 2001). 
Unless a woman is lucky enough to have an understanding and supportive 
employer, and husband, she faces two challenges in trying to keep a job.  
 
 
Cohabitation and Married Parenthood  
 
It is also culturally not accepted to choose to cohabit or to have a child outside of 
a marriage; there are limited options for Japanese women and men. Today, in the 
west women and men have more opportunities to live together without being 
married (Lewis, 2001). According to Lewis (2001), it is more natural for couples 
in Europe to live together and have children. In the west, there are fewer 
differences between people who choose to have children outside of marriage and 
traditional families, when compared with Japan. In Japan and South Korea, fewer 
than 2% of people are choosing to cohabit, with 70 % opposed to the idea (The 
Japanese National Institute of Population and Social Research; JNIPS, 2010).  
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Table 3: Percentages of unmarried women with a child or children 
 
 COUNTRY 1980 1990 1995 2002 2010 
United States 18.4 28.0 32.2 34.0 35.2 
Canada 12.8 24.4 27.6 28.9 28.9 
Japan 0.8 1.1 1.2(*1) 1.7 2.0 
Denmark 33.2 46.4 46.5 44.6 44.8 
France 11.4 30.1 37.6 44.3 46.2 
Germany (NA) *2 15.1 16.1 (*1) 25.0 28.2 
Ireland 5.0 14.6 22.3 31.1 33.4 
Italy 4.3 6.5 8.1 *(3) 9.7 9.9 
Netherlands 4.1 11.4 15.5 29.1 30.2 
Spain 3.9 9.6 11.1 21.8 23.2 
Sweden 39.7 47.0 53.0 56.0 58.2 
United Kingdom 11.5 27.9 33.6 40.6 45.6 
 
“Families and Work Transition in 12 Countries 1980-2011” Notes: *1 Data are for 2001 instead of 2002.*2 Data are for 
1991 instead of 1990.*3 Data are for 2000 instead of 2002.*3 Data are for 2008 instead of 2010. Source: U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, "Families and Work Transition in 12 Countries 1980-2011" 
http://www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2012/january/competes_010511_0.pdf 
 
When a single woman in Japan becomes pregnant, it seems she only has two 
choices: having an abortion or entering (unwillingly) into a marriage; choosing to 
have an illegitimate child is rarely seen as an option (Hertog, 2008). Marriage is a 
very important family issue in Japan, and it is not generally acceptable to have 
children outside of marriage (Yu, 2002; Sato 2008; Ato; 1999). The Japanese have 
always regarded marrying and having children as the natural order of things (Atho, 
2001; Raymo, 2008). In Japan it is very difficult to be a single parent, especially 
for women, because the family unit is culturally considered to be comprised of 
both parents, and very few support systems exist for families who do not fit the 
mold of the traditional family unit (Hertog, 2008). Table 3 shows that, of 
developed countries, Japan has the one of the lowest rates of births to unmarried 
mothers. In 2010 the percentage of women having children outside of marriage 
was just 2 % in Japan, but 45.6 % in the U.K. The highest was 58.2 % in Sweden. 
This shows that there are fewer differences in the numbers between having 
children outside of and within marriage in Europe quite a contrast with Japan. 
There are some compelling comparisons between European countries and East 
Asia. Japan, along with Korea, Italy, and Spain, tends to have more traditional 
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family structures (Segawa, 2001). 
 
Very few Japanese women choose to be single mothers because there is much 
discrimination against single mothers and their children (Hertog, 2008: 123; Aoki, 
1999 ; Alison, 1994). It is much tougher to be a single mother in Japan than it is in 
the west. Legally single parents and their children with single parents do not have 
the same rights as married couples and their children. Legally, a single woman 
with a child must ask the father to approve and sign the birth certificate. If he 
refuses, the certificate will not list the father, which means the child would face 
more discrimination without a certificate called ‘Kosaki’ (see Chapter 3) which 
shows the entire family tree. Or the mother must go to court to ask for an order to 
retain all legal rights. This is difficult for women due to the time and finances 
involved. Women must continually wage court battles to receive what they are 
legally entitled to, such as child support payments. In Japan, there are far fewer 
such court cases; such cases involving marital, divorce and settlement problems 
are not common, and Japanese women have difficulty standing up for their legal 
rights and consequently suffer greatly from it (Hertog, 2008). As a result, few 
women opt to be single mothers. Those who do are regarded negatively and are 
considered to be careless and irresponsible, whereas single fathers are regarded 
with more warmth and empathy and are considered to be brave (Ochiai, 1998; 
Sato, 2004). When Japanese people apply for a job, that they have to write all of 
their family members’ names, occupations and addresses, which would show 
whether or not the applicant has parents who live at the same address. Some 
companies still check their family members’ backgrounds. These are all reasons 
Japanese women chose not to have a child without marriage.  
 
Women in Japan do become pregnant outside of marriage, but they either marry 
before the child is born, or they opt for an abortion. In 2010 more than one fourth 
(25.4 %) of Japanese brides were pregnant. In 1980 this rate was only 10.6 %, so 
the number has more than doubled since then (MHLW, 2011). If there were fewer 
‘shotgun weddings’, the percentage of people married might be even lower. There 
are fewer options available to Japanese women compared to women in other 
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countries, causing a decline in TFR in Japan. In contrast, women and men in 
European and other western countries have more options available to them such as 
cohabitation and single parenthood when making decisions to have children.  
 
 
Contraception and Health Insurance 
 
Contraceptive pills only became legal in Japan in June of 1999, quite late 
compared to western countries which have been using them since the late 1960s. 
In fact, some contraceptive pills are still illegal in Japan (Goto et., al. 2002). There 
has been little research about and limited access to them, resulting in a dearth of 
information for women (Sato and Iwasawara, 2006). According to the Japan 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in 2010, only 1.8 % of Japanese women 
are using contraceptive pills. Qquantitative studies show that one of Japanese 
women’s one of the main concerns is the possible side effects of contraceptive 
pills (MHLW, 2010). Other quantitative research notes that, compared to other 
countries, awareness is much lower in Japan of women’s right to protect their own 
bodies, including the perception of responsibility of contraception (Cabinet Office, 
Government of Japan Research; COGJR, 2005). In European countries, there is 
more widespread awareness of women’s rights with regard to fertility decisions.  
 
         Table 4: Perceptions of Responsibilities of Contraception 
 
 Women’s 
Responsibility 
Men’s 
Responsibility 
France 89.1% 9.5% 
Japan 15.7% 73.2% 
South Korea 27.6% 64.2% 
Sweden 45.3% 17.5% 
U.S.A 56.5% 28.1% 
 
Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan research, 2005 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/shoushi/cyousa/cyousa.html 
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As seen as Table 4, that most Japanese women rely on men to prevent becoming 
pregnant. However, it is much more difficult for women to access contraceptive 
pills when compared with the west. One major cause might be National Insurance 
card system in Japan. This system perfectly fits the patriarchal family structure in 
Japan. The National Insurance card follows a family system rather than an 
individual system. The information on the family National Insurance Card, known 
as Hokensho in Japanese, includes the main insurance holder’s name and address, 
the city providing the service, expiration date, and the percentages which the 
family must pay and what the national insurance will cover. The main holder 
(normally the husband or father) will be contacted if any of his family members 
go to a hospital and which department of hospital
7
 they went to, as he will be 
partially charged by National Insurance
8
. After seeing a doctor, the hospital 
stamps what department was visited inside the Hokensho. This does not protect 
privacy. Since the main holder of national insurance in a family is usually male, 
this underscores the gender inequality in the male-dominated Japanese society.  
 
 
Figure 5: Paper type of Hokensho (National Insurance Card in Japan) using one for whole 
family type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://stat.ameba.jp/user_images/20110507/17/casaanita/1e/66/j/o0480064011212923175.jpg 
 
 
                                                 
7 There are specialised departments in Japanese hospitals. There is no general practitioner system in Japan. 
8 Typically, people who are employed pay 30 % of all health bills while the national insurance will cover 
70 %. Elderly people and children under 12 years old are responsible for paying only 10 % of health bills, 
with the national insurance paying for 90 %. 
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There is a card type which is for individuals rather than for a family.  
 
Figure 6: Card Type of Hokensho (National Insurance card in Japan) Individual Card Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.kyoukaikenpo.or.jp/11,189,43.html 
 
 
Most of the information of the card holder is the same as the old paper type. It is 
cannot be stamped, so all information is entered via computer which affords 
parents more privacy. The problem with the individual card is that, when a wife or 
her children want to be a National Insurance card holder separate from the head of 
the household, they have to pay higher tax than if there is only one national 
insurance holder per family (see Chapter 6; Appendix IV). This family insurance 
system might be affecting women’s fertility decisions. When women are 
considering having an abortion or want access to contraceptive pills, it is harder 
for them to see a doctor. If women do not have individual insurance, the main 
family cardholder will know who used the card and for what purpose. This makes 
it even harder for women to make own their individual choices; postponing or 
hesitating to see a doctor may have forced women to make fertility decisions they 
might not have made otherwise. Since 1945, approximately 300,000 abortions 
have been performed every year in Japan (MHLW, 2010). In the U.K. in 2010, the 
number of abortions was 196,082 (National Statistic, 2012). In Japan, the official 
number of abortions are probably underestimated because of the National 
Insurance system, which does not reflect the number of illegal abortions.  
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Question for Research 
 
 
When I began this process, I asked myself why Japanese women were choosing to 
have fewer children than before. There could be various reasons, such as Morgan 
and Taylor’s seven findings; however, in Japan’s case, a patriarchal society plus a 
male-dominated family structure might affect fertility decisions. There are gaps 
between what Japanese women want to do, and what their society and family 
expect them to be. When Japanese women struggle against their culture, their 
family feels shame, which means that Japanese women do not choose even if they 
want to do so. Family comes first, and women, wives and mothers find it more 
difficult to make their own decisions, because they have to be concerned with 
their family first and with themselves later, especially after marriage and even 
more so after being mothers, which is why the patriarchal ‘ie’ system still exists in 
Japan.  
 
Sechiyama (2013: 249) notes that every society experiencing falling fertility rates 
has had similar issues: men’s attitudes and the society in general fail to adjust to 
an increase in the number of women in the workplace. But this explanation does 
not take all variables into account, such as Hong Kong, where middle-class 
women employ maids, often from the Philippines, for housework; despite this, 
Hong Kong’s fertility rate is falling even lower than Japan’s (Sechiyama, 2013). 
Sechiyama (2013: 249) argues that simply making it easier for women to return to 
work outside the home will not halt falling fertility rates, nor will a movement 
toward gender-neutral policies.  
 
Using women’s opinions, perspectives and voices at the individual level, I hope to 
find out why women have been choosing to have fewer children or none. What 
has been happening, or what do they need to be changed? What do they really 
want? It is my hope that this research into women’s fertility decisions can 
highlight issues from which women have been suffering.  
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Chapter 2: Gender, Family and Fertility: Why are 
Japanese Women Having Fewer Children? 
 
Research Design 
 
Why qualitative research?  
 
Everyday life, and the way it is structured, organized and limited, 
is experienced differently by people in different geographical 
locations, but especially by women and men, due to the overt 
gender division of Western society. Men fail to realize that the 
knowledge and concepts on which they rely lean heavily on a 
male perspective, rather than being truly objective and neutral. 
Women can see that this knowledge is subjectively masculine, 
but they are frequently excluded from science (Lorber, 1994: 
22). 
 
A male-centred viewpoint of social relations has long been the dominant 
viewpoint as Lorber indicates. Men have done research on women and women’s 
issues, but that research is still conducted from a male perspective, and often fails 
to consider perspectives to which female researchers would be more sensitive. 
The answer is not simply that research should be conducted by women, but it 
should proceed from a feminist viewpoint which values women’s experiences 
over established thinking that keeps traditional male power structures in place 
(Lorber, 1994: 23). 
 
The personal experiences of women are seldom considered part of the academic 
mainstream, and their everyday concerns do not often become part of public 
knowledge (Edwards and Ribbens, 1998). Feminist research has often been 
ignored or regarded as less important by a male-dominated society (Edwards and 
Ribbens, 1998: 2). Feminist researches and studies have previously been treated 
as though they were more of a domestic private matter (Edwards and Ribbens, 
2006), but attitudes are slowly changing and feminist research has developed and 
gained more acceptance in academic research than before (Olsen, 2011: 129).  
Feminism in Japan is often seen as foreign import (Molony, 2010: 90). Though 
initially seen as a threat to Japan’s prevalent right-wing ideology during World 
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War II, ‘transnational feminism’ gained new ground as a dominant form of 
feminism in Japan (Molony, 2010). The Japanese feminist (or ‘feminizumu’) 
movement has been kept weak, and has been limited by traditional perceptions of 
‘ie’ and the patriarchal system’s prescriptive view of motherhood and housewife 
roles (see Chapter 1 and 3), and is tied to a negative image of the 1970s women’s 
liberation (‘uman ribu’) movement (Tokuhiro, 2010). The lack of feminist 
research might be further evidence that the feminist movement has been weakly 
developed in Japan.   
 
This may be one reason why qualitative research has been under-utilised in Japan. 
Feminists tend to favour qualitative research because it places such importance on 
women’s experiences and stories (Jackson, 1998: 48; Maynard. 1994). Feminist 
researchers have relied heavily on qualitative methods to show the perspective of 
the individuals interacting with society (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 16). Very little 
qualitative research has been done on women’s fertility decisions in Japan. Much 
quantitative research has been conducted on fertility in Japan, but this has mainly 
focused on the effect of the declining economy on the already low fertility rate, 
without enough attention on how women’s lives and gender inequality factor into 
the problem. More specifically, the existing research is not focused on women’s 
attitude toward fertility decisions, and is failing to find out why Japanese women 
are choosing, on an individual level, to have fewer children or none at all. In order 
to explore the issues behind the individual fertility decisions made by Japanese 
women, I decided to use qualitative research to discover more of the complexities 
and focus on gender issues and feminist perspectives. There are some areas where 
it is easy to see that women are obviously oppressed and dominated by men, but 
some of the oppression is less visible, and this applies to my research.  
 
Feminist research, by its definition, examines women from their 
own perspective, and includes the researcher in the subject 
matter, with the understanding that the researcher’s views shape 
the research, making it feminist research in the first place 
(Harding, 1987:9). 
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In keeping with Harding’s view, as I have continued working on my research, I 
have realised how important it is to acknowledge feminist perspectives, because 
Japanese women have rarely had any opportunities to discuss their lives openly, 
for cultural and social reasons. Using a qualitative method helped me to explore 
what has not appeared in other research: women’s voice regarding their own 
fertility decisions. Moreover, my research involves not only Japanese women’s 
fertility decisions, but various other aspects of inequality and oppression. Harding 
(1987: 9; also see Edwards and Ribbens, 2006 ) also argues the feminist case that 
traditional belief systems often exclude women as carriers of knowledge or 
participants in science; history and traditional sociology are frequently expressed 
from the point of view of men. Feminist research places a value on women’s 
experiences and social standing as a basis for research, instead of simply 
assuming a male viewpoint (Weston, 1998: 148).  
 
Feminists pay careful attention to how female respondents think about their own 
lives and the lives of men (Harding, 1987; Edwards, Ribbens, 2005; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2011). Behaviors of both genders that might have been regarded as 
insignificant by prior, more traditional, research are analysed to find new patterns 
(Harding, 1987). I chose to use face-to-face in-depth interviews, because I could 
then hear each woman’s voice, allowing me to be flexible in asking about the 
process of making decisions. I hoped to uncover many views of Japanese women 
that were previously kept secret. One-on-one, in-depth interviews are best for 
gathering information about respondents’ experiences and views, particularly 
when the subject matter is of a sensitive nature (Ulin, Robinson and Tolley, 2004; 
Arksey and Kemp,1999). Feminist scholars regard the individual interview as 
being one of the most commonly used, important, and effective research methods 
(Mason, 2004: 62; Finch, 1984; Oakley, 1981; Wilkinson, 1998). In interviews we 
can draw upon our own experiences and understand the feelings of our 
respondents.  
 
Qualitative research can delve more deeply into the issues and bring the process 
of Japanese women’s fertility decisions more into focus. There could be major but 
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unrevealed motives for why fertility rate has been decreasing. For example, 
quantitative research does not show why there are differences between the ideal 
number of children women say they want and the actual number of children they 
do have. Do they really want to have children? If these women do want to have 
children, then why are they choosing not to have them? What do the surveys and 
quantitative research show, and what do they not show? Qualitative research will 
help to clarify the complicated issues behind Japanese women’s fertility choices. 
Japanese women are resisting the oppression of the male-dominated social 
structure by changing their ideas on fertility. It is important to understand 
Japanese women’s individual views in the process of decision making.  
 
Lather (1998: 571) says that the goal of feminist research should be to correct 
both individual and widespread distortions of the female experience. Feminist 
research strives to ‘capture women’s lived experiences and legacy of emphasizing 
in a respectful manner that legitimates women’s voices as sources of knowledge 
(Davies, 1996: 579; Campbell and Wasco, 2000; Stanley and Wise, 1993). Mason 
(2002) argues that qualitative analysis allows the researcher to examine many 
different social factors (such as the research participants’ own daily lives, beliefs 
and what they mean) Preparation is essential in order to focus the interviews 
properly which will optimally benefit the research. It is also very important to 
build a good relationship with participants before conducting the interviews, and 
make them comfortable enough to talk, so I began thinking about how I could do 
this. If the roles were reversed and I was one of the participants, what would make 
me comfortable enough to want to talk to a researcher?  
 
 
Research Strategy 
 
My answer was, if I were one of participants, I would be more comfortable to talk 
to a researcher if I felt I knew and trusted the researcher (see Patton, 2001), and 
not have to speak to a total stranger about my experiences. I decided to conduct 
pre-interviews because in Japanese culture and tradition, ‘trust’ is necessary to 
build a relationship, allowing people to feel more at ease to talk to each other on a 
50 
 
more personal level. I personally met with the participants, so I would not be 
nervous and they would know and trust me prior to the interviews. In an interview 
session, this ultimately allows the researcher to gather a greater amount of 
information from the respondents’ personal narratives (Yoshino, 2005). Chenail 
(2008) noted that conducting pre-interview exercises can improve reliability and 
productivity. The process of scheduling pre-interviews with some of my 
participants by Skype helped me realise that conducting pre-interviews was the 
right decision, since it is important to have face-to-face contact even for a little 
while: ‘It made me feel much at ease’ (Kamiko, married with a child and 
housewife). When it is easier for participants to talk to a researcher, there are more 
opportunities to gather deeper and richer information and to listen to their stories 
(see Patton, 2001).  
 
During the pre-interviews, I gave participants the opportunity to pick which name 
would represent them, so if any of them read my completed thesis, they would 
recognise themselves.
9
 Naturally, the participants did not know each other’s 
names. This helped to build a relationship based on trust, and knowing that they 
might read and check my work later, it put pressure on me to accurately present 
their stories, though I used this as a positive pressure to encourage myself. 
However, this strategy worked well and all of them were happy to choose their 
own names to build a better ‘trust’ relationship.  
 
My advantage was most respondents were interested in me, because I was still a 
student. I could use that interest to my advantage, to satisfy their curiosity, answer 
their questions, and gain enough trust to get to know each other and start a 
conversation. I explained that I was majoring in Women’s Studies in the U.K., and 
that I was researching women’s fertility decisions. I was especially interested in 
Japanese women’s attitudes toward fertility decisions.  
 
 
                                                 
9 Each participant was asked to chose a pseudonym according to the category they fell under: single 
participants were designated with pseudonyms beginning with ‘A-E’; married participants were ‘E-S’; and 
participants living in the U.K. were ‘S’. Unfortunately, there are many names beginning with ‘K’ and several 
of my respondents have similar pseudonyms, e.g. Kamiko, Kimiko, Kiriko, and Kuniko; nevertheless, I have 
a commitment to the respondents to use those names.  
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What are you going to be after those long studies? (Keiko, Married, 
housewife and two children)  
 
I answered:  
I have been told it is natural for women to have a child. I could not agree 
with it since I was a child. And then I studied and studied! I do not know 
what am I going to do (Smiled).  
 
Keiko replied: 
I could study more but I did not have the time like you do. I spent more 
time worrying about getting a job, getting married and having a family, 
typical Japanese women’s path. By the way, I would like to know more 
about women’s studies. Could you tell me more? Being a woman is not 
fair. I am interested in women’s studies. 
  
It was necessary to know each participant’s background before the interviews, so 
we introduced ourselves to one other. In addition, women’s studies is not a 
common or major subject at all, and most universities do even offer it as a course 
of study. There are two universities in Japan offering majors in gender and 
women’s studies. Some of the interviewees said that it was very easy to talk to me 
because they knew me, even though I was not a family member or a best friend. 
The fact that I lived overseas made them even more confident in sharing their 
feelings because they did not feel they needed to worry about their private matters 
spreading around them. Keiko said,  
 
I do not have to worry about my privacy because most of the readers (of 
my story) will be overseas. They do not know me. (Married, housewife 
and two children)   
 
Pre-interviews were the best choice for this research, especially since some 
questions were very private and therefore difficult topics; these things would be 
easier to discuss if the interviewer and respondents had already established a good 
relationship, making it more comfortable to talk about sensitive issues that would 
not be discussed with a total stranger.  
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Sampling and Participants 
 
 
This research used both convenience and purposive sampling. A convenience 
sample is a sample where the candidates are selected in part or in whole, at the 
convenience of the researcher (Babbie, 2001). I had known some of my 
respondents in advance, not personally, but as friends of friends. I avoided 
choosing close personal friends to participate in the research because I wanted to 
make participants comfortable and it was necessary to maintain a professional 
attitude (Woods, 1997). I also used purposive samplings, because it was important 
to interview respondents over a certain age who needed to be serious and were at 
ease to consider their feelings and experiences about marriage and fertility. 
Purposive sampling involves looking for certain characteristics for research, such 
as gender, age, race, class and so on (Babbie, 2001). I am 33 years old, so my 
convenience samples from school would be around same age as myself; this also 
matched the age group needed for my purposive sampling, which made it easier to 
find participants for the research. The target age range for the respondents of my 
research was between 29 and 40. The mean age of first marriage of Japanese 
women is 28.8 and the age of first marriage of Japanese men is 30.5 (Cabinet 
Office, Government of Japan, 2012). The age range was decided in relation to the 
mean age of marriage; after the age of 40, the research shows fewer Japanese 
women are choosing to marry (MHLW, 2010). Purposive sampling techniques are 
carried out in a specific manner, as opposed to in a random fashion (Tashakkori 
and Teddlie, 2003). Researchers often use both convenience sampling and 
purposive sampling techniques when conducting interviews (Morgan, 1998). I 
used the snowballing technique to recruit respondents from my initial pool of 
friends. Snowballing or chain referral sampling, is also a from purposive sampling. 
It involves participants using their own social circles to find additional 
participants to refer to the researcher (Ulin, Robinson and Tolley, 2005). 
‘Snowball’ sampling can help researchers find less obvious participants that other 
sampling techniques might miss (Ulin, Robinson and Tolley, 2005). From a 
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cultural standpoint, using ‘snowball’ sampling makes it easier for respondents to 
talk with a researcher in Japan, because they have some knowledge of each other. 
The important question to ask when deciding about sample size in qualitative 
research is whether the sample provides enough data to allow the research 
questions to be thoroughly addressed (Mason 2002). Deliberately selected small 
samples or individual cases are utilized by the qualitative approach and intensely 
focused upon in the literature (Patton 2002: 230). When employing qualitative 
methods, it is important to choose participants in a rational manner as opposed to 
‘creating a representative sample’ (Carpenter and Suto, 2008). To interpret the 
findings from a convenience sample properly, one must characterize (usually in a 
qualitative sense) how that sample would differ from an ideal sample that was 
randomly selected. I had contacted female classmates from my junior high school, 
high school, university and graduate school by email, phone and Skype prior to 
going to Japan. Two-thirds of my respondents were from Tokyo or a suburb of 
Tokyo, while the remaining third were originally from rural areas and had lived in 
the Tokyo area for at least twelve years. They were all very modern-thinking 
women. If the interviews had taken place in a rural area the results might have 
been different. 
 
In total, I interviewed 22 people in Japan and two in the U.K. Originally the 
interviews were to have been done only in Japan, but I decided to interview two 
more Japanese women in the U.K. after I came back from Japan in the middle of 
February 2010. Their time living and studying in a foreign country would surely 
change their attitudes compared to women who have been living in Japan their 
entire lives. I have already mentioned that Kiyomi had lived overseas. Kiyomi has 
lived a different lifestyle, and has developed an attitude of independence. She has 
been enjoying her married life much more when compared with other participants 
who have lived their entire lives in Japan. This experience made me want to 
interview more Japanese women who live in the U.K. When people have lived 
overseas, they usually become aware of the differences between cultures (Adler, 
1981), gaining practical experience from living within a culture, rather than 
learning about another culture from the outside (Roberts, 1994:12). 
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Table 5: Interview Subjects 
 
 
Name Age 
Marital 
Status 
and 
children 
Years in 
Relation- 
ship with 
a partner 
 
Background 
Education 
and 
Occupation 
Partner’s 
Education 
and 
Occupation 
Akiko 30 
Single 
None 
N/A 
Middle-class family; An older brother and a 
younger sister;  
From a suburb of Tokyo 
High school 
Has a job 
N/A 
Aya 31 
Single 
None 
N/A 
Middle-class family; An older brother; From a 
rural area 
College 
Has a job 
N/A 
Ayako 32 
Single 
None 
N/A 
Middle-class family; An older brother; From 
Tokyo 
University 
Has a job 
N/A 
Chiho 33 
Single 
None 
N/A 
Middle-class family; A younger brother; From 
Tokyo 
University 
Has a job 
N/A 
Chiyomi 34 
Single 
None 
N/A 
Middle-class family; An older brother From a 
suburb of Tokyo 
College 
Has a job 
N/A 
Chiriko 35 
Single 
None 
N/A 
Middle-class family; A younger sister 
From a rural area 
University 
Has a job 
N/A 
Ema 36 
Single 
None 
N/A 
Upper-class family; No brothers or sisters 
From Tokyo 
Graduate 
school 
Has a job 
N/A 
Eri 38 
Single 
None 
N/A 
Middle-class family; An older brother  
From a rural area 
College 
Has a job 
N/A 
Eriko 31 
Married 
None 
2 years 
Middle-class family; A younger brother 
From a suburb of Tokyo 
University 
Housewife 
B.A 
Business 
Kayo 32 
Married 
None 
1 year 
Middle-class family; A younger brother and a 
younger sister; From a rural area 
University 
Has a job 
B.A 
Engineer 
Kayoko 34 
Married 
None 
1.5 years 
Middle-class family; An older brother 
From a suburb of Tokyo 
University 
Has a job 
B.A 
Business 
Kazumi 34 
Married 
None 
3 years 
Middle-class family; A younger brother 
From a suburb of Tokyo 
High school 
Has a job 
B.A 
Business 
Kazuko 35 
Married 
None 
3 years 
Middle-class family; A younger brother 
From a rural area 
University 
Has a job 
B.A 
Engineer 
Kamiko 30 
Married 
1 
2.5 years 
Middle-class family; An older sister and a 
younger brother; From a suburb of Tokyo 
College 
Housewife 
B.A 
Business 
Kimiko 31 
Married 
1 
2 years 
Middle-class family; An older brother and a 
younger sister; From a rural area 
College 
Housewife 
B.A 
Sales 
Kiyomi 32 
Married 
1 
2.5 years 
Upper-class family; An older brother 
From a suburb of Tokyo 
Graduate 
school 
Has a job 
PhD 
Associated- 
Professor 
Kiriko 32 
Married 
2 
6 years 
Middle-class family; An older brother 
From a suburb of Tokyo 
College; Has 
a part-time 
job 
B.A 
Sales 
Kumiko 36 
Married 
3 
8 years 
Middle-class family; An older brother 
From a suburb of Tokyo 
High school 
House wife 
B.A 
Sales 
Keiko 36 
Married 
2 
10 years 
Middle-class family;  An older brother 
From a suburb of Tokyo 
High School 
Housewife 
High School 
Sales 
Saki 38 
Married 
3 
12 years 
Middle-class family; A younger brother 
From a suburb of Tokyo 
College; Has 
a part-time 
job 
B.A 
Engineer 
Sakiko 29 
Single 
None 
0.6 year 
Middle-class family; One younger sister 
From a rural area 
University; 
Has a job; 
Lives in the 
UK 
High school 
Shop 
Assistant 
Suzuko 30 
Single 
None 
1 year 
Middle-class family; One younger sister and 
brother 
From a rural area 
College; Has 
a job  
Lives in the 
UK 
High school 
Plumber 
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As Table 5 shows, ten of the women were single, including the two respondents 
who lived in the U.K., while the remaining twelve were married, including five 
without children. Respondents fell into three categories: single, married without 
children, and married with children. There were no respondents who were single 
mothers or had experienced a divorce. In Japan there is still a lower divorce rate 
and it is even rarer to be an unmarried, single mother (see Chapter 1).
10
 There is a 
higher pre-marital pregnancy rate than previously, but women tend to marry 
before having a child (see Chapter 4). All of the single participants had full-time 
jobs and were financially independent. None of the single respondents had a 
steady boyfriend. Some single participants mentioned that they had boyfriends 
that they would choose to marry, saying that certain life goals must be achieved 
within a particular time frame by a certain age (see below). The respondents who 
were living in the U.K., Sakiko and Suzuko, are living with their partners, which 
is very rare in Japan, and they are enjoying the freedom in their lives. All married 
participants had husbands with higher education, except for Keiko, who has the 
same level of education as her husband. Almost all of the participants defined, 
themselves as middle class, except for two people who have master’s degrees who 
defined themselves as upper class (see Table 5). Japan is the one of the most 
egalitarian countries in the world in terms of income and sharing of wealth 
(Wikinson and Pickett, 2010). Compared to Japan, which has set minimum and 
maximum wage levels, other countries such as the U.S., U.K. and Malaysia have 
larger gapes of income (Wikinson and Pickett, 2010). Japanese people feel that 
they not only share wealth, but also experience being a team at their workplace 
(Nakada, 1995), and therefore the majority of Japanese people, 79.7 %, consider 
themselves to belong to the middle class (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 
2010). One reason for this is that most Japanese people, by definition, actually do 
belong to the middle class. Another reason was that it was very difficult to 
distinguish who was from the upper, middle or lower class. The feudal system was 
eliminated after the 1868 Meiji Restoration (Sugimoto, 2013: 6). From a cultural 
perspective, class is very hard for people to talk about, especially among the upper 
classes, because this is usually regarded as arrogance or boasting. This could be 
                                                 
10
 The divorce rate has been stable at 2 per 100010, which means that there is still not a high percentage 
compared with other developed countries’ and therefore few divorced single mothers. 
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the reason almost all the respondents chose to self-identify as middle class. Suto 
(1997) explains that in Japan people prefer to be in the majority and do not want 
to be in the minority. It is typical in Japanese culture for people often to inquire 
about averages, like the average age of one’s first marriage, of graduation from 
school, and of having one’s first child.  
 
Scheduling 
 
Recruitment was one of the easiest tasks at this stage of my research, and I felt 
very positive that everything would go smoothly. When I decided to conduct 
pre-interviews, I was worried about whether the participants would agree to meet 
me two times, considering how busy they were, but they happily agreed to meet 
twice. I was happy and the research was exciting for me until I had to begin 
scheduling. I had to fit all participants’ pre-interviews and interviews into a very 
tight schedule, taking up much of my time until I left Japan. Before travelling 
back to Japan, I contacted participants by phone, email and Skype, and made 
appointments for pre-interviews. I started to conduct pre-interviews in the last 
week of September 2009, and completed them in the middle of November 2009. 
After finishing the pre-interviews, I began to conduct the interviews. There was a 
risk that I might lose respondents between the pre-interview and the interview. To 
avoid this I kept in touch with them, sending email greetings once a week every 
Friday afternoon. Luckily, I did not lose any contact with my participants between 
the pre-interviews and interviews. All participants replied to me by email after I 
finished conducting pre-interviews. It was good to send and reply to emails, 
because I felt that even taking the time to write a few sentences was worthwhile, 
and it helped to build the connection with participants. After pre-interviews were 
done and during the wait for interviews, one of the participants replied to my 
greeting email, and wrote that she was talking to her friends about the 
pre-interview, and said that her friend had a different view of relationship with her 
mother, which she would tell me about next time. I was amazed because, after 
finishing the pre-interview, she was thinking about it and talked to her friend and 
shared her experiences. The delay between the pre-interview and interview took 
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more time than I wanted or expected to spend, but I am glad I could complete all 
of the interviews. I had intended to return to the U.K in January 2010, but I finally 
completed interviews in February 2010.  
 
Scheduling was one of the most difficult aspects of research, and I needed to be 
patient because I was interviewing each participant twice. I particularly did not 
want to mix pre-interviews and interviews because the pre-interviews could give 
me a chance to learn from them and arrange better interviews afterwards such as 
changing and adding questions and preparing vignettes to make better follow-up 
interviews. I wanted to have as much experience as possible through the 
pre-interviews. So, I had to wait until pre-interviews were completed. Many of the 
respondents were working long hours, including weekends. We set our interview 
on a Saturday for some people, particularly those working outside of their homes, 
because Saturdays and Sundays are usually days off, but some of them suddenly 
had to work on Saturday and had to postpone the appointment for both the 
pre-interview and interview, so it took longer than expected to complete both their 
pre-interviews and interviews. 
 
Moreover, I learned from the pre-interviews; I saw one participant per day during 
each pre-interview except on weekends, when I met two participants, one in the 
morning and one in the afternoon. When making the weekend appointments, I had 
to make sure they were spaced out enough to allow for any extra time that was 
used by the first appointment of the day. Some participants insisted upon a certain 
day, so sometimes there was little choice, but fortunately no one had to wait. 
Pre-interview questions were much simpler and more general, but despite the 
pre-interview having fewer questions, it took an average of 2 hours, longer than I 
had expected. I originally expected each pre-interview to last an average of one 
hour. After pre-interviews, I knew that I wanted to complete interviews as soon as 
possible because my schedule had been delayed. However, I knew through my 
experiences with the pre-interviews, that the interviews would require a full day. 
Of course, after one pre-interview, I was tired but I had a second pre-interview 
scheduled some weekends, which was a very exhausting experience.  
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In terms of scheduling, parents were most concerned about scheduling the 
pre-interview and interview. Participants who had a child or children preferred to 
conduct their interviews in the morning, at about 10am, and finish about noon. 
Those who had a job, even if it was only a part-time job, preferred weekdays, but 
they had to schedule during a day off from work. Participants who were single 
would be more flexible. All married participants asked me to schedule their 
interviews on weekdays, because they have children and husbands to consider. 
When some participants told me ‘I have to consider my husband,’ I thought they 
wanted to spend time with their husband, but it was often for different reasons: 
because participants have husbands who do not take care of the children, or they 
have to spend more hours taking care of their children on the weekends, since the 
schools and nursery close for the weekend. Other respondents who mentioned a 
husband do not have a child or children, but are expected to clean the house and 
do housework over the weekend because they are married, even though they have 
a job. Only married participants with jobs but no children wanted to schedule 
interviews on weekends. One participant who has a full-time career also preferred 
a weekday so she could make time for work, and because she wanted to spend 
time with her child (Kiyomi). Kiyomi’s case was totally different from other 
married women with children. Financially she did not need to work, but works 
because she wants to. Her husband is educated, wealthy and could provide a 
comfortable life for the family on his wage alone. He is also more supportive 
about doing domestic work than other participants’ husbands. She also mentioned 
‘spending more quality time’ with her child, while the majority of other 
participants said they ‘have to take care of children and their husband’ and 
domestic work. Kiyomi has a more comfortably affluent life because she is able to 
share roles with her husband. Other participants were possibly pressured to meet 
on weekdays, when their husbands were at work; where help and support at home 
were concerned, a husband is considered another child (see Chapter 3). One 
government study showed that a disadvantage of married life was that women 
spent less time with friends and family, and that one of the top reasons why they 
do not have time after marriage is because they have to take care of children and a 
husband (MHLW, 2010). For instance, Table 6 shows how one participant, Saki 
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(married, has children and part-time job) spends her time every day.  
 
Table 6: Saki’s Daily Activities 
 
Time 
For 
herself 
For all of 
the family 
Duties for her husband Duties for her children 
5:00 a.m.   A lunch box for him and breakfast   
6:00 a.m.   
Wake husband up and be ready to send him to work, 
preparing his clothes, lunch bag and so on.  
 
6:40 a.m.   Take him to a train station by car.   
7:00 a.m.     
Wake children up and make 
breakfast for them. 
7:45 a.m.    
Send two children to  
school.  
8:00 a.m.  Laundry   
Take one child to nursery by 
bicycle.   
8:30 a.m. 
Eat 
breakfast  
Laundry   
8:45 a.m. 
Goes to a 
part-time 
job 
   
9:00 a.m. - 
1:00 p.m. 
Work    
1:30 p.m. - 
2:00 p.m. 
 
Grocery 
shopping 
  
2:15 p.m. 
Eat lunch 
at home 
   
2:30 p.m.  Cleaning    
2:45 p.m.    Pick up child from nursery.  
3:00 p.m.  
Cleaning 
or finish 
laundry 
 
Two other children come 
home from school; 
preparing snack for them.  
4:00 p.m.    
Take children to private 
classes: swimming, writing, 
English, mathematics, 
martial art class and 
dancing.   
6:00 p.m.    Cooking dinner for children 
7:00 p.m. Eat dinner   Sit with children for dinner  
7:30 p.m. – 
8:00 p.m. 
   
Check children’s homework 
after dinner  
8:00 p.m.   
Pick her husband up from train station with children by 
car 
 
8:15 p.m. - 
9:00 p.m. 
 
Wash 
dishes  
Prepare dinner for husband 
Watching TV and play 
games with them and give 
each child a bath  
8:30 p.m.    
Read a book to help one 
child go to sleep 
9:00 p.m. - 
9:30 p.m. 
  Prepare hot bath for husband 
Make sure two children go 
to bed and sleep 
9:30 p.m.  Ironing  Making a drink for husband  
10:00 p.m. 
Take a 
bath 
   
10:30 p.m.   Make drinks for husband again  
11:00 p.m. 
Goes to 
sleep  
 Help husband sleep  
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When I was making an appointment to talk to her via Skype, I found out about her 
everyday routine. It is easy to see that she does not have any time for herself when 
she is using all of her time for necessary activities such as working and eating. At 
this point, it crossed my mind: what about her husband? Japanese men work 
longer hours than in western countries (see Chapter 1) but my participants work 
longer than men (see Chapter 1 and 4). It may also be that Japanese men are able 
to work such long hours because of the way they use Japanese women to do work 
at home. Women’s care work is always unrecognized because, even in parts of the 
world where women are part of the labour force, the cultural assumption is that 
men have the main responsibility of working and earning money, and women’s 
main responsibility is care work (Jackson and Scott, 2002: 86; Lewis, 2002 ). 
After I heard Saki’s daily routine, I felt very emotional, and it made me feel that I 
cannot waste her time or her stories, because they appear to be every woman’s life 
story. Saki’s daily activities involve much more work, whereas Kiyomi’s daily 
activities are much more independent (see Chapter 3). Saki met me when she did 
not have to go to her part-time job. Most of the participants were very busy, so I 
had to choose a convenient time and place for them.  
 
 
Choosing the Location  
 
The location of the interviews should be comfortable, friendly, quiet, private and 
convenient for the respondents. A nice and quiet a Café was chosen for the 
pre-interviews in a suburb in Tokyo, which was more convenient for commuting, 
and not as crowded as central Tokyo. I was concerned about the sound level at the 
Café, but it was manageable. For interviews, I reserved a quiet, empty flat that my 
parents own in a suburb of Tokyo which is easily accessible. It took all of the 
respondents less than one hour to commute one-way for the interview and 
pre-interview. The location of the pre-interview was different from the interview, 
because I wanted to meet them in a public place first to allow them to feel more 
relaxed and less pressured. However, the setting of my interviews was more 
private. My parents live on the top level of the apartment; I used the place just 
below. Participants could bring their children to the interview but most of them 
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did not. I asked why they were uncomfortable bringing children with them, since 
my mother would be happy to take care of them during our interview. I also told 
them, with a laugh, that I was asking since my mother has three grand children, 
and she raised me and I had turned out all right, so they should not worry whether 
she would be able to take care of them. One of respondents said, I did not want to 
create trouble for you (Kumiko, married housewife with 3 children). Even if I was 
asking for their time to conduct an interview they were considering others, which 
is a very typical Japanese response. Two respondents brought their children, and I 
asked their permission to take the children to my mother. Both agreed. Neither the 
respondents nor I were concerned about the length of time of the interview or 
even when they could come. There was a kitchen and a toilet. During the 
interviews, I offered participants some tea, coffee and soft drinks, and some lunch 
and dinner my mother brought to us when I asked. Some respondents turned down 
the offer of lunch and dinner, and preferred to keep to the interview. I thought 
participants might feel uncomfortable to ask for something to eat during the 
interview, especially since my mother was providing food, so I asked to go out to 
eat or order something from there, but none of them wanted to order or go outside 
during the interview. I provided some snack food, sandwiches, rice balls and some 
cookies on a table. If any respondent had preferred another place, such as a café or 
park, I would have been happy to move to any more convenient and suitable place 
for them. I conducted twenty interviews in the flat near Tokyo, and two interviews 
in a café in the UK. I chose quiet and private areas of the cafés. When I was 
choosing locations and asking permission to use my parents’ empty flat, my 
mother reminded me to bring ‘omiyage’ (souvenirs) for my respondents and not to 
forget Japanese etiquette.  
 
 
Interviews and Etiquette 
 
Before leaving the U.K., I prepared gifts for participants, including leaf tea 
(approximately £5) and shortbread (approximately £10). This is our custom, and 
though it is not often mentioned, it is normal ordinary behaviour, not because I 
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was asking them to be interviewed, but because I was in the U.K. and would 
expected to bring ‘omiyage’ back to those in Japan who have never visited, to 
show them different things. I chose leaf tea and shortbread because those are well 
known and I guessed that most people would like them. I did not choose tea-bags 
because they are easier to get hold of in Japan and leaf tea would appeal more to 
an efficient tea culture. I had nearly forgotten about the ‘omiyage’ system. Nobody 
would have said anything if I had not brought it to them, but it is offensive not to 
display good manners, especially since I was asking to interview them at this 
point. It is a good gesture and good manners to bring something back from one’s 
travels abroad. Most Japanese people expect this. All my participants were very 
happy receiving my omiyage from the U.K. It may have helped to show them that 
I am a reasonable person. This custom is much less common in western countries. 
It might be mistaken for asking for favouritism by some people in western 
countries. In my own experience, when I lived in the U.S.A. and a professor asked 
what we were doing during summer vacation, I told him I was going back home to 
Japan. I brought classmates and the professor ‘omiyage’. He told me ‘I cannot 
accept it’. I was shocked to learn of this different cultural perspective. 
 
I also offered to pay commuting expenses when scheduling pre-interviews 
because the majority of employers pay for commuting, even if workers only have 
part-time jobs. Japan’s commuting expenses are among the highest in the world 
(see Chapter 5). For instance, in the U.K., there are one-day bus tickets, train day 
tickets, and off-peak tickets, and ways of saving money on tickets for a day out, 
but not in Japan; however, all of the participants refused my offer to pay these 
expenses. Most participants told me ‘Please don’t joke with me about taking 
money from you’ Or ‘You are student, I cannot take money from you’. At the time I 
accepted their kind offer, but after each interview I felt bad that they were 
spending any money on participating in my interviews, since one of the topics was 
economic matters: some participants do not have any personal money. On the 
other hand, some my participants felt bad about the fact that I had spent money to 
bring them omiyage’ (souvenirs) despite being a student. ‘You are a student, and 
spending money for the research and the omiyage and so on, please keep the 
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money and use it for your study’ (Saki, married with children, part-time).When I 
finished each interview, I offered one more time to cover their commuting 
expenses, but no one would accept it. I had guessed they would not accept my 
offer to cover their commuting expenses; however, it is good manners and a kind 
gesture, to offer ‘Tatemae’, even if only for the sake of politeness. Those last 
preparations highlight the importance of taking into account the customs of the 
local culture when conducting field work.  
 
 
The Interview Process  
 
Creating Rapport 
 
One concern was that some of my participants were older than I was. In Japanese 
culture, this is called ‘nenko-joretu’ (age hierarchy), which involves respecting 
those older than oneself. I always used a polite way of speaking when I was 
talking with all my participants at first, but some participants told me ‘not to be 
too polite’. When I was told not to be polite I used a more casual way of speaking 
Japanese because I was told ‘that formal Japanese speaking makes me more 
nervous’. It gave me an advantage, as a student, in speaking to older interviewees. 
I felt they would tell me and teach me much more about Japanese social structures. 
I was often told ‘Don’t do that’ such as: don’t marry someone unless they support 
you not only financially, but by cooperating and supporting you at home, which is 
much more important. I felt like older sisters were telling me their experiences 
and teaching me to make better decisions for myself. I do not have any sisters, so 
it was very interesting, and sometimes I was moved by their thoughtful advice. 
One of my respondents told me, ‘Don’t make the same mistake as I did’ (Keiko, 
married with children, housewife). I was not sure if she was joking or being 
serous at first, so I smiled and nodded my head. Keiko added, ‘I am serious, 
okay?’ At this point I could see she was trying to give me serious advice. Most of 
my participants were near my age, so it was easy to interview them, and they were 
relaxed enough to share some similar experiences as well. It is easier to share 
ideas and experiences in a woman-to-woman interview, though it was more 
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important to listen closely than to build a relationship (Reinharz and Chase, 2001: 
226). During the interview process, I tried to focus on paying attention and 
allowing participants to talk, instead of spending too much time sharing my 
experiences. I was occasionally aware of forming ‘sisterly bonds’ with 
interviewees (Oakley, 1981 cited in Reinharz and Chase, 2001: 229). Reinharz 
and Chase (2001: 229) warn against confusing rapport, which is necessary for 
interviewing, with forming more intense bonds, since women often find it easier 
to socialize with others. I was very lucky that my respondents and I could share 
similarities and different experiences; whether they were married or single did not 
matter, since Japanese women share enough common experiences with inequality 
and oppression by men and male social structures (see Chapter 1).  
 
It helped me that also we could share interests; each interviewee was interested in 
my study and had an understanding of my aims, which can make a major 
difference in the answers and the resulting research (Patton 2001). Pre-interviews 
helped my research, since I developed relationships with my participants, and in 
the interviews, respondents told me many stories and experiences, and sometimes 
shared their friends’ experiences and stories also. I was amazed how many of the 
women’s stories I could gather.  
 
My interviews were flexible and conversational two-way communications. During 
the interviews, we could discuss a matter when it comes up, but generally all 
respondents were asked the same questions, to allow me to see both the 
differences and similarities in their decision making processes. When we were 
talking about cohabitation, some participants did not know why I was asking, 
because it is not common for Japanese couples to cohabit or have a child together 
without marriage. Only three participants were familiar with cohabitation because 
of their experiences of living abroad (Sakiko, Suzuko and Kiyomi). Sakiko and 
Suzuko live in the U.K., and Kiyomi had lived in Germany. Some of them asked 
me about cohabitation in western countries. Their facial expressions were 
surprised, and later changed to confusion. One participant asked me, ‘What is 
marriage for them?’ (Eri, single, full-time job). It was a difficult question for me, 
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because if I had never lived abroad, I would never have thought about it. If I had 
never seen or experienced it, I am not sure I could have understood. It helped me 
to review my literature and experiences of living in western countries before 
answering. This experience with two-way communication helped me to gauge my 
participants’ interest in my research. They seemed happy to learn about different 
cultures. Some participants had never done any travelling abroad, so the stories 
were even more surprising for them to hear. One participant, Saki, said, 
 
‘It is depressing me. I wish I were single and younger I could travel all 
over. I feel I live in a small world ‘(Married with children, has a part-time 
job).  
 
She is still young (age 38) and talked as if her opportunities for travel were over. 
She cannot do anything because of her marriage and her children. In her situation, 
marriage is the end of freedom, and she describes her life as a small world. She 
also added that she always does the same routine, there is never any excitement, 
and she feels she cannot do anything anymore. All she can do is focus on her 
family. There are similarities in many Asian countries in the expectation that 
women and mothers will give up their careers, independence and dreams after 
marriage or having children. Research conducted by Wei (2011: 114) examined 
the lives of Chinese women who emigrated from China to the U.K to support their 
husbands and provide better lives for their children, but gave up their social 
standing and careers in China. These women’s situation is best summed up as 
living not for themselves, but to be satisfied living for their families (see Chapter 
3). This is similar to life for women in Japan, however, Chinese women are able to 
find much more work outside and have a better chance to keep their career than 
Japanese women (see Chapter 1).  
 
Rapport between the researcher and respondent is not a one-way street but a 
two-lane avenue of communication (Patton, 2001). The semi-structured interviews 
allowed for some spontaneous questions, but also allowed some respondents to 
express themselves on sensitive issues (Woods, 1997). These interviews also put 
respondents at ease, as they may feel more comfortable revealing information in a 
conversation than they would be filling out a form or a survey (Woods, 1997). 
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Both the pre-interviews and interviews featured open-ended questions. Reissman 
(1993) emphasises that interviewers should avoid using leading questions in order 
not to adversely affect their subjects’ responses. An informal, casual conversation 
is better suited for this purpose as opposed to a more rigid question-answer 
session. Spontaneously asking questions and organically interacting with the 
subject is a normal part of the researcher’s information-gathering process (Gall, 
Gall, and Borg, 2003). In this approach, the researcher does not guide the process 
with specific questions, allowing the respondent to determine the direction of the 
interview (McNamara, 2009; Woods, 1997). The respondents tell the interviewer 
stories and their opinions, but the interviewers must be non-judgemental, must not 
argue with the respondents, and must be flexible and open-minded (Mason, 2002). 
It is sometimes an issue for researchers to avoid bias, and steps must be taken to 
maintain objectivity (Patton 2001). Reinharz and Chase (2001: 226) note that 
during interviews, the participants and interviewer may share similar experiences, 
but it does not mean they have the same or similar opinions. This sometimes 
happened to me during interviews, but I had to remember that to achieve my goal, 
I had to provide a forum for voices who do not often get to tell their stories’ 
(Sprague, 2005: 120). I did not want to ignore anything because of my viewpoint 
was different from my respondents’ perspectives. Those different views might be 
lead to find new findings, so I paid careful attention to what my participants said. 
Two participants, one of whom is married and the other single, told me similar 
surprising stories. 
 
I would divorce my husband; if I were totally alone I would not have to 
respect my family (Keiko, married with children, housewife). 
 
If I did not have any family, I would already have married and divorced 
at least a couple times (Sakiko, single, has a job lives in U.K).  
 
Both of them immediately added that they love their families, but there are 
obligations not to choose that way, restrictions and expectations tied in with 
family. They would like to do it but they will not do it, or it would be too hard to 
do. I was nearly rushing to ask “why do you not do it?” But I waited a while so 
they would talk in more detail about it, perhaps indirectly. Meantime I was trying 
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not to show them my surprise or my emotions on my face, and tried to prepare for 
the next question. I was not expecting one other participant, Sakiko, to say that 
she would have been married and divorced if she did not have a family. Decision 
making would be easier for her if she did not have any family. Even if they are 
independent, grown up adults, it is difficult for them to make their own decisions. 
Keiko added at last, ‘we are women at the end of the day’. I asked her, ‘Could you 
describe for me your feelings about being a woman, please?’  
 
‘We cannot do what we want to do. I feel that my elder brother has made 
mistakes and is more accepted, but for me it would not be acceptable. 
Especially with big events, like marriage, now it would not be accepted. 
Women always seem to be oppressed, and we cannot make our own 
decisions, which is not fair. Women have to consider family more than 
themselves’. (Keiko, married with children, housewife) 
 
 
Keiko feels her marriage was a mistake; however, she cannot confront that fact. 
She prefers to be silent, even though she says she is not happy. I was not 
expecting such an outcome. I felt upset, but tried not to be judgemental about why 
neither Sakiko nor Keiko could choose what they wanted; my goal was to try to 
understand what they want. Bearing in mind McCracken’s (1988) caveat that 
qualitative interviews could be ‘time consuming’, ‘privacy endangering’, and 
‘intellectually and emotionally demanding’ for participants, I remained sensitive 
to the needs and emotions of each person. I was sometimes emotional when I 
learned that some participants were pushed to leave a full-time job after marriage 
or having a child (see Chapter 3). I read a great deal of literature on gender 
inequality in Japan before embarking upon the research, but it was only after 
conducting personal interviews that I fully came to appreciate how Japanese 
women are compelled to live with inequality and discrimination.  
 
 
Asking Questions  
 
 
When I designed questions for pre-interviews, I had decided to start out with 
introductions, so it would be easier for participants to talk about themselves freely 
and to ask them to introduce themselves instead of asking general questions. 
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Unfortunately, this turned out to be a mistake. One participant was very quiet and 
demure, telling me only her name and her age. She told me ‘I do not know what to 
say’ (Chiho, single, has a full-time job). So, I changed my plan on the first day of 
pre-interviews. I told Chiho, ‘OK, I was being rude; I should have introduced 
myself first. I will introduce myself now,’ telling her my age, where I am from, 
marital status, relationship, and family background; my aim was to demonstrate to 
my participants that I would share with them too, because it was necessary to 
build trust. It worked very well and participants listened to my introduction. 
Sometimes participants forgot, or did not want to tell me, about their relationships, 
especially for single participants, which I wanted to find out. After making 
introductions, I asked single participants if they have a boyfriend or not. One of 
single participants who did not tell me about her past relationship, Akiko, ‘I forgot 
my last relationship long time ago, that’s why I did not tell you. I did not mean I 
am hiding’ (Smile) (single and has a full-time job). I made a list on paper and had 
it in my hand, marking the paper with a check mark when each respondent 
answered. So, I could check what information I had, and what was missing. If 
they did not tell me, I could see a list of notes and ask them later on. I made 
questions following a general life course. I wanted to ask respondents about their 
relationship with their mothers and the differences between their own education, 
work, and expectations from those of their mothers. This would show not only 
whether the relationship was close, but would provide more detail of what women 
learn from their mothers, what experiences they share, and how this affects their 
fertility decisions, the experience of being single, meeting a partner, deciding 
whether or not to marry, life as a married couple, and making fertility decisions 
(see Appendix I). The pre-interview session essentially consisted of general 
questions to get to know respondents, and it was also an opportunity to 
experiment with using vignettes.  
 
Using the experience I gained from the pre-interview sessions, I changed and 
added some questions (see below) for the main interviews. The questions in the 
main interview were related to more specific topics and themes, such as the 
advantages of being single or married and the disadvantages of being single or 
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married (see Appendix II). I could also find out more about my respondents’ 
experiences, opinions, and future plans. The questions in the main interviews 
followed a general life course. 
 
I made a Table for questions for main interview (see Appendix II) which was 
divided into four different categories of participants; the questions I asked in the 
pre-interviews helped to categorise each participant prior to interviews: those who 
are single without a steady boyfriend, those who are single with steady boyfriend, 
those who are married without any children, and those who are married with a 
child or children. This was order to prevent confusion over which participants 
should be asked which questions. Some of the questions would not be applicable 
to all participants, such as the process of meeting a husband, experience of 
married life, how income was affected after having a child etc., because not every 
participant would have gone through all of those experiences. However, there 
were some equivalent questions, like asking about the ideal number of children, 
attitudes toward conception, opinions of shotgun weddings, intimacy and sexual 
experiences, and attitudes toward using oral contraceptives and abortion. I 
planned to ask about experiences dealing with intimacy or abortion toward the end 
of the main interview; I wanted to begin with more general, easier-to-answer 
questions before delving into more sensitive areas. The last was explored through 
a series of sensitive, experimental vignette questions to reveal their opinions about 
pregnancy among unmarried young women, and I hoped that the depersonalised 
questions would allow them to give their honest opinions (see Appendix III).  
 
Many quantitative studies show fertility decisions as the result of economic issues, 
gender roles, gender inequality and welfare policies. I asked a question in the 
hopes of discovering more about their childhood experiences and what they want 
to pass on to their children. I also posed ‘what if’ questions. I asked them what 
they would change if they were the Prime Minister, hoping it would lead to their 
specific opinions, revealing what is most important for them, and why they are 
choosing to having fewer children, if any. I also wanted to find out from my 
participants what would have to change for them to be happy to have a child or 
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more children. 
 
 
Pre-interviews  
 
After pre-interviews, I had a great opportunity to prepare for the much longer 
in-depth interviews using my pre-interview experiences and new findings. Some 
questions resulted in more silence than other questions, and I learned from some 
mistakes I made during pre-interviews. After the pre-interviews, I needed to 
change some questions for the interviews, for instance, in pre-interviews I asked 
‘What kind of contraception do you use?’ All of them told me they used a condom. 
I was expecting this response because Japan has some of the highest usage of 
condoms, because it is very hard to access other contraception for women when 
compared with western countries (see Chapter 3). However, I wondered if they 
wanted to use different types of contraception without relying on men. I could not 
hear any of the respondents’ voices, because my pre-interview questions were not 
structured to take note of their voices or attitudes toward contraception. So I made 
a note to remind myself to add a question during the interview, ‘How do you feel 
about oral contraceptive pills?’ There are many incidents of premarital pregnancy 
in Japan (see Chapter 1). Those questions might help reveal why Japanese women 
do not opt for contraceptives where they could take control, as opposed to relying 
on men to use contraceptives. Some of my respondents told me that some of them 
are scared to take other forms of contraception, because of the image of oral 
contraception pills in media talk about side-effects for women (see Chapter 3). 
However some of respondents would like to use or should have used other 
contraception so they did not have to rely on men, but access to those alternate 
forms of contraception are limited. One respondent said, ‘I did not have to be 
pregnant if I was using contraceptive pills’ (Keiko, married with children and 
housewife). Keiko was pregnant before marriage, but after she found out, she and 
her husband were married before the birth of their child. She would not have 
married him if she was not pregnant at the time, she added. The male-dominated 
social structure and family system (the one family insurance card) has been 
blocking access for women to choose their contraception, even though women 
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have the right to make that decision (see Chapter 1 and 4).  
 
Another example that illustrates the benefit of conducting a pre-interview and 
adding questions afterward was that one pre-interview question concerned the 
issue of class. The majority of respondents described themselves as middle class  
except for two participants who had masters’ degrees (see Table 5), so I made a 
note of it and decided to add a question to ask respondents to describe the upper 
class. When asked if they felt they had enough money, the majority of participants 
said ‘More than enough money’. One respondent, Keiko (middle-class, married, 
children and housewife) said, ‘more than enough with only the father’s single 
income and they have never worried about money’. Keiko specifically did not 
count the mother’s income to describe class. She also used herself to describe her 
definition of upper class: she thinks that, when she goes back to the labour force 
(which will be soon), her job will be part-time and she cannot imagine that her 
lower wages will contribute toward making her family upper class. Her image of 
upper class is that the wife is staying at home as a housewife for the rest of her life. 
She needs to work for financial reasons, so she told me she is thinking about 
going back to work soon, even if the job is meaningless for her compared to when 
she was single and enjoyed a job (see Chapter 4). Adding these questions to the 
interviews improved the interviews overall, leading to more findings. 
 
I also realised that taking notes was useful during the pre-interviews to remind 
myself (see above) to pay attention to any change in the participants’ attitudes, 
behaviours, tone or pitch of voice, or their eyes in response to a question. It was 
important for me to maintain body language which was open and emotionally 
neutral: nodding, smiling, showing that I was listening, and occasionally 
encouraging respondents to continue (Britten, 1999). These notes were taken 
because it was important to acknowledge changes in human behaviour during 
each interview, because the recorder would not show those behavioural changes. I 
noted how participants’ behaviours changed when asked a specific question, so 
when analysing I could add emphasis that would be easier to understand in the 
circumstances. The first time I realised this was when a participant asked me a 
72 
 
question and I said something and she smiled; I realised it again when I asked ‘do 
you have a child or children?’ Some respondents’ facial expressions and posture 
changed when they answered, so I knew that adding a note would be useful for me 
to improve analysing my research. I also decided to take notes during interviews, 
but I tried not to focus too much on that aspect. I would lose focus on my 
participants’ stories, meaning I would lose track of questions, affecting my 
research. 
 
At first, it was mentally exhausting, and I felt I was using a different side of my 
brain than usual. In the beginning, I was nervous about conducting a good 
pre-interview, but my nervousness was soon alleviated because most of the 
respondents were happy to talk with me very openly. The pre-interviews took an 
average of two hours (the longest one was 3.5 hours and shortest one was one 
hour), which was longer than I expected. At the beginning of each pre-interview,  
I also asked the interviewees for their permission to record all of their 
pre-interviews. I believe that in Japanese culture, it is better to record and to ask 
for permission verbally, rather than securing written permission. In Japan there are 
fewer written contracts than in other cultures. If I had asked for written permission 
I might have scared off potential respondents and would thus have negatively 
influenced this research. I also mentioned them only I would be able to access 
those both pre-interviews and interviews. I also assured my interviewees that all 
of their responses would be anonymous and confidential, and thus hoped to gain 
their trust. I had clarified that everything would be confidential and that some 
parts of their background stories might be changed, but most of the respondents 
asked me to not identify them.  
 
Some of the interview questions were sensitive, so before that I wanted to try 
using vignettes during pre-interviews to see how useful they would be (Appendix 
III). It was very useful to depersonalised the questions. Moreover, one respondent 
did not know how to react after I read one of the vignettes during a pre-interview. 
Akiko (single and has a job) said, ‘I will think about it till next interview’, and 
then she remembered and told me what she thinks. I was quite surprised my 
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participants felt the need to take responsibility for my research. I greatly 
appreciated it. Interviewees can become more comfortable talking to the 
interviewer after a pre-interview meeting. 
 
 
Interviews 
 
Each interview was expected to last at least two hours because the pre-interview 
was much simpler and consisted of fewer questions. Most took more time than 
expected sometimes as long as six hours. The average interview length was about 
four hours, while the shortest was about one and a half hours. During the 
interviews, the respondents spoke at length most of the time. As with the 
pre-interviews, I asked permission to record before starting the interview. I felt 
relaxed, because I was already prepared from conducting the pre-interviews and 
felt more confident in interacting with my respondents. Before each interview I 
was already somewhat familiar with their interests and opinions, allowing me to 
hear their viewpoints. I also felt that it was nice and fresh to see each other after 
some time had passed since the pre-interview. One participant, Saki, told me ‘It is 
my fourth time
11
 to see you. I missed you (Smile). We are not strangers anymore’. 
She also suggested that it could be interesting to have a group discussion to talk 
and share our experiences. At the time I thought this might be a better idea than 
individual interviews, but I changed my mind because Saki is a very sociable, 
outgoing person and she loves to share her experiences, but some respondents 
were quieter and shy and it would have been easy to miss their opinion. It is also 
because some participants might not like to share their experiences due to 
concerns for their privacy.  
 
Kiyomi’s (married with a child and full-time career) case was again very rare; 
when I met and greeted here, before recording had even begun, she told me: 
 
My husband and ‘our child’ are making dinner for me while I am 
being an interviewee (Smile).  
                                                 
11 At first I contacted the participant by Skype to make the appointment for the pre-interview. The second contact was the 
pre-interview, the third time was confirmation of the interview by Skype, and the forth time was the interview.  
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This sentence was very important for three reasons: (1) She looks very happy and 
smiled. I had not asked her, but she started to tell me. (2) She has a very 
supportive husband who helps with domestic work and teaching, while the 
majority of other women complained that their husbands only play with the 
children, or they do have nothing to do with the children. (3) Only she used the 
phrase ‘our child’, while other participants specifically said ‘my child’ or ‘my 
children’. That choice of words implies that the children and the responsibilities 
that go with them belong to women, while only easy tasks, and keeping the family 
name, belong to their husbands. Women sometimes use unusual wording to 
explain their situations, ‘translating’ their experiences to explain their perspective 
(DeVault, 1990: 96). Listening to women’s choice of words in explaining their 
experiences is vital to feminist research (DeVault, 1990). During pre-interviews, I 
had already found that Kiyomi was different from others because she was satisfied 
with her marriage, so I wanted to listen very carefully. I immediately took notes of 
what she said, and noted gestures such as a very big smile.   
 
However, the researcher and respondent need to understand each other, and the 
researcher must control the interview so the interview does not stray too far from 
the topic. When I asked ‘How did you meet your husband?’ many respondents 
straight away began to complain about their husbands. The question revived 
uncomfortable memories of their past experiences, and it was sometimes hard to 
find out about the respondents’ marriage decisions. However, even those negative 
experiences were positive findings for me, because I have never imagined how 
married Japanese women changed to fulfill the role of their husbands’ mother, 
who did everything for them before they were married (see Chapter 1 and 3). 
Feminist researchers must realise that the women acting as participants in their 
research are often trying to work against and change the oppression they 
experience (Ralph, 1988: 139). Fine and MacPerson (1992) demonstrated that 
women engage in self-analysis are they express their own feelings on feminism, 
using the occasion to consider different ways of being women, dealing with 
gender, power, culture and class struggles (Fine and MacPerson, 1992; 201).  
However, even if sometimes during the interview I wanted to ask more direct 
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questions to participants, for instance why participants wished they could be 
divorce their husbands but chose not to, I had to keep calm and remember 
Woods’s (1997) tip of keeping a focused interview technique. Rather than asking 
directly, I asked respondents to express their responses as a story. I would ask 
questions such as ‘Could you give me an example?’ or ‘Could you elaborate on 
that idea ?’ and respondents started to give me more detailed information. 
Respondents started sharing more information. For example, Kiriko (who is 
married with children and has a part-time job) said, ‘My husband has changed 
after marriage, especially after we had a child, but do not want to divorce him 
now because it would be a disadvantage for the children......’. I could hear that, 
from her single life through dating her husband, the pressure and process of 
marriage and the obligation of her family (parents) and the pressure of her 
husband changing after marriage, and now obligation of her new family, 
especially for her children. Use of Woods’ technique allowed me to expand my 
research, because if I asked directly ‘why don’t you divorce?’, the answer would 
only be ‘for the children’s sake’. Feminist researchers must pay careful attention 
to the organization of their interview questions, and the interpretations suggested 
by the wording of those questions (Anderson et. al., 1997: 114). 
 
During the interviews, I realised again the importance of taking good notes, so I 
could go back and ask them certain things. When I asked about the ideal number 
of children and the reality, the majority of women said their ideal number was 
higher than reality, which the quantitative data also shows, but two respondents 
said their ideal number was fewer than reality, so I did not want to forget the 
different findings between the quantitative research and the qualitative research, 
so I took a note and I asked ‘How do you come up with the ideal number of 
children and reality?’ Two respondents ideally only wanted to have one daughter, 
but the reality is that they will have two children in hoping for a son, because they 
feel pressured to maintain the family name of their husband’s family. Kamiko has 
already has a daughter and she is very happy, but she said she has to at least try 
once more to prove she tried, because she knows that his family wants another 
child, hopefully a boy. According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
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(2010), Japanese women prefer to have a daughter, which is also indicated by my 
research, but my research found that it does not mean they do not have any 
pressure to make a decision as in Kamiko’s case, who already has a daughter: she 
does not particularly want to have another child, but feels the responsibility to 
have a son. 
 
 
Sensitive Issues  
 
I was concerned about participants telling me their stories regarding sensitive 
topics. Vignettes are very useful for qualitative research because they can help 
people focus on what they want to share and so make the process less intimidating 
(Barter and Renold, 2000: 309). Those conducting qualitative research have found 
it useful to employ vignettes to reveal respondents’ attitudes toward and beliefs 
about certain situations within a cultural and moral context. Participants are 
usually asked to say what they or a third person would do in particular situations 
involving a moral dilemma in difficult and sensitive topics. (Barter and Renold, 
2000: 310). In this way respondents do not feel they are talking about their own 
experiences. Sometimes I used vignettes (see Appendix III), because a respondent 
had stopped talking or did not say very much. One example was when Ema was 
talking about pregnancy outside of marriage and then became quiet, so I used the 
following vignette (see Appendix III): 
 
‘Miss A is 32 years old. She has a great career. She loves her job. She has a 
boyfriend, but their relationship is not serious. She has become pregnant. What 
should she do?’ 
 
 
She should talk to her partner first and make up her mind. 
Personally she can afford to support her child, but if she wants 
to have a child they should marry too. How can she respect her 
parents if she becomes a single mother? I have a friend who 
became pregnant outside of marriage, and she was not serious 
about her relationship, but after discovering she was pregnant 
she and her partner married. Now they are happily married and 
a second child on the way. Relationships and marriage are 
different. I personally and strongly believe this. Arranged 
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marriages, not like those where parents choose a mate for their 
children, but where people can date or meet a partner at a club 
and then get married, will last longer I believe because love is 
created day by day. Before marriage a couple can see only the 
good things. After getting married, everything will be different. 
My parents have always told me that. (Ema, single, employed 
full-time) 
 
 
I came to see that vignettes can be very useful in eliciting the deeper opinions of 
respondents. Vignettes help to put relationships into context (Barker and Ronald, 
1999). If I had not used them, the results might well have been different. When I 
asked about pregnancy without marriage, most respondents fell silent or took 
longer to answer, but after using a vignette, respondents such as Ema opened up 
and started to share more intimate information. Vignettes help subjects to focus 
and be more forthcoming in their responses (Stolte, 1994). Another participant, 
Keiko, who is a married housewife with children, initially balked at answering a 
question I posed regarding pregnancy outside of marriage. After I used a vignette, 
she relaxed and started to talk more. 
 
It depends on whether or not she thinks having a child the most important, 
but she should try to keep her job anyhow, even if she decides to have a 
child... Actually, I was in a similar situation to hers. I regretted not 
keeping my job. (Keiko, married with children and housewife). 
 
Keiko had previously not told me anything about being pregnant before marrying. 
After I used a vignette, however, she slowly opened up about it. At first, she spoke 
about the hypothetical Miss A but gradually started to compare herself to the 
character and remarked on their mutual experiences. Respondents do not want 
their interviewer (me) to judge their responses toward the situation nor they do not 
want to me to know their true opinion or what they would do if they were 
pregnant, because making fertility decisions is a sensitive topic. Stolte (1994) 
explains that vignettes are useful for qualitative interviews to elicit respondents’ 
thoughtful replies regarding the vignette subject’s reactions rather than their own. 
The flexibility of vignettes helps respondents to give their answers more 
comfortably and more thoroughly (Riley, 2001).    
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Qualitative researchers allow their interviews to be flexible and flow in 
unforeseen and interesting directions, as opposed to having a scripted set of 
questions, and may adopt a thematic approach which covers a range of topics they 
wish to explore (Mason, 2002). However, it is very important that the interviewer 
knows how to pose questions and deal with lack of response, for sometimes the 
interviewee cannot respond so quickly. Perhaps she may be deep in thought and 
trying to examine herself. The interviewer thus needs to pursue the matter by 
using the respondent’s hesitation to probe more deeply. I took a note when a 
participant’s facial expression changed. It was also an opportunity for me to 
prepare to ask questions in a different order than planned during a participant’s 
silence. When I was using a vignette to ask about the idea of abortion, one of the 
participants was quiet after I read the vignette, leading me to wonder what I 
should ask next. Or maybe she did not want to tell me, but after pausing to think, 
she told me about her friend’s experience with abortion. She was thinking of the 
topic while she remained silent. If I had not waited, or had not put enough thought 
into which question to ask next about her opinion of abortion, she might not have 
told me the story of her friend’s experience. It was a very important experience for 
me to realise how important it is to allow respondents to think and talk. In this 
case I was able to add the voices of two women’s experiences. If the interviewer 
misses the opportunity, however, some very pertinent information might by lost. 
Sometimes such a moment can provide surprising revelations that the interviewee 
herself never gave conscious thought to before. 
 
During the interviews some of the married participants expressed distress and 
anger toward their partners, society and the law. Some even expressed regret 
about marrying, telling me they wished they could change the past and be single 
again. Yet despite this nobody regretted having children. In fact, some of the 
respondents who were married with children said that they wished they had had a 
real choice of being single mothers, or that they regretted marrying. Married 
respondents mentioned that they did not think that becoming single mothers or 
remaining single were choices they could make in their lives. There are pressures 
to conform to the majority and in the average lifetime women are expected to 
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marry and have children. Yoshizumi (1995: 184) noted that once women are 
considered to be past ‘marriage age’, they are regarded as ‘unsold goods’. I should 
take the time to make them more comfortable talking to me to share their 
experiences as members of the same generation.  
 
When I asked the single participants about their backgrounds, some were 
surprised when I asked them their actual age or if they had children. It is 
interesting to note that most of the single women (7 out of 10) at first jokingly 
said ‘Do I have to say my true age?’ or ‘I am 20’. Single women did not want to 
tell me their actual age, explaining that they were ashamed to still be single, 
especially after age 30. In Japan there is cultural and social pressure to achieve 
major things by a certain age. After age 35, only 2 % of women and 3 % of men 
will marry
12
 (Census, 2010). There is accordingly one distinct difference between 
married and single women when revealing their age; none of the married women 
hesitated to tell me. Culturally, it is assumed that women do not have any children 
outside of marriage, so when I asked the single respondents directly if they had 
any children, they reacted with surprise and shock. Japanese women still have to 
follow rules of the traditional way of life married and having a child without 
marriage is taboo (Fujumura-Fanselow, 1993; also see Chapter 1). During the 
interview, one respondent said, ‘I am single; how would I have any children? If I 
had children now I would have already been married before having any’. Another 
replied, ‘I already mentioned before I am single; how could I be a mother 
beforehand?’ A third said, ‘I am still single. That means I am totally single’. Five 
women mentioned that if they did have children, they would have (or already 
been) married; three of those five stated that they would not be brave enough to be 
a single mother. Two respondents who lived in U.K. responded a little bit 
differently 
 
If I married a non-Japanese man, I could imagine being a single mother 
or having a child without marriage (Sakiko, single and has a job). 
                                                 
12
 In 2005, the proportion of single women between ages 35-39 was 12.8%; for single men of the same age, 
it was 30.9%. In 2010, the proportion of single women between ages 40-44 was 10.8% and single men was 
27.9% (Japanese Census, 2010). The proportion of both men and women over 40 who married for the first 
time was 0.5%; for both men and women marrying for the first time over age 45, this proportion was 0.1%. 
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In the U.K., I could imagine having a child without marriage, but I am 
not sure what my family would think (Suzuko who lives in U.K, single 
and has a job).  
 
There were differences between other respondents when it came to their ability to 
be single mothers. Suzuko mentioned her parents, just as other respondents 
mentioned respect for their parents and family, so they cannot imagine being a 
single mother or having a child without having been married. All of the married 
respondents currently without children said they intended and wanted to have 
children in the future:  
 
I am married. I do not have any children yet, but I would love to 
have a child as soon as possible. We have been trying, but it has 
not happened yet. I hope it will happen soon (Kayo, married 
without child, has a full-time job). (My emphasis) 
 
I am married. I have been married two years now, so I think this 
year or next year I want to have a child (Eriko, married without 
a child, housewife). (My emphasis)  
 
They seemed to want to communicate that since they were now married, they 
wanted to start having one or more children and regarded that as the next step in 
the process, quite as if they felt they were entitled to having children. This will be 
covered further under the discussion of marriage and family (see Chapter 4). 
Lastly it should be mentioned that, both of them reminded me of their marital 
status and talked about their perspectives and plans regarding fertility decisions. It 
is important for Japanese women to be the same as everybody else, to join the 
majority and choose a predicable life course; they feel pressure and discrimination, 
and feel they cannot avoid having the choices made for them (Fujumura-Fanselow, 
Kameda, and Yoshizumi, 1995). I could see behavioural differences between 
married and single women during the interviews, especially on sensitive topics 
such as fertility decisions.  
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Analysing and Writing Up 
 
My aim in using qualitative research methods was to discover the hidden voice 
behind women’s fertility decisions. However, this research led me into much 
deeper issues has to be understood and expanded in order to be analysed. I 
realised after the interviews that I could not only talk about fertility decisions, 
because many women have difficulties to make their own individual decisions due 
to family pressure, social pressure, discrimination against women even before 
marriage, and the decision to have a child or not have a child after marriage. 
Women in Japan may also be experiencing discrimination due to their fertility 
choices: having or not having children, and being single or being married. For 
instance, one of the main subjects explored in quantitative research is the effect of 
financial issues on fertility. After women decided to have a child, there were many 
losses for women, such as financial independence, which has been discovered by 
quantitative research on fertility, but not how women are choosing not to work 
and relying on men. This research told me that it was because it is simply harder 
to work at home and also keep a full-time job (see Table 6), for women are forced 
to work unpaid work and then made to rely on men, and women are at a 
disadvantage (Jackson and Scott, 2002: 86). It is physically difficult to have a 
full-time job because there is little support from husbands, social policies and the 
welfare system; however, it is also harder for women to keep a full-time job 
because they are discriminated against in Japanese social structures that are not 
specifically protected by laws governing women’s job security (see Chapter 3 and 
6). ‘Having’ and ‘keeping’ a full time job are two hurdles for women to conquer or 
give up. Which is easier and which way are women choosing? It is not only a 
matter of finances, which is only one factor involved in making it more difficult 
for women to make these decisions. Another thing I have found though my 
research is that many quantitative researchers have produced misleading literature, 
claiming that Japanese women prefer to be housewives and stay at home 
(Watanabe, 2011; Maruyama, 2001). As I listened to the recorded interviews, I 
was more and more interested in discovering the gap between quantitative 
research and my qualitative research. My first interest was the low fertility rate, 
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but my research expanded to include the question of whether these women want 
to become housewives. The quantitative research only shows that respondents 
might say they prefer staying home to take care of children due to the belief that 
the first three years are the most important (see Chapter 1), and it might show that 
the tax system (see Chapter 6) helps women more if they stay at home after 
marriage, so they might choose to answer ‘yes, I prefer to stay at home’. This is 
the strength of using qualitative research: it added much more detail on how and 
why women are choosing, or are being forced to choose where quantitative 
research does not show that decision making process.  
 
I allowed one day for interview and transcription for both the pre-interviews and 
interviews. I have used a small portable voice recorder, which could be connected 
to a computer to copy the interviews. I could listen from the recorder or from the 
computer as I transcribed. Sometimes I could not concentrate at home, so I took 
the computer out of my study area and went outside to transcribe. It was important 
to listen to my participants’ words very clearly. In order to analyse all recorded 
interviews were first transcribed in Japanese. The process of transcription took a 
long time because all of the participants told me more of their stories, experiences 
and beliefs than I expected. After reading the transcriptions several times, I wrote 
down any emerging themes that surprised me. Re-reading transcripts can be useful 
for finding unexpected differences and similarities between participants 
(Taylor-Powell and Renner, 2003). I was especially interested to see differences 
between my participants who are married and single. For instance, during this 
process it seemed that most of the married women had not wanted to be 
housewives when they were single, but the single women were more realistic; one 
said ‘I would say to be married is not difficult but changing my life to be 
housewife is difficult, so I am still single’ (Akiko, single and employed full-time). 
My more realistic participants remained single. This research needed to expand 
and analyse data more than I expected, but I gathered much more information on 
the participants’ stories and experiences than I required. 
There was simply so much data, I did not know where to start. I remembered to 
review the information from the interviews with regard to a few specific questions, 
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aware that the findings could change during analysis (Taylor-Powell and Renner, 
2003). I chose at first to ask three main questions: (1) their ideal number of 
children, and intent to have children, (2) their description of an ideal marriage 
(which might indicate respondents’ attitudes toward choosing to become a 
housewife), and (3) challenges of having raised children, because the aim of my 
research was to find out why Japanese women have been deciding to have fewer 
children or none at all. Existing quantitative research leaves gaps, showing only 
that Japanese women want to be married and want to have children, and showing 
that the ideal number of children is higher than the actual number they will have.  
 
Next I tried to identify themes, recurring ideas, patterns, and behaviours 
(Taylor-Powell and Renner, 2003). Woods (1997) advises researchers to be 
mindful of repetition of specific words or repeated mentions of specific incidents, 
as well as making note of verbal irregularities and emotional states, such as anger, 
embarrassment, laughter, and so on. Careful notes of the entire exchange are as 
important to the researcher as the words themselves (Olsen, 1994 et. al). For 
instance, when I asked my participants ‘How do you feel about oral contraceptive 
pills?’, three of them looked confused. I then tried to clarify with a more precise 
explanation. One of them did not have any knowledge of contraceptive pills. The 
other two were aware of them, but had never thought of using them. Kayo 
(married without child has a full-time job) said ‘Fortunately, neither my husband 
nor I have any “rubber allergy”, so it is not necessary’. It shocked me, because to 
the best of her knowledge, using contraceptive pills was more closely related to an 
allergy than to a means of having control over fertility decisions or women’s 
rights (see Chapter 1). Even if they would like to use them, it is harder to see a 
doctor because of the ‘Hokensho’ system (see Chapter 1). If I had not made notes 
of these facial expressions, I risked misunderstanding; better understanding of 
women’s real voices and stories should change a researcher’s point of view and 
offer new discoveries. Sometimes it is normal for researchers to guess and 
imagine something, but it does not mean that we understand other people; for me, 
it was hard to imagine some women’s attitudes toward fertility decisions. After 
living overseas for a while, where many women are using contraceptive pills (see 
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Chapter 1), it was difficult for me to remember that some women had so little 
knowledge of them. They have access to the internet and can learn about them, 
but there are few other opportunities to learn about contraception. This facial 
change gave me a fresh view of the cultural experience in Japan, and how 
important it is to record both women’s words and their facial expressions.  
 
I was exhausted mentally and physically by the process of listening to and 
transcribing the recordings. However, nearly every detail from the interviews was 
important to my research, so I transcribed the entire recording. In the meantime, I 
had to look carefully at the notes I took during the pre-interview and the interview. 
Did respondents mean what they said, or were they joking, which a simple 
transcription might not recognise? When I was transcribing, I added memos to the 
side, indicating facial expressions and tone of voice, laughing, upset, seriously 
saying, joking and irony, etc. One participant said ‘I love my husband so much. He 
is my destiny. He is my load!’ But it was irony, because after this she began to tell 
her story of how much she regretting having met her husband. It took so much 
time and I started to be worried about having the time write up the thesis, because 
there are many important stories I have, but also felt that I would never finish 
going through what seemed like endless information. But I told myself to go step 
by step, transcribing one by one, every day. I also felt that commitment to my 
participants, since they shared their stories and spent their valuable time with me.  
 
I had to choose categories and topics for first Chapter, and which text matched the 
themes, and to explain why some categories appeared more important. The 
analysis was focused on the four following issues: alternatively gender equality is 
covered in Chapter 3, particularly regarding gender roles in housework and career 
loss, since only one of my respondents (Kiyomi) were happy after marrying and 
having a child. The fourth chapter I chose to focus on marriage and family values. 
There is a strong relationship between marriage and the fertility rate in Japan. 
After marriage, more participants became unhappy, and all respondents who are 
single were worried about marriage, which is a very important decision for 
Japanese women due to the pressure to marry. The fifth chapter discusses 
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economic resources: the costs of having and raising children which are ever 
increasing. Lastly, the sixth chapter covers care, welfare and policy, which takes a 
closer look at the underdevelopment and inequality of welfare and policies for 
women. Those last two chapters are usually the main topic being researched in 
quantitative studies of low fertility rates, and while I do not deny the connection, 
these issues have to be understood within the context gender inequality. Of course 
there are links, but if gender equality changed, issues such as high education 
expenses would become less important. Welfare and policies have been 
established by the Japanese government to fight TFR (see Chapter 6), however 
respondents either did not care or did not believe change was coming anyway; one 
respondent told me ‘It will not change anything, even law, because it has not 
changed anything before now’ (Kiriko, married with children, employed 
part-time). Other respondents who are married also mentioned changes in 
Japanese law to reduce working hours; however, their husbands do not change 
their habits anyway: ‘Even if my husband comes home earlier or takes a day off 
he just sleeps’ (Saki, married with children, part-time; see Chapter 3). Those two 
topics will be discussed later, however, in the course of my research I discovered 
that there were many issues mentioned where respondents wanted to see change.  
After creating a rough table of contents, I decided to choose some quotes to 
illustrate new and interesting findings. A carefully chosen quote can support an 
interpretation of data, but there is a risk of choosing or editing a quote only to 
supports the argument at hand (Taylor-Powell and Renner, 2003). Taylor-Powell 
and Renner (2003) say that any quote’s inclusion should be explained, without 
being edited so heavily that the point is lost to the reader. It is also important to 
find quotes from different respondents to support the same theme (Taylor-Powell 
and Renner, 2003); often in my research, this was Kiyomi. During the interview 
Kiyomi said, I am not happy when someone called me Saito’s (‘husband’s’ family 
name) wife. I feel I lost my identity (married with a child and full-time job). 
Kiyomi is happy with her married life, but she was not happy to be treated as if 
she now belonged more to her husband and his family. Even if Kiyomi is happy 
with her marriage, she is not happy with how Japanese people treated her after 
marriage. This could indicate a much more unsatisfying life for the majority of 
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Japanese women. I was able to follow the entire course of their lives and how they 
made decisions, starting when they were children until now, sometimes including 
the future, because how they were raised and will be treated in the future reveals 
what they want and hope for themselves and their children. I tried to connect key 
points and important findings while sorting through the data. I asked myself 
where the research was leading me, what the major lesson was, and if there were 
any new findings and differences between the existing quantitative research and 
my research. It was the trickiest part for me to make decisions about which quotes 
best fit which themes and Chapters, because I felt many themes are linked and I 
was confused about which Chapter would be best served by a quote; for example, 
whether a quote was a better example for explaining gender equality or economic 
resources. I was confused and repeated same quotes and findings in different 
Chapters. It was a tricky task because so much of the data contained very similar 
opinions and stories. At times I thought I was going mad listening, reading, and 
transcribing the same material. My memory was not working properly.  
 
After transcribing and choosing quotes, I translated passages and quotes from 
Japanese to English. I have tried to keep participants’ original speech as much as 
possible not to lose their meaning, personalities, voice strength and expressions. 
Making notes of distinctive ways of speaking is of great importance (Standings, 
1998). Some expressions only exist in the Japanese culture, and even if similar 
English expressions existed, I am not a native English speaker and could not 
recognise some of the equivalent expressions. I could understand what 
participants meant, but when I was translating I had to make sure to translate 
Japanese cultural references for readers who might not know them, which is very 
challenging. It can be difficult if the language of the people to whom I spoke is 
different from the language in which my research will be written (Temple, 1997). 
I had to determine if a literal translation would be best, or if my interpretation 
might be missing some connotations of the responses (Birbili, 2002:2). After I did 
the translation, I read it again to make sure that meanings, phrasing and cultural 
differences survived the translation to English. It was natural for me to understand, 
however explanations had to be added for non-Japanese-speakers. This process 
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required a detailed working knowledge of both cultures (Birbili, 2000: 2). I asked 
my English-speaking friend several times to read the translations, and asked their 
opinions and if they had any problems understanding them.  
 
Participants knew that their stories would be translated into English and become 
part of my thesis in U.K., so they knew they would remain anonymous. They were 
not worried about being a part of it, but if it were in written in Japanese and 
published in Japan, it would have been more difficult for them to respond, and this 
could have affected our interviews. There were many good responses which 
caused me to spend more time on the transcription process. Sometimes I was 
confused as to whether portions of the conversation were necessary or 
unnecessary to the transcription. After that, I listened and re-read the transcript, 
cutting and pasting selected quotes to group them by theme, and re-reading them 
to see if the quotes linked to other themes.  
 
I was sensitive to the concepts of weakness and oppression from Lorber’s theory 
of gender inequality, and women’s struggle against men. Those theories fit this 
research well by helping to explain why low fertility has become a problem, 
because solutions based on women’s viewpoints have been ignored. Lorber (1992: 
22) raises the standpoint feminism argument that the experiences and voices of 
women will be different from those of men, and women must make themselves 
heard to challenge a male-dominated society. Lorber (1997: 22) believes that the 
common thread of feminism is placing the female viewpoint and voice at the 
center of research, politics, and culture, rather than reducing it to a marginalized 
perspective. Hegemonic power is held by the party that controls scientific research 
and education, as well as the symbolism that pervades an entire culture. Western 
society draws many of its justifications for assumptions about man and women 
from scienctific findings. Feminists frequently accept scientific fact without 
question, while standpoint feminism offers criticism of mainstream science and 
social study, provides an alternate method for researching feminist topics, and 
questions the power behind the knowledge and research that society already 
embraces (Lorber, 1997: 22).  
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Reflection on the Research Process 
 
 
Qualitative research is more widely used in western countries, but there is much 
less use of qualitative research in Japan. It is thought to be difficult in Japan to do 
qualitative research, because Japanese people normally do not talk about their 
private lives, preferring to discuss these matters only with close family members 
(Sasagawa, 1997). Japanese people tend not to share certain private problems 
even with their close friends, particularly regarding life-changing issues and big 
decisions, such as marriage, taking exams, divorce and pregnancy (Dixon-Mueller, 
1993; Sasagawa, 1997). Moreover, the reasons behind their reluctance to discuss 
these issues are more difficult for researchers to uncover.  
 
At first I was worried about the interviews, and the lack of literature and related 
studies in Japan, but I felt it would not be so difficult to do. I enjoyed listening to 
the experiences and stories that emerged in the interviews. Of course, it was 
sometimes difficult for participants to speak openly to me, so I had to use 
vignettes, to read depersonalised stories to encourage them to give their opinions. 
Even as a Japanese researcher, I had to careful not to be too formal, but once I 
built the relationships, it was easy to do the interviews. It was easy to establish to 
relationships with the participants. It helped me a great deal that the respondents 
were interested in me, my age, my marital status, and so on, and they wanted to 
find out what they could discuss with me without embarrassing themselves. But I 
was very open and when they wanted to ask me something, and I answered as 
much as they wanted to know. It helped that I was a student, single and around the 
same age as the participants; they felt it was easier to share information which was 
very helpful because they felt that I was not in a higher position (or, more likely, 
in a lower position being an student not following the traditionally accepted 
Japanese path). Some single participants told me that it was easy to talk to me 
about marriage and having a child because I was also single. I felt that some of 
them even wanted me to agree with them and be a part of these issues. Some 
single participants were worried that they would be judged by someone to be too 
old for marriage and child-bearing. During interviews, my respondents advised 
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me in many ways, especially those who were married with children, how precious 
time is for single women, and on choosing the right man or choosing not to marry 
at all. One of the participants I clearly remember, when she was advising me, 
would not look at me or put her hands on me. I felt she was looking at past me, 
remembering when she was single and telling herself these things.  
 
Lastly, most respondents were interested in my thesis. I could have very good 
interviews with great depth and quality because I was a student overseas. If I was 
a government employee conducting this research, it would have affected the 
interviews, but because I was a student, there was no pressure or judgement; it 
was easy for them to talk to me. I am a student, so there was no class barrier, 
which I felt was my strength (and I was told so during the interview). They 
mentioned that they would like to read my completed thesis, which delighted me. 
On the other hand, I have started to feel pressure in writing about this topic, due to 
their expressed high interest. I hope I will be able to complete this thesis and 
uncover new findings. Moreover, it will help readers to understand some unclear 
data and gaps from previous qualitative research, and would also help readers to 
understand Japanese women’s attitudes toward fertility decisions. I would also 
hope that more qualitative research would be undertaken to focus on and support 
women’s decisions.  
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Chapter 3: Gender Inequality 
 
Introduction 
 
All men profit from the ‘patriarchal dividend’ which refers to the unpaid 
work of women in raising children and doing the housekeeping, their 
low-paying jobs in various service fields, and the caring, emotional 
support they provide. This deep-rooted gender disparity is prevalent in 
the fabric of cultures around the world, shaping economies, family 
structures, politics and religion, even our vocabulary. True equality would 
require analysing these issues and bringing about reformation not on a 
personal level, but on a societal one (Lorber, 2010: 5). 
 
As Lorber points out, women are compelled to perform unpaid domestic work, 
and men benefit more than women do from being married or living together, even 
if after having children. Men enjoy the benefits of greater financial power. This is 
still happening all over the world. Gender inequality is often seen in economic 
terms, such as income, financial inequality and the number of women 
participating in the labour force vs. the number doing domestic work, but it is 
important to acknowledge that women are spending huge amounts of time at 
home and are missing opportunities for paid work as a result in most countries 
(Robeyns, 2003; Cockburn, 2002). Lorber’s theories of inequality very much fit 
my understanding of Japan’s male-dominated, patriarchal society, and the 
instances of gender inequality described in this chapter. Standing (1999: 587) 
analyses the workplace inequality facing women in developed countries in terms 
of male-dominated ideologies and religions, even though there are fewer barriers 
faced by married people or parents; those setting the cultural standards have 
tended to be men. Standing (1999: 587) also noted that women have lower job 
security, fewer entitlements and lower wages (see also Bono, Vuri, 2011; Seguino, 
2010). Hartman (2002: 97) argued that not only must the hierarchy of division of 
labour between men and women end, but that all division of labour between the 
sexes needs to be erased in order for women to achieve equality with men, and for 
either gender to achieve the fulfilment of its human potential. 
 
Inglehart and Norris (2003) imply that the changes that occur in gender roles due 
to modernisation can be predicted, and occur in stages. Industrialization brings 
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women paid work and better opportunities for education and literacy, and it can 
also mean a significantly reduced fertility rate. This empowers women to 
participate in political decision making, but generally they still have less influence 
than men. A second, post-industrial phase introduces more gender equality: 
women can achieve management positions and gain greater influence 
professionally and politically. The results of their study indicate that only the most 
advanced industrial societies have reached this point, while over half of the world 
has not. Changes occur in public life as well as personal lives, as the traditional 
two-parent system becomes less common and there is wider acceptance of 
liberalization of sexual behaviour, marriage and divorce; the effects are felt even 
in the workplace (Inglehart and Norris, 2003).  
 
Japan is one of the most modernised and developed countries in the world, but 
Japan has yet to establish even basic gender equality. In Japan women cannot even 
keep a job after marrying and having children, which is the first step toward 
equality of labour force and financial equality in the women and men, even before 
we see further problems such as the income gap and women’s lack of 
management positions at work (see Chapter 6). Women are still expected to leave 
their jobs after marrying or having a child; even if women have the same level of 
education as men, it does not mean that they have the same opportunities for 
career advancement (see Chapter 1). Confucianism, along with patriarchal 
traditions and belief systems, prevents women from attaining power (Lim 1997: 
32). Optimistically, if Japanese women could remain at their jobs as men do, it 
would lead to more equal pay and higher position for women. However, in such 
strong patriarchal societies such as South Korea and Japan, it would be difficult to 
attain more gender equality because the Confucian ideology preserves the 
patriarchal structure (Lim,1997). There are many Western countries where gender 
equality is much more developed than in Japan, but there is still inequality in pay, 
and few women have higher positions than men in most of these countries (see 
also Jacobs, 1996; Whitehouse 1992; Kamo; 1994).  
 
Only a few countries have come close to complete gender equality in paid and 
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management positions at work, such as Norway, which introduced a law which 
specified that 40% of higher management positions have to be occupied by 
women. At the time when the law was enacted in 2003, only 7 % of such positions 
were held by women. Two years later, that percentage had only risen to just 18 %, 
well short of the goal of 40 %. In response, the Norwegian government issued a 
strict mandate which stated that any company failing to comply with hiring more 
women in higher management positions to reach the goal of 40 % would be 
dissolved (Atsumi, 2011). If the Norwegian government had not strictly enforced 
rules about gender equality in management positions, it would not have reached 
the desired threshold of 40% of higher management positions being held by 
women. 
 
How many countries can take the steps Norway has taken to be more gender 
equal? I cannot see it happening in Japan. Although Japanese women now have 
greater access to education than before, they still face formidable obstacles in 
being able to keep their jobs after marrying and having children. There is much 
inequality preventing women from remaining in a job over a certain period of 
time (see Chapter 1), but most of the time, after marrying and having children, 
women are working part-time, doing temporary work, or working at home. I have 
realised in the course of conducting this research, that it all comes back to the fact 
that Japan is still a strongly male-dominated and patriarchal society. 
   Figure 7: Partriarchal Society: A vicious Circle 
 
Source: Heidi Hartman ‘Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation by Sex’, 1976 
13
 
                                                 
13 Permission was granted to use my supervisor Professor Stevi Jackson’s version of this graphic based on 
Heidi Hartman’s ‘Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation by Sex’.  
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The vicious circle of patriarchal systems is like asking if the chicken or the egg 
came first. At home, women are dominated by a patriarchal system: women do 
unpaid domestic work. Even work outside the home is subject to a 
male-dominated society, and there is still inequality; for the most part, women can 
hold only lower-responsibility jobs at work.  
 
This Chapter will explain how gender inequality for women persists from 
childhood until adulthood. When children are born anywhere in the world, they 
observe their mothers’ and fathers’ behaviours at home and learn about gender 
roles. This continues from generation to generation. Inglehart and Norris (2003: 
19) discuss the attitudes toward gender roles held by people in East Asia, focusing 
particularly on Japan. As one might expect, the values of the younger generation 
and older generation differ greatly. Younger people tend to favour greater equality 
of the sexes, while older people are more comfortable with more traditional roles 
for men and women. Yet societal change cannot occur quickly, as people retain the 
values and beliefs that were instilled when they were younger (Inglehart and 
Norris, 2003: 19). In Japan, from the day girls and boys are born, they are treated 
differently and taught how to speak and behave differently, ensuring the 
continuation of the male-dominated patriarchal society. 
 
 
Cultural and Behavioural Differences  
 
Behavioural Differences  
 
Inequality is an integral part of gender identity; each gender is 
sequestered socially to justify unequal treatment, leading many 
to regard gender inequality as normal and natural (Lorber, 
1997:29).  
 
As indicated by Lorber’s gender inequality is treated treatment between as a 
natural. Most of the time, when a child is born, the mother takes care of them, and 
the child (whether a boy or girl) sees the mother is taking care of them, the idea 
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forms in their minds that women’s responsibilities are taking care of children and 
taking care of the house, perpetuating the existing gender roles of that way of life, 
and how much the mother and father are involved in housework (Henley and 
Kramarae, 2001). If the father spends more time working outside and doing 
maintenance at home, it fixes the idea that men’s job is to work outside and fix 
things at home, which influences the children’s idea of gender roles (Henley and 
Kramarae, 2001).  
 
One of the everyday differences is that women and men speak to one another 
differently, but there are some similarities between women and men of similar 
class, age, ethnicity, and so on (Coates, 2004). But in Japan, the use of language 
between women and men is very different from western countries’ language use. 
There are distinctly different ‘male’ and ‘female’ speech patterns in Japan. The 
‘female’ pattern tends to be more polite, while the ‘male’ pattern could be 
construed as arrogant or demanding. I myself was only made aware of this after I 
started to learn English, and at first I was confused, because in Japan there are 
many differences between women and men’s way of speaking. One of my 
respondents shared similar experiences, Suzuko (living UK, single, employed 
full-time): ‘there is much more equality using the English language rather than 
Japanese language, because basically we do not have to think about whether we 
are speaking to women or men when using English’. Sasaki (1997) explains that 
Japan, with its distinct male and female language, is thereby different from other 
cultures. According to Sasaki (1997), Japanese people must know and use three 
different modes of speaking: masculine, feminine, and ‘polite,’ the last of which is 
very similar to the feminine mode.  
 
 
When I was a child I felt it was not fair that my brother could say most 
things and describe anything using the Japanese language, but I was told 
often not to use those sayings, or do not say that, and so on. However, 
now I am doing the same things to my son and daughter. I feel bad, but I 
have to, right? What can I do? I cannot change Japan (Kiriko, married 
with children, part-time employed).  
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Kiriko felt inequality through the use of language in Japan, but she has to teach 
her daughter the same unfairness. She feels that her resistance against social 
convention cannot effect any change, and gives up and follows ‘what should be 
done’ for women and men. These instances of inequality, in normal everyday 
word usage, help to erect barriers to equality between women and men, and 
perpetuate the teaching of differences between women and men. Kondo (1990), a 
Japanese-American sociologist went to Japan as a young female student and 
experienced difficulty in accepting Japanese women’s roles, not only in language, 
but because there are many surprising tasks and responsibilities that fall to women 
in Japan, becoming a natural part of their everyday lives. She was surprised that, 
when someone wants more rice in their bowl, the bowl is passed to their mother, 
and she is expected to fill their bowl with rice each time (Kondo, 1990). Kondo 
had to act as though she was not offended by this behaviour and many others, and 
said it was difficult to ignore the gender inequality that exists for Japanese women 
in everyday life, accepted as culturally natural behaviour. In her two years of 
living in Japan, she did not want to be transformed by these inequalities.  
 
Sechiyama (2013: 83) explains how Japanese husbands behave after work; until 
recent years, it was common for them to use only three words after coming home: 
‘Meal, bath and bed’, and women had to do all of the housework for their 
husbands. I have found through my research that the behaviours of Japanese 
husbands follow a similar pattern: wives do everything for their husbands, 
remaining awake to assist until their husbands sleep. Saki wakes her husband up, 
makes breakfast, lunch and dinner, takes him to the station to work, and takes him 
back home by car, makes drinks, prepares his bath, and prepares for her husband’s 
sleep (see Chapter 2). I did not ask her how many words her husband says from 
the moment he comes back from work until he goes to sleep; I could imagine little 
conversation because she told me she is very busy the whole day, but her husband 
does not care if she is busy or not. Saki said, ‘Even if my husband sees and 
realises I am getting the children ready for bed, he will still ask me to bring a 
drink for him’ Even on her husband’s day off, her daily activities do not change 
much (see below).    
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There are many expressions of behaviour in Japan that pertain exclusively or 
especially to women. Gender roles are a learned behaviour, shaped by society’s 
expectations, acquired attitudes, and behaviours specific to certain situations; girls, 
boys, women and men have different experiences that shape these roles in the 
world (Lott, 1987; Coates, 2004). Perhaps many Japanese people might not realise 
it or simply accept these differences between women and men, but females are 
treated as being somehow inferior to males, even when they are still children. 
They even have a different way of sitting on the floor. 
 
Figure 8: Differences in Ways of Sitting by Gender 
                         
        For Japanese female                          For Japanese male 
 
     Source: (Left side) http://userdisk.webry.biglobe.ne.jp/007/913/58/N000/000/000/IMG_2582.JPG 
     Source: (Right side) http://genki-do.up.seesaa.net/image/yugami-kotuban.JPG 
 
Japanese women are not allowed to sit in the ‘male style,’ and vice versa. If 
someone sits the ‘wrong’ way, they will possibly be regarded as either being rude 
(females) or homosexual (males). Japanese women are expected to sit in the 
accepted female style, and men are expected to sit in the accepted male style; 
there are more differences as well, such as formality, kinship, occupation and ages 
(Kondo, 1990). From the feminist viewpoint, cultural acceptance of gendered 
behaviour and widespread disapproval of anything straying from the accepted 
norms are simply a means of controlling the culture and keeping the 
male-dominated power structure intact (Lorber, 1997: 30; Inglehart, and Norris, 
2003). I was taught the required expressions and mannerisms as a child, such as 
how to sit, how to speak, and how generally to behave and they are still being 
taught today in Japan. There are many such restrictions placed on Japanese 
women. They are so deeply ingrained that people do not even think about 
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exhibiting these mannerisms but do so instinctively as it were; they find it to be 
neither strange nor restrictive. One respondent living in the U.K., Sakiko, noted 
that her time of living abroad had made her realise that in Japan women face more 
discrimination: 
 
I hadn't realised just how much inequality there was between men and 
women, following the female and male ways of behaviour when I was still 
living in Japan. When I was Japan, I was told often: behave like a woman. 
At the time I did not think but what is it to behave like a woman? Now I 
can ask, but when I was in Japan. I was told to behave politer, softer and 
quieter (Sakiko, single, has a job in the U.K).  
 
The fact that people regard such submissive and deferential behaviour as natural 
and a normal part of the culture is disconcerting to say the least. Even the U.K. 
does not have total gender equality far from it in fact but Sakiko’s experience 
living in the U.K. opened her eyes, and she has come to realise that she has many 
more opportunities and a better developed sense of equality than in Japan. She 
told me that she has been enjoying living in the U.K., and added that there are 
more freedoms and equality for women there, and fewer expectations. During the 
interview she mentioned that, when she was in Japan, she hated that some of her 
family members told her, ‘You are a girl, so you cannot do that, you do not behave 
like that’. She asked me, ‘Have you ever had the same sort of experiences?’ She 
wanted me to agree and I wanted to know her experiences. I have had many of the 
same experiences as Sakiko, so I said ‘Yes, I have’. She asked me for an example, 
so I told her that I had once hated my physical appearance; because I have a scar 
on my face, many male strangers told me when I was a child that no one would 
want to marry me, or that my voice was a lower tone than normal (what is 
normal?). “You are like a boy” was something which hurt badly to hear as a child. 
Sakiko agreed with me and finally told me, ‘I miss Japan, but I do not want to go 
back there because there is no hope that it will change, anyway. Even I did not 
notice the degree of inequality in Japan before I lived in the U.K.’. Japanese 
women and men have yet to acknowledge the inequality of the gender gap, 
because they think it is the natural way of life that women take care of the house 
and men work outside to earn money for the family (see Chapter 1). Even if they 
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notice and acknowledge the inequality between genders, what they can do? There 
are limitations on how much they can change how they speak, and it is very tricky 
to convince people to acknowledge such change. There are other examples: 
Japanese people celebrate different customs and events, celebrating girl’s day and 
boys’ day; boys’ day, called Kodomono-hi (which means child’s day) is treated 
with much more importance than girls’day.  
 
Girls’ Day and Boys’ Day 
 
Figure 9: Pictures of Displays for Girls’ and Boys’ Days 
     
Hina-ningyo             Gogatu-ningyo             Koi-nobori 
Inside House for Girls’ Day   Inside House for Boys’ Day  Outside House for Boys’ Day 
Source: http://www.yoshitoku.co.jp/ 
 
Japan celebrates both a Boys’ Day (May 5th) and a Girls’ Day (March 3rd), but 
only Boys’ Day is a national holiday (see also Ehrenreich 2003). Historically, 
when a baby girl is born the maternal grandparents will give her special dolls, but 
when a baby boy is born the paternal grandparents will provide the dolls. Figure 1 
shows examples of Boys’ Day and Girls’ Day observations in Japan. Although 
dolls are on display inside the home on both days, only on Boys’ Day are 
decorations, called ‘Koinobori’, displayed outside the home. Koinobori is a 
symbol indicating that a family has a boy, and is always shown off from outside. 
Boys’ Day is more publicly visible and more openly celebrated than is Girls’ Day. 
In my own experience I have had only one maternal grandparent, my maternal 
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grandmother. She had raised five children, of whom my mother was the youngest. 
She could not afford to provide me with special dolls. On the other hand my 
paternal grandparents were wealthy, and so my brother was given the biggest dolls. 
Even though my father’s side could have afforded to provide special dolls for me 
as well, they did not. Therefore my parents gave me the dolls that my maternal 
grandmother could not. At first, when the tradition began in 681 A.D., these dolls 
were meant to bestow good luck and protect the children (Hasegawa, 1965; Sano, 
1998). Today such dolls symbolize a child’s future success, which is represented 
by the variety of doll sizes and types of accessories to show the level of expected 
wealth. By this standard I was thus destined to be very poor and miserable, as I 
had very small dolls and only a small number of accessories. Today I cannot 
imagine anyone in Japan not having those dolls. According to Shogaku-kan 
(2008), they cost an average of ¥ 250,000 (Approximately £ 1,953). It can thus be 
stressful for grandparents.  
 
It is ridiculous that my parents have to buy such an expensive doll 
because of tradition, but my son already received dolls from my 
parents-in law, so my parents feel and I feel it is necessary for a daughter 
as well, which truly I feel unnecessary. I am supposed to belong to my 
husband’s family and even change my name; however, ironically my 
parents still have to do something for me and their grandchildren. This 
system only uses the female’s family when they want to. It is also more 
troublesome that I have to put them out and away until the children are 
married, especially with the myth for daughters that we have to be on 
time to put them away after Girl’s day (Keiko, married with children, 
housewife).  
 
Keiko makes a very interesting point, because historically, after marriage, a 
woman is supposed to have no dealings with her family. However, when they 
need to buy expensive items for their daughters, women’s parents have to buy 
them. This is one of the paradoxes of Japanese society. On Girls’ Day, by tradition, 
the parents must put away the dolls the following day. If they are late in doing so, 
it is believed the result will be a delay in their daughter’s marriage, however the 
same deadline is not applied to boys’ dolls. It might indicate that marriage is 
primarily a concern for women, and women are expected to care more about it. 
Also, as Keiko mentioned, ‘It would be my responsibility to follow this custom 
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even I do not believe the myth; my husband would not take on any of the 
responsibility for it’. Packing these dolls is a time-consuming process, because the 
dolls and tools are expensive, and more be individually packed with special care 
to prevent them from being eaten by bugs.  
 
My parents were a little bit different, however; they donated my dolls to an 
orphanage so I no longer have them. Most families, however, keep the dolls until 
their daughter is married. My participants’ mothers took care of the dolls on time 
and put them away on time. However, I could see differences between single 
participants and married participants’ parents’ attitude toward those Hina-ningyo 
and the beliefs surrounding them.  
 
My mother still cares about Hina-ningyo and decorating, and putting 
them away on March 3
rd
 after noon, and praying that I could marry 
(Smile). It is like a joke. (Akiko, single, full-time employed).  
 
My mother simply does not believe in Hina-ningyo after I married, 
because I think I am not so happy with my married life. However, she 
said that when her granddaughter is born, she would buy it for her out of 
respect for my husband’s parents (Kazumi, married without a child, 
full-time employed).  
 
Single participants’ parents, especially mothers, still believe in following the 
custom to take care of Hina-ningyo, but married participants’ parents and mothers 
do not seem care about it, but are still intent upon following the custom. My 
research revealed that none of my participants believed the myth, and they think it 
is better not to have this custom. Most participants have negative opinions of 
those days. Kumiko (married with children, housewife) said, ‘I have to organise 
family parties for those days and people are comparing notes: who got small dolls, 
small parties and so on, which is too much. My husband says those events are for 
our children. But he does not do anything, anyway.’ When I was listening to their 
attitudes toward Girls’ day and Boys’ day, it all came back full circle: participants 
have to do all the work to organise the parties for their children, while their 
husbands do not do anything, even if they hold a positive opinion of the event. I 
wondered if my participants would be in the same position if their husbands said 
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they would enjoy the event. One participant told me that ‘I would enjoy it if my 
husband would do all of the hard work for the children those days’ (Kiriko, 
married with children, employed part-time). Japanese men do not want to do 
anything involved in children’s events, expecting women do all of the work to 
have big dolls and big parties. ‘My husband does not care about the expenses of 
child parties; he always says “get this, get that” to order me to do’ (Kamiko, 
married with a child, housewife ). Japanese men only work outside, and do not 
consider other issues and unpaid work and how those inequalities might affect 
women’s fertility decision making.  
 
 
Women’s Responsibilities and Decisions  
 
Keeping a job or not being able to keep a job  
 
The starting point is already different: to be born as a woman. Will women ever be 
treated as the equals of men? I did not realise how important this question would 
become when I started my research, because my research and study have gone 
deeper than I had ever imagined before I started (see Chapter 2). I found a pattern 
among my participants who could and could not keep a job: there are many 
difficulties and reasons why women give up their careers and jobs. Kiyomi 
(married with a child, full-time job), is a unique in this research because she is 
happy and satisfied with her life even after marrying and having a child, which is 
easy to understand compared with the general life experience of Japanese women 
who are unhappy and dissatisfied with their lives. Her background is highly 
educated, teaching at university and happy because she could keep her job after 
marrying and having a child.  
 
My life is good, I have a child, job and a supportive and helpful husband. 
I did not have to choose career or family, I could have both. My husband 
and I experienced life overseas .We studied together there, which helped 
him to share the responsibilities of sharing domestic work. I changed my 
family name legally but I am using my own family name at work. The 
school is accepting this (Kiyomi, married with a child and has a job). 
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The first factor in Kiyomi’s narrative is that she did not have to choose between 
work and family, and was able to keep them both, but the majority of women have 
to choose only one; after marriage and after having a child, she could keep a job 
because of her professional work environment (see Chapter 6). In professional and 
career jobs more allowances are made for those who care for children, such as 
flexible working hours, maternity leave and so on (Ato, 2000; Yamane and Ook, 
2008). Second is a supportive husband to share domestic work, and the third one 
is she could keep her name, at least at work. It is important that she did not have 
to choose or change after marriage (see Chapter 6). It is still rare for women to 
retain their jobs in Japan after marrying and having children. When a Japanese 
woman has a child she has to take maternity leave, making it difficult for her to 
return to the same career even if she has support (see Chapter 6). Kiyomi had 
support from professional work and her husband, both of which are rare; she is 
very fortunate. She also has her parents’ support: when she married, her prenuptial 
agreement with her husband was that her parents would live nearby. Her husband 
is a very understanding and supportive man, which is unique in my research.  
 
Table 7: Daily Duties for Kiyomi, Her Husband and Her Parents 
 
Time Kiyomi Kiyomi’s Husband Parents 
6 a.m.    
6:30 a.m.    
7 a.m. Make breakfast for all   
7:30 a.m.    
8 a.m. – 5 p.m.  Take child to nursery 
and go to work 
 
8:30 a.m. –  
4 p.m. 
Leave house to work   
3 p.m.   Pick up child from 
nursery 
5 p.m. Pick up child from 
parent’s house 
  
5:30 p.m. Play with child at 
home 
Grocery shopping for 
dinner 
 
6 p.m.  Cook dinner for all  
8 p.m. Wash dishes and 
ironing  
Clean house  
9 p.m.  Put child to bed  
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Kiyomi’s duties are much lighter than those of other participants (see Chapter 2 
Saki’s daily duties), because her husband and her parents help with domestic 
duties. In fact, Kiyomi’s husband works fewer hours than other participants’ 
husbands (see Chapter 2), which I will talk about in a later section. Kiyomi told 
me that she has hobbies and she has time and money, which is also very rare. 
During interviews, most participants said they had to choose to live far from their 
parents, mostly because they had to choose not to live very far from the husband’s 
workplace, making it was difficult to ask parents for help with child care. It was 
surprising to find that most of participants did not rely on their parents for child 
care during the week. Kiyomi has a life that most Japanese women would dream 
of, but it is a lifestyle that’s very rare and difficult to find. My other respondents 
have to go through many difficulties to keep a job.  
 
Figure 10: Participants’ Difficulties in Keeping a Job After Marrying 
 
 
This is the process that has emerged from the narratives of my respondents; 
however, it is a very simple diagram of a process in which there are much deeper 
issues. After marrying, women have a far greater chance of losing their jobs 
because their employers force them to leave, and because there may be too much 
work outside and at home. When a wife and husband live together, they have to 
choose a convenient place to live for commuting to work, and it will usually be 
nearby the husband’s workplace, making it harder for women to commute and 
manage both a paid job and unpaid work at home. Husbands often transfer to 
different offices in Japan and overseas, making it even harder for women to keep a 
job. Women have child care responsibilities and the expectation of women in 
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Japan to be wise mothers and good wives (see Chapter 1) further restricts women. 
Lastly, when women return to the labour force after having children, they cannot 
return to the same careers they had before when they were single. Japanese 
women have many hurdles to keep a job.  
 
Moreover, in Japan many companies have been hiring women as candidates for 
future wives for their male workers. The expression koshikake-zoku means that 
only young and beautiful women are hired by companies as ‘window dressing’ 
and for the prospects of the male workers, since men and women can meet each 
other at the office (Kagawa, 1996). Female office workers in Japan are referred to 
as ofisu redi (office ladies, or OL for short). OLs are responsible for everything 
from bookkeeping and word processing to more mundane tasks such as secretarial 
and even janitorial duties (Adachi, 1989; Ogasawara, 1998). The majority of 
women in companies are working in supporting roles to male employees 
(Tatenaka, 2000). According to Ueno (2004), Japanese women are always 
supporting men, both at work and at home. They are relegated to supportive 
positions even if they are as highly educated and skilled as their male counterparts. 
The chances of their being promoted are slim, and Japanese women are treated 
differently from men due to the patriarchal, male-dominated society. Women face 
more hurdles than men in the workplace and fall behind. It is nearly impossible 
for Japanese women to compete with men (Adachi, 1989: Ogasawara, 1998). OLs 
do not carry business cards, which are crucial for anyone in Japan who desires a 
more responsible job (Ogasawara, 1998). Even if women work longer, this work 
is not treated as experience or a career. Most of men’s jobs are treated as 
experience, and it is a positive even if they change jobs (but not so for women). 
OL is a job taken by Japanese women which does not further their careers. 
Japanese women are not categorised as career employees, and longer experience 
can be negative (Lo, 1990; Shirahase, 2009). Easy and non-responsible jobs are 
usually reserved for women, and experience is not considered beneficial for 
women, making it is easy to replace women’s positions in Japan. Keeping young 
women at work is important for Japanese companies, to prepare them to be future 
wives for male workers in Japan. 
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My friend lost a job because she was the same age as me, and still single, 
and working at a small company. The company wanted to hire a younger 
woman, so they get rid of my friend. When I started to work I thought I 
would meet a nice man and get married in my 20’s. I have been working 
now since I was 18, quite a long time. Many of my colleagues married 
and quit their jobs a long time ago. Only I and one other woman are left 
and still working at the same company. I am lucky I am working for a 
large company, so that they cannot get rid of me. If I were working for a 
small company I would have already experienced trouble in trying to stay 
there. Most companies do not like to keep older female employees, I think. 
(Akiko, single and has a job). 
 
Most companies seem to view women as expendable, preferring to hire younger 
females and then forcing them out when they decide they are no longer needed 
(Sato, 2004). In large companies more than half the women working full time are 
no older than 29, with a significantly smaller proportion in their 30s or above 
(Ogasawara, 1998). It is difficult for women to remain in a company when they 
age past a certain point (Lo, 1996). Japanese culture pressures women to be 
sexually appealing and beautiful, yet expects them to assume the duties of 
domestic life when the time comes (Rosenberger, 2001) For instance, in the case 
of Akiko’s friend, she was too old for the company’s purposes, and Akiko felt she 
had a more secure position because her company was large.  
 
Paradoxically, women are seen potential wives, even though having relationships 
at work is often a very problematic issue for Japanese women. People have always 
believed that is it not possible to focus on work while maintaining that kind of 
relationship with a co-worker. Quite often in such cases, it is the woman who is 
transferred to a different department within the company, the man remaining in 
the same position, creating a disadvantage for the woman (Lo, 1996). According 
to Lo (1996), who has experienced very different work situations herself both in 
Japan and in other countries, most people hide these relationships from their 
bosses, most female workers being worried about their jobs and not wanting to 
move. One respondent, Eriko, said that her boss had subtly implied that dating 
colleagues is forbidden, especially in the same department, so if she intended to 
stay at the company she would be transferred to a different department or a 
different office altogether. It is always the women who are moved and transferred, 
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because they are not regarded the same as males on a career path (Lo, 1996). 
Another respondent, Kayo, also had a negative experience.  
 
 
I first met my husband at work. It was nothing special, but it was a 
difficult situation for us because our company prohibited dating among 
the employees, and so we had to hide it from all of our colleagues. 
Another reason we didn’t say anything was that we would still have to 
work together at the same company even if the relationship didn’t work 
out. It was very uncomfortable. I thought of it as a platonic love. He was 
nice and so we dated, and then I was kind of pushed by my parents to 
marry him. By the time I turned thirty most of my friends had already 
married, so I thought maybe it was time for me too. I dated him for about 
two years. I cannot see myself having a good career in this company 
because I am a woman. My husband and I started working for the 
company at the same time; in time he was promoted, but not me. It is 
unfair, but it is not a big company so we do not have any sexual equality 
rights. Only a big company can have that sort of rights. One of my 
friends who works for a large company says they are more careful about 
it, but not our small company. I do not enjoy working here, so when I 
become pregnant I might quit my job and become a housewife. I wish I 
could enjoy my work more and could focus on my work like my husband. 
He enjoys being promoted often. (Kayo, married without a child, has a 
full-time job) 
 
 
In Japan women graduate from University and then work for several years until 
they either marry or have a child, and then they are expected to quit because of the 
expectations of their family or society (Lo, 1990). Even when women do stay in 
their jobs after marrying, in most countries they face many gender inequalities, 
such as a lack of promotion opportunity and child care support (see also: 
Cockburn, 2002; Mcmullin and Berger, 2006; Chapter 5 and 6). This lack of 
opportunity causes Japanese women to become disillusioned and lose heart in 
fighting to keep their jobs (Adachi, 1989; Atho, 2002). One such example of this 
inequality is at a bank where the payment curve of the OLs reached its zenith at an 
earlier point and a lower level than men, resulting in a disparity wherein a woman 
would have to work until age 51 to reach the same level that a man in a similar 
position would reach in only four years from starting out (Ogasawara, 1998:12; 
also see Lo, 1990; Habu, 2000). The pay differential is greatest among people in 
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their forties, with women making less than half the wages men do (Ogasawara, 
1998). Thus Kayo (Married without a child and has a job) was considering 
becoming a full-time housewife because she was not happy with how she was 
being passed over for promotion by her male colleagues. Her husband was 
promoted, but she was not. She realised her future in the company would be bleak 
and so could not see any benefit in continuing to work there. When Japanese 
women decide to marry, they face another barrier to keeping a job, because there 
is no strict law designed to protect women (see Chapter 6). A law to protect 
women was established in 1972, stating that when women are married or pregnant, 
an employer must not force them to leave and must not cut wages (see Chapter 6). 
But even then, one of my respondents experienced illegal action by a company 
trying to fire her. 
 
 
I told my office manager that I was marrying soon. The manager asked 
me right away ‘when?’ ‘Are you planning staying?’ I said in 3 months 
time and yes, I would like to stay. But two weeks later I was told that, 
about a month before, I had made a mistake and made trouble for our 
team, so I had to go. Even I did not remember that happening, and there 
is not any evidence I made the mistake. I could not do anything and I was 
forced to leave the company (Eriko, married with out a child and 
housewife).  
 
 
Two of my participants, Kayo and Akiko, said that they think large companies 
offer much more protection to women, however, Eriko was working for a larger 
company, but she was forced to leave the company when she was married. One 
government study shows that 9% of women are forced to leave a company after 
marriage or having a child (MHLW, 2011). Though the law exists, an employer 
could make many excuses to make women leave a company even if they do not 
want to (see Chapter 6). In Eriko’s case, she was forced to leave the company not 
because she was marrying, but because she was accused of making a mistake in 
her work. Even with legal protection, married and/or pregnant women still face 
the possibility of losing their job, even married women who aren’t planning on 
having any children. 
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After having a child, respondents expressed their concerns that finances demand 
that women should return to the labour force, but most respondents who are 
married without children said they plan to quit their jobs after having a child. 
During the interviews it came to light that some of the respondents were 
experiencing the responsibility of raising children; some were dreaming of being 
mothers, and some of them were willing to quit their jobs because they were not 
their ideal jobs. Even if women could remain at work after marriage or after 
having a child, some women are pushed into different departments, or are 
transferred to different, less important jobs to make them decide to leave the 
company (MHLW, 2011).  
 
 
I am definitely quitting my job when I become pregnant. I do not 
particularly enjoy my work. I would prefer to be a good mother and take 
care of my child. I have felt that it was enough to take care of my 
husband, but my child will be different. I would like to take care of my 
child probably until school starts. I want to be there for my child. My 
mother stayed at home for me, so I want to be a good mother, which is 
the most important thing for me at this moment. (Kazumi, married, 
without a child and has a job) 
 
 
Some of the respondents who were married without children were willing to be 
mothers, wanting to be the ideal mother. Japanese women are afraid of not being 
good mothers even if they have to make sacrifices. When single women were 
asked by researchers about their attitudes toward a remaining at a job after 
marriage, 36.9 % of women said they would like to keep the job, but after having 
a child, decreased to 21.3% of women wished to remain (MHLW, 2010). Japanese 
women face tremendous difficulty if they wish to return to the workforce in the 
same kind of job after having been gone for a length of time (Okagawa, 2001). 
For example, many women who had been teachers before birth attempted to 
return to their jobs, yet all they could find was factory work or work as shop 
assistants (Oda, 2008). This is one example of why Japanese companies have 
started to become concerned about national depopulation, because they want to 
hire and retain talented, intelligent and trained people and they have started 
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providing better working conditions, especially for women. During the raising of 
a child, women are most likely to lose their careers, and even if women go back to 
the labour force, they are usually offered unskilled jobs (Ochiai, 2008; Shirahase, 
2009). Women have to work after their children become older due to financial 
reasons, even if they can only find menial jobs.  
 
 
I quit my job when I become pregnant. Now I have a part-time job 
working at a factory where I check bread. I used to work for a bank. I 
wish I could get my old job back. But because I need money I do not have 
any choice. That is the reality. (Saki, married with children and has a 
part-time job) 
 
 
Nagase (1997) also described the ‘home-working’ style for Japanese women who 
are married and have a child, and who stay at home and do some jobs to earn 
income. It is called Naishoku. A supplier brings tasks to a housewife at home, 
sometimes checking faulty products such as electrical goods, stationery, toys and 
clothes. Depending on the volume and speed with which they do the job, they earn 
a small amount of money when the task is completed. Recently, many more 
Naishoku jobs have become computer data entry jobs. When children are small, 
Japanese women stay at home, take care of the family and home, and work (do 
Naishoku and earn some money) at home. Below are images of ‘Naishoku’ in this 
case, making envelopes.  
 
Figure 11: Naishoku 
   
Sources:  http://photohito.com/photo/82581/        http://yaplog.jp/vert_saison/image/621 
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I used to work for a large company. Everything was great! I was able to 
earn my own wages and spend all of my money on myself. But now that I 
am looking for a job, there is no way I could get my old job back. I also 
can’t work full-time anyway, because of my children and my husband. I 
prefer going outside to see different things other than my home 
surroundings. Every day I see the same views, but it would be difficult to 
leave the house. I would do Naishoku (Home-working) to earn some 
money. (Keiko, married, children, housewife) 
 
 
In Keiko’s case, she now has to perform an unsatisfying job. Keiko said, ‘I prefer 
work outside, even part-time, because I can feel connected to the outside world 
and society again’. She was not happy, she would have a meaningless job at home, 
but she preferred even a meaningless and unsatisfying job if it meant working 
outside of her home, but in her in situation it is still hard to find outside work, so 
for financial reasons she has to choose work at home. Keiko told me that her 
friend is making envelopes at home and she does not, but she needs to do so.  
 
 
Lack of Support  
 
 
In Japanese companies, men and women do not travel along the same career 
trajectory, such that it is much easier for men to claim better and higher positions 
than women. According to research conducted in 2010 by Corporate Women 
Directors International, Japan was ranked 38
th
 out of 42 countries for labour force 
equality; the four countries ranked lower than Japan were Arab countries. The 
research shows that only 1.4 % of higher management positions are held by 
women. South Korea was ranked 37
th
, with 1.5 % of higher management positions 
in Japan held by women. The most equality between women and men found by 
this research occurred in Norway (40.3%) and second-ranked was Sweden 
(21.9%) and U.K was 12.2% (Corporate Women Directors International, 2010).  
 
Most Japanese men work for only one company. One study compared this with 42 
other countries, and found that the younger generation of Japanese people still 
believe that it is better to stay with one company, compared with young workers in 
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other countries (Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, 2012). That is, 
they do not often change jobs, except in the cases of part-time workers, and this 
applies to women as well. So for Japanese men it is nearly a lifelong commitment, 
with the average male employee working for the same company for 40 years. This 
is the ‘Nenko-joreshu’ system: when you stay longer at work, you are 
automatically promoted, similar to the patriarchal system in which the older male 
is the top of the hierarchy (see Chapter 2). Women usually have more time off, 
such as for maternity leave and for taking care of sick children. In Japan this can 
cost women their chances of promotion while most Japanese women must give up 
their jobs after starting to have families.  
 
Japan and South Korea share similarities regarding women in the workforce, 
though it is more common for South Korean women to re-enter the workforce via 
self-employment, since that country is less corporate-based than Japan, and 
self-employment is also regarded as a viable path for men (Yamane and Ook, 
2008: 78). It is also more common for South Korean families to rely on networks 
of relatives to help with child care. Women also find it easier to enter professional 
careers and women in South Korea have more rights in the workplace than they 
would have in Japan (Yamane and Ook, 2008: 77). This results in a dichotomy 
between Japan’s advanced urban and economic planning, and its educational 
system on one hand, versus very slow advancement in gender equality on the 
other. This is an important factor in the low fertility rates experienced in Japan and 
South Korea (Suzuki, 2008: 36). Women professionals generally marry men of 
comparable productiveness, but even in the West, men still receive greater 
recognition for their work and move up the career ladder faster (Lorber, 2005). In 
Japan, it is even worse. This problem has been discussed at length in the media 
and at academic conferences, and it is generally agreed that it is very important to 
keep talented women in the workplace, or the consequences could soon be 
economically disastrous due to the shortage of properly skilled workers in Japan 
(Shionoya, 2001). Despite this recognition, little has changed.  
 
Dasgupta (2000) found in her research that Japanese husbands today prefer their 
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wives to be employed outside the home for the sake of the extra income, but not 
as the main provider. It is better for Japanese husbands if their wives do 
meaningless jobs such as ‘Naishoku’ to make extra money and help the family 
financially, but women will not gain the confidence from this work that is needed 
to become more independent. Women are unsatisfied with their limited options to 
help their families financially, but this is not regarded as part of their duties as a 
mother and wife (Delphy and Leonard, 2002). The constant interruption of daily 
life, the tendency for other family members to take them for granted, and not 
being considered for work positions that involve major decision making, form a 
discouraging pattern for women and diminishes their efforts and achievements in 
the eyes of others (Lorber, 1997: 16; Delphy and Leonard, 2002: 21). Also during 
my interviews, respondents said that they felt it was ‘unfair’ having to work 
‘double time,’ both inside and outside the home. Jackson and Scott (2002: 152) 
point out that, if both their home chores and outside work are counted together, 
women work much longer hours than men. In an average day, a Japanese man 
spends 59 minutes cooking, cleaning or attending to child care duties, while the 
average amount of time spent by men on these duties in the OECD was 131 
minutes (see Chapter 1). Women are expected to work four times longer. Japanese 
men do not want to change anything that would allow women to have more 
responsibilities and easier access to paid work.  
 
Men still think women are supposed to be in charge of the household. Finch and 
Mason (1993) describe how the cultural and geographical surroundings of women 
and men may affect gender roles and role models, but morality, responsibility and 
acknowledgement of the differences in gender are important to change men’s 
attitudes towards gender roles or sharing the responsibilities of domestic work. 
Whereas working wives have two duties, working both outside and inside the 
home, their husbands have only one such duty, working outside the home.  
 
I married and quit my job, because if both of us were working outside, it 
would be impossible for me to do all of the domestic work by myself and 
take care of a child. His and my work place are quite far from our house 
(Kamiko, Married housewife, with a child).  
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Even though some women need to earn money for the family, they cannot work 
outside; they have to work at home to earn money. Women who left a job after 
marriage or having a child said that their main reason for leaving work was to 
focus on housework (39 %), because they felt they had to quit because women 
cannot take on both responsibilities (26.1 %). For 4.7 % of the women, the reason 
was the distance between their workplace and home (MHLW, 2011).  
 
Women have to consider commuting time as well because when they are single, 
she can commute and come home, but after having a family, women have to 
handle all domestic work and take care of children. They would use more time to 
commute, leaving many women such as Keiko to take on Naishoku work at home. 
Another respondent, Saki (married with children, employed part-time) said, ‘I 
could not go far to work part-time because I have very limited time. Commuting is 
losing my time. I chose my part-time, which was just a conveniently close 
location’. My respondents wanted to find any job close to home, or work at home 
to earn some money for the family. Their husbands could pursue their jobs and 
gain more confidence; this has a negative effect on women, since men’s financial 
power leaves women little choice but to obey the call to work at home for 
financial reasons after marrying and having a child. They lose their self-esteem as 
a result.  
 
When Japanese people pursue their career, there are some opportunities for 
employees to transfer to other offices Japan or offices overseas. According to the 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in 2011, Japanese men often transfer to 
different offices: 36.2 % of employees of smaller and medium-sized companies 
have a chance to transfer to other offices, while 46.9 % of employees of larger 
companies have opportunities to transfer offices (MHLW, 2009). When a husband 
is transferred to another office and must go to another city or prefecture, the 
family might have to move depending on the distance involved, again making it 
more difficult for women to keep a job. Kamiko also mentioned that her husband 
has quite often transferred offices, so it is more difficult for her to keep a job 
(Married housewife, with a child). 
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Retirement  
 
 
In most countries part-time workers do not receive equal pay or equal benefits 
because their shorter hours make them ineligible (Gregory and Connolly, 2008). 
One respondent, Kiyomi, had a secure job and was completely financially 
independent from her husband, saying that she would have a good settlement 
when she retired and that she was not worried about finances. Kiyomi is rather 
unique in that she has been able to retain her financial security and independence. 
Kiyomi’s case illustrates the importance of understanding women’s desires and 
needs so to allow them to thrive personally and professionally. The Japanese 
company retirement system also widens the gap of inequality, forcing women to 
rely all the more on men, i.e. their husbands. Thus in situations where a woman 
would prefer to divorce before her husband retires, she must often put it off, 
waiting until he retires before she can receive any benefit payments. One option 
which many Japanese women have been exercising after their husbands retire is 
known as Narita Rikon (Divorce at Narita Airport), which has a double meaning. 
The original meaning refers to young couples who would marry and leave for 
their honeymoon from Narita Airport, but then decide to end their short marriage 
upon their return which was popularised in a 1997 television drama. In this 
situation where the husband and wife have not been married long, there are no 
children involved and thus fewer responsibilities, since children bind the wife to 
the husband to each other and compel them to not divorce (see Chapter 4). 
Divorces of couples married less than five years and more than 25 years have 
steadily been increasing since 1990 (MHLW, 2010). The other meaning of Narita 
Rikon is that after a couple’s children marry and go off on their honeymoon, the 
parents can finally divorce, because the children are now married adults and the 
father is of retirement age. One respondent, Kumiko (married with children and a 
housewife), told me about her parents. 
 
My mother was thinking seriously about divorcing my father after he 
retired, but she realised that it would be very financially difficult to live by 
herself, so she decided not to. She calculated their pension, which was 
about ￥17,0000(￡1,328) a month for both of them together. She could 
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not live on half of that. 
 
 
In April, 2007, a law was enacted which stated that when couples in Japan divorce, 
women can apply to receive the maximum amount of money from their husbands’ 
retirement benefits, which is half. In April, 2008 this law was further modified 
which stated that even if the husband has not yet reached retirement age, wives are 
entitled to half of their husbands’ retirement settlements. Japanese law has been 
favouring women, but there are still many issues. In most cases, men cannot gain 
access to their retirement settlement until they actually retire, so they can claim 
that they have no money, often forcing women to give up pursuing those claims 
(Murakami, 2009). Japanese authorities are trying to change this to be more 
favourable toward women, but they have not been completely successful, making 
it more difficult for women to pursue divorce. Any available pension monies will 
be split after a divorce, but there are still financial difficulties (see also Chapter 4 
and 6). 
 
 
I worked full-time until I got married; now my children are in school. I 
need to raise education expenses for them, so I am now working part-time, 
about 25to 30 hours a week. I am not entitled to any retirement benefits 
from my company, which is unfair. I do the same work as any full-time 
worker, but my status is that of a part-time worker. (Kiriko, married with 
children and has a part-time job) 
 
 
The average retirement allowance in 2008, for employees who had worked at least 
20 years on a full-time basis, was ¥ 23,350,000 (£ 182,422) for those with 
bachelor’s degrees, and ¥ 20,010,000 (£ 156,328) for those with only high school 
diploma (MHLW, 2008). Actually, those who had stayed at one company for many 
years earned quite a bit on the ‘escalator system.’ As many as 85.3 % of 
companies provided severance packages for their retiring full-time workers. 
Kiriko (married with children, employed part-time) was 32 years old and expected 
to continue working until she was 60 or 65 years of age, at which time she would 
have been working on a part-time basis for 28 to 33 more years. Companies are 
quite eager to employ people like Kimiko (Married with a child and housewife) 
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for cheap labour. More than 50 % (51.7 %) of companies who employ temporary 
and part-time workers explain that they prefer to hire such workers because of 
reduced cost, and more than one-quarter of companies (26.5 %) say that they can 
control the number of workers easier, increasing the numbers during busy times, 
and reducing the numbers during slower times (MHLW, 2010). Nearly 80 % of 
employers feel that hiring temporary and part-time workers is beneficial to them, 
for there is less payment, less commitment and fewer restrictions on their part. 
Part-time workers can be easily laid off, and they do not receive any retirement 
benefits. Yet Kimiko felt that she was doing the same kind of job as a full-time 
worker but without any of the benefits or security. Both Kazumi’s and Kiriko’s 
husbands could expect to receive a full retirement allowance, but even though 
Kiriko might work for more than 20 years on a part-time basis, she would not be 
entitled to any benefits. Less than 10 % of temporary and part-time workers are 
receiving any benefits (MHLW, 2010). 
 
 
 
Balancing Work and Home Life 
 
 
Women cannot simply undertake a paid job and gain independence because men 
do not do domestic work. Cockburn (2002: 180) says that there is an unspoken 
question about women in the workplace: can they ever achieve equality with men, 
or will their gender always be a disadvantage? Even in European countries, where 
women have greater rights and enjoy better living conditions, there is not total 
equality yet, including Scandinavia (also see OECD in 2011:Work and Life 
Balance). One of my respondents Saki (married with children, part-time) has a 
busy life because of her husband does not support her at home (see Chapter 2). 
For Saki it is impossible to have full-time job without any support because there is 
not enough free time in her day. 
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Figure 12: Satisfaction with Work-Life Balance 
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     Sources: OECD Better Life Index. Work-Life Balance (2012) 
     http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/ 
 
 
Moreover, according to OECD (2011) Japan has the longest working hours and 
out of 36 countries, ranks 34
th
 in work-life balance; below Japan were Turkey 
(rank 35) and Mexico (rank 36). The research found that families found it 
particularly hard to achieve this balance. Some couples want more children, but 
delay because they cannot afford for either partner to stop working. Some parents 
are satisfied with the size of their families, but find it difficult to find the time to 
work. The resulting imbalance becomes a problem for governments: families that 
cannot achieve a balance between work and home life are less healthy and less 
productive as a result. When families have to choose between work and raising 
children, fewer babies are born and fewer jobs are filled.  
 
Since 2003, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan has been 
introducing laws to encourage Japanese men to go home and help women by 
trying to reduce working hours and allow for a more balanced family life. In 2007 
Japan installed a new Ministry of State for Gender Equality and Social Affairs 
which was in charge, among other things, of documenting the decline in fertility. 
The ministry’s ‘Work-Life Balance’ charter stresses the long-term importance of 
creating policies to balance work and raising children. The ministry also 
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established a ten-year plan (2008-2017) which includes three major goals: The 
first goal is to raise the labour force participation rate of mothers at six months 
after giving birth from 38 to 55 %. The second is to increase the percentage of 
men who take paternity leave from 1.6 to 10 %, and the third is to increase 
husbands’ time spent on housekeeping and child care from 60 to 150 minutes a 
day. In 2005 the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare introduced a mascot 
named ‘Kurumin’.          
 
Figure 13: Kuromin 
 
Translation: Above: Supporting Joining Child Support 
           Below: Year of authorisation  
Source: http://www.job-getter.com/img/kurumin.gif 
 
 
Companies have to try to receive this ‘Kurumin’ logo certificate from the Ministry 
of Health, Labour and Welfare every year. They can earn it if at least 70 % of the 
female employees who have recently had children take maternity leave, and if any 
male employees are taking paternity leave. Even if only one male employee is 
taking paternity leave, the company would be accepted. This logo has been used 
by companies for advertisement since 2010, printed on the companies’ business 
cards, courier bags and so on, and it can earn the companies a tax deduction. Since 
the tax deductions were announced, 920 companies earned the seal and qualified 
for the deductions in 2009, while 1,300 companies received the ‘Kurumin’ in 2012. 
One of my participants told me about the ‘Kuromin’.  
 
My company received Kuromin, and my married male colleagues were 
joking, ‘good, we are hoping for fewer hours then.’ I asked them, ‘What 
you are going to do when you finish work early?’ They told me they are 
planning on going fishing or golfing. They are hopeless, really (Chiyomi, 
single, employed full-time).  
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Chiyomi already has a negative opinion of the government plan, which is not 
helping women. It seems it is only helping more men to enjoy themselves. 
Approximately 6,500,000 companies exist in Japan and the top five prefectures in 
Tokyo have 267,630 companies with 2,777,223 employees, but only 39 of those 
companies received the ‘Kurumin’ (MHLW, 2012). It is not hard to receive the 
‘Kurumi’ symbol, but the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan has to 
focus more on supporting women with flexible hours. Even though Chiyomi’s 
company received the ‘Kurimin’, she has not seen any changes. Chiyomi said,  
 
 
‘Maybe ‘ONE’ male colleague took paternity leave. That’s why we 
received the ‘Kurimin’ or whatever it is called. As far as I can see, after 
having children, my female colleagues are gone. I know the meaning of 
flexible hours, but it would be impossible for our company, simply 
because a supportive atmosphere for women does not exist here. 
 
 
Only large companies can and will accommodate these needs, usually to use that 
fact to advertise their work environment for women, but the majority of 
companies ignore gender inequality. Kawaguchi (2000) argues that in recent times, 
Japanese husbands have been going home earlier in the day to help their wives. 
But I found that most of my participants were not helped by their husbands. Kim 
(1997: 37) found, in her research of the patriarchal system, that Korean husbands 
did not like their wives adopting a ‘westernised’ ideology of individualism. South 
Korea and Japan are similar male-dominated societies (see Chapter 1) they do not 
like changing; even nowadays, many wives work outside but men feel failure 
(Kim, 1997: 33) not to be able to provide all, and yet they still refuse to share in 
domestic work. My respondents’ husbands are not from an older generation, but 
despite being from the younger generation, they are not interested in changing 
their attitudes to gender roles, or doing more to support their wives or families. 
Even if those Japanese government policies changed and Japanese men could 
have fewer working hours, it would not guarantee that men would do more 
domestic work to reduce women’s workload, as I saw from my participants’ 
experiences. Saki’s weekend activities (her husband’s days off), so that it can be 
compared with her weekday schedule (see Chapter 2). 
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Even if my husband comes home earlier or takes a day off he just sleeps. 
I cannot clean the house because of him. Plus I have to prepare his meals 
three times a day. When he is at home there are more things for me to do, 
and I cannot do what I want to do. I have three children and a part-time 
job. I do not need a fourth child! (Saki, married, has children and has a 
part-time job). 
 
 
 
Table 8: Saki’s Weekend Activities 
 
 
 
 
Time For herself For entire 
family 
For her  husband For her children 
6:00 a.m.    Make breakfast and lunch 
6:30 a.m.    Wake child up 
7:00 a.m.    Dress up in baseball uniform  
7:30 a.m.    Take a child to baseball field by car 
8:00 a.m.    Stay there and give lunch to coach 
8:30 a.m.   Wake husband up Wake up other two children 
8:45 a.m.   Make breakfast  Make breakfast  
9:00 a.m. Eat breakfast    Help eating breakfast  
9:30 a.m.    Brush teeth and help to dress 
10:00 a.m.    Take second child to private class: 
dancing class   
11:00 a.m.  Grocery 
shopping 
  
12:00 p.m.    Making lunch  Making lunch  
1:00 p.m. Eat lunch   Pick up children 
3:00 p.m.  Continuing 
cleaning or 
finish laundry 
 Children come home from 
activities; preparing snack for them.  
4:00 p.m.   Take him to golf practice 
range  
Take them to park and so on; 
outside activities  
6:00 p.m.   Pick husband up  
7:00 p.m.  Making dinner   Check children’s homework 
8:00 p.m.  Wash dishes  Prepare hot bath for 
husband 
 
8:30 p.m.   Make drink for husband Watching TV and play games with 
them 
9:30 p.m.   Make drinks for husband 
again 
Read a book to help one child go to 
sleep 
10:00 p.m.  Ironing   Make sure two children go to bed 
and sleep 
10:30 p.m. Take a bath  Make drinks for husband 
again 
 
11:00 p.m. Go to bed  Help husband sleep  
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Saki smiled and joked that one difference between weekdays and weekends is that 
she could sleep until 6 instead of wake up at 5am. Japanese women actually react 
rather negatively when their husbands take a day off. Wives even prefer husbands 
who are absent. Women feel that there is more work to do when men are around. 
Saki’s weekend is not very different from her weekdays, because domestic work 
and child care is nonstop, plus taking care of her husband. Saki told me ‘I would 
prefer going to a part-time job, even if I do not like it there, rather than taking 
care of another child who is my husband’. It was surprising to find was mothers 
take turns each weekend making a lunch for their children’s coach, so some 
weekends she has to make lunch for the baseball coach.  
 
I asked: ‘Do you have any opinion of lunch service for a coach?’  
Saki said: ‘It is not a written rule but everybody is doing it, so I have to. I 
do not want to be a leader to say we are paying for the coach, why do I 
have to make a lunch? I am afraid my child will be picked on by the 
coach if I say something’.  
 
 
In a male-dominated culture, women and mothers are expected to make a lunch 
for the male coach. The Japanese patriarchal social structure not only compels 
women to be housewives, but it also brainwashes them into believing that the key 
to their happiness is to be good wives and wise mothers, harkening back to the 
ideology of the Meiji Period. This forced servitude of women to men is still 
continuing to this day (Kimura, 2012: 108). Women and mothers have to do all the 
work for a family; even though Saki thinks it is not right to make a lunch for a 
coach, but she is not fighting back against this system, because she prefers to do it 
rather than in confront the matter and bring a negative reaction for her child. I was 
fortunate to hear the story of lunch-making duty for a male coach, because the 
week I interviewed Saki, it was her turn to make him lunch. If it had been a 
different week, it might not have been mentioned. Other married women with 
children told me of similar experiences, such as a school teacher voicing an 
opinion they oppose, but they do not protest. Kiriko (Married with a child, 
part-time job) said, ‘One of the male school teachers offers a very male-dominated 
opinion of mothers, but I ignored this because of my child. He said ‘mother should 
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stay at home’. Other married participants with children also mentioned similar 
duties for school: PTA (Parent-Teacher-Association), class leaders, publicity, 
health and physical education, off-campus activities, and so on. Each school term 
and every class has to choose a parent to be an officer in charge, and the majority 
of these officers are mothers.  
 
I have never seen a father as in an officer of something at school. I have 
three children; every year I am being some officer at school. Sometimes 
in classrooms, we argue because no one wants to do it, because 
everybody is busy and nobody wants to spend time to be an officer. Only 
mothers have to do those responsibilities and sometimes argue at school 
and so on, men, father do not have to be involved in any school activities 
or duties that would cost them their free time, which is not fair.(Kumiko, 
married with children, housewife).  
 
 
About once a week, there are meetings to attend and other duties and events every 
month for officers. It varies from school to school, but according to my 
respondents who are married with children, one parent from each has to be 
involved in some school activities. ‘We cannot ignore those officers, someone has 
to do it. We could not decide, so we did a lucky dip to pick up a piece of paper; if 
it says something you have to be an officer’ (Kiriko, married with children , 
employed part-time). It is a mother’s commitment and task to do this when her 
children are at school. School activities and events are regarded as duties for 
mothers. Japanese wives and mothers have to do the majority of housework and 
raising the children. They do not have time to themselves when they go to a 
nearby part-time job or do ‘Naishoku’ work at home to earn some extra money for 
family, and they make less money than men, so women have to take on the 
responsibilities of domestic work and child raising.  
 
All of these inequalities might have led to more women in Japan remaining 
unmarried; few women have the same range of choices that Kiyomi has. The 
result is that it is better to remain single rather than marrying or having a child, 
because it means more responsibilities and more change for women. Aya (single, 
employed full-time) said, ‘I prefer to be single rather than changing all which I 
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have now being free! My career is not bad, and my friends who are married are 
miserable, but do not wish to say it’ While even today many Japanese people still 
believe old expressions and symbols, this not true with single women. All the 
single participants preferred not to quit their jobs, even past research findings 
show that less educated Japanese women are more likely to remain in the labour 
force (see Chapter 1), while my research indicates that women want to stay at 
work, but are not able to.  
 
My mother wanted to divorce my father, but she did not because of me. I 
appreciated my mother for that, but I do not want to be like her. She has 
always told me to be an independent woman. She always encourages me 
to pursue a higher education accordingly. So I will not quit my job. My 
career is very important to me. (Chiriko, single and has a job) 
 
 
Chiriko cited reasons such as wanting a safety net in case of divorce, wanting to 
maintain her own self-esteem, not wanting to stay at home, and also financial 
reasons. But after marrying and becoming pregnant, will they still have the same 
opinions as before? Do single women remain single because they feel they cannot 
take such a huge step? Many single respondents mentioned the responsibilities 
and pressures they would face, and feared becoming be a wife and a mother.  
 
 
Expectations of being a Woman  
 
The Traditional Japanese Wife and Woman 
  
 
Culture and the media, through representations of women in movies, 
television, advertising, popular music, and even dance and ballet, has 
deconstructed feminism by aiming its messages at children, teenagers and 
adults alike. The messages, both subliminally and more obviously, relay 
society’s approved notions of female and male bodies, gender roles and 
sex. Songs about the “man who got away” reinforce a heterosexual 
viewpoint; a tragedy such as “The Death of a Salesman” reinforces the 
traditional values surrounding the nuclear family, and no room is left to 
question the underlying messages about sexuality or gender roles. 
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Women are encouraged to make decisions about work and family of 
which society will approve, while decisions not sanctioned by society are 
shown to be destructive. (Lorber, 1997: 33-34).  
 
 
Lorber’s comment can be apply to the experience of being a traditional Japanese 
woman. The roles of wife and mother are played by popular actresses on TV 
series, and are glorified in music and the media, with the promise that women will 
meet a nice partner and ‘live happily ever after’, but my research has shown that 
the reality of being a traditional Japanese woman does not always lead to this 
happy ending. There is a famous mythical figure named Yamatonadeshiko, who 
embodies how to be a good Japanese wife. She is a quiet, good housekeeper, hard 
worker, and supporter of her husband and family (Kawaguchi, 1996). The name 
Yamatonadeshiko is a combination of Yamato (Japan) and nadeshiko (a small, 
beautiful and strong Japanese wildflower). 
 
Figure 14: A Nadeshiko Flower  
 
Source: http://www.hana300.com/nadesi.html 
 
Yamatonadeshiko never actually existed; she was created long ago to be a symbol 
of the ideal Japanese woman’s behaviour and beauty. Shindo (1999) explains that 
this Yamatonadeshiko has created much difficulty for women and men to find 
partners. That is, partners’ ideals and expectations are too unrealistically high 
because of this symbol. According to Shindo (1999), there are serious gaps 
between the typical male and female visions of the ideal partner. Men believe such 
an ideal could and should exist, but many women today feel totally the opposite of 
125 
 
what Yamatonadeshiko is supposed to be. In 1959 Akiko Kojima, the Japanese 
woman who won the title of Miss Universe, said in her speech that her dream was 
not to be an actress or model but a good wife. As a result she became a 
representative of Yamatonadeshiko. She led many men to believe in the ideal of 
the intelligent, beautiful and supportive wife. Another example is the 1980s singer 
Momoe Yamaguchi. She was popular and beautiful and had a promising career, 
but suddenly she announced her retirement in order to marry. She also said she 
wanted to be an ordinary woman and a good wife, and she still serves as the 
symbol of the ‘good Japanese woman’. Surprisingly, there is a Japanese Women’s 
Union recruiting women to be like Yamatonadeshiko. The union organizes tea 
parties, kimono parties, flower arranging parties and Japanese calligraphy 
exhibitions. The purpose of the Japanese Women’s Union is to ensure that the 
values of the ideal traditional woman are preserved, such as having a strong spirit, 
being supportive of the family, and being a good mother, a good wife, quiet, and 
beautiful.  
 
The concept of Yamatonadeshiko still persists today. The Japanese women’s 
World Cup football team was called ‘NadeshikoJapan’, the same meaning as 
Yamatonadeshiko. They won World Cup in 2011. As an illustration of the 
Japanese people’s specific image of Yamatonadeshiko, a TV series was recently 
created featuring one of the most famous and beautiful Japanese women of today 
as Yamatonadeshiko. When interviewing my respondents about gender roles, I 
asked them if they were aware of Yamatonadeshiko. All the single participants 
said yes. Three participants mentioned they could not be like her because 
Yamatonadeshiko has to be a beautiful woman, something that all the respondents 
knew well. Most single Japanese women think it is important to spend time and 
care to maintain their beauty. But this mythical being symbolizes a 
near-impossible traditional ideal.  
 
I cannot be a Yamatonadeshiko. I am not beautiful as she [the 
Yamatonadeshiko actress] is. I do not want to work hard and support my 
husband. If I were as beautiful as she is my husband would do everything 
for me. (Akiko, single and has a job).  
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Many of the single participants thought that even if they were beautiful enough to 
identify themselves as Yamatonadeshiko, they would not want to. During the 
interviews I was given the general impression that if they were that beautiful, then 
the men should serve them, not the other way around. Their comments could 
perhaps be an indication of the emergence of a new, modern-day Japanese 
woman.  
 
Can you imagine being like her? She is very beautiful and does 
everything for her family and husband. If I were her I would play around 
and finally I would find a rich man so I would not have to do anything. 
Japanese men are dreamers and ask too much from women. Why do they 
only think about themselves? Do they think they are princes? I do not 
think so. (Ayako, single and has a job) 
 
 
Single women think when they are beautiful they have greater chances and more 
choices and feel they do not have to work so hard to do anything. In my study 
there was a big difference in the responses between the single and the married 
participants, but there are fewer differences between the married participants with 
or without children. Most of the single participants made mention of 
Yamatonadeshiko’s physical appearance and that they could not be like 
Yamatonadeshiko, but the married women were more likely to be comfortable 
describing themselves as such.  
 
I am the one. I did not think I would be, but since marriage I have 
changed so much. I am working hard to support and do everything for my 
family. I quit my job for my family too. (Kimiko, married, has a child and 
housewife) 
 
 
One participant in particular (Saki) described her own metamorphosis into 
Yamatonadeshiko after marrying. She noted that pursuing her image ‘was like 
fishing for my husband. He’s treated me well, but now I have been caught’. There 
is a Japanese expression that says, ‘After we have caught a fish, we no longer have 
to feed it’. All but one of the participants referred to themselves as 
Yamatonadeshiko. The one who did not, Kiyomi, felt that sometimes there was no 
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other choice but to be Yamatonadeshiko so as to work hard to support her family 
and husband. In Kiyomi’s case, when she shared domestic work with her husband, 
she was more relaxed and I felt much more confidence and did not feel desperate 
or forced to do the work. Kiyomi also said, ‘I have not changed so much after 
marriage I am happier, perhaps’. All of the other respondents mentioned that 
since marrying and giving birth, they had had to change. 
 
I have turned into Yamatonadeshiko since marriage. Now I that have a 
family I have to be a hard worker and support my family and my husband. 
(Kiriko, married, has children and has s part-time job) 
 
Since I married, and especially since having my first child, I have had so 
many responsibilities to keep to my family. I think I am now 
Yamatonadeshiko, but was not so before marriage (Keiko, married with 
children, housewife). 
 
 It is interesting to note that only one of the participants in the married group 
mentioned Yamatonadeshiko’s appearance, the rest focusing more on her hard 
work and support of her family. The participants apparently thought they were 
working very hard to support their families and felt entitled to say so.  
 
Marriage has made me different. Before marriage my husband did 
everything for me, but now I have to not only do everything for him but 
also for my children. I am working outside to help financially and then I 
come home to do the housework. (Saki, married, has children and has a 
part-time job)   
 
I am Yamatonadeshiko because I am working hard; actually I am working 
both outside and at home. I am Yamatonadeshiko because I support my 
husband. (Kayo, married, without a child, has a job) 
 
Yes, I am Yamatonadeshiko. I am supporting my husband and working 
hard. (Kazuko, married, without a child, has a job) 
 
Sakamoto (2002) explains that most Japanese woman want to be married if they 
feel it is worth it to change themselves into being a good wife and a good mother. 
It is also the case that many Japanese women leave the workplace after marriage 
and do not return until their children have grown (Holloway, 2010). Japanese 
mothers also have a very strong desire to take care of their children and be a 
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positive influence on them during this critical period (see Chapter 1).  
 
 
I do not want to work outside the home yet because my child is still small. 
I think the period of time until they are three years old is the most 
important time for raising a child. I want to be there for my child always. 
(Kamiko, married, has a child, housewife) 
 
 
Ochiai (2008) found research that many people in East Asian countries say they 
would like to stay at home while their children are small; in Japan, this means 
until the child is three years of age (see Chapter 1), since it is believed that until 
children reach that age, it is vital to their development that they be loved and 
raised by their mother. This myth supports Japan’s male-dominated society and 
the gender inequality that forces women to leave their jobs (Ochiai, Yamane and 
Ook , 2008). Even after becoming mothers, the women feel guilty about working 
outside the home even if there are financial considerations. 
  
I raised my children until they were three years old. I needed to go back 
to work as quickly as possible for financial reasons, but I always felt bad 
that I could not stay longer to take care of them (Kiriko, married, has 
children and has a part-time job).  
 
 
This myth is developed in China and South Korea as well (see Chapter 1): China 
has its own 7 year myth and Korea has a 5 year myth (Ochiai, 2008; Yamane and 
Ook 2008). When women do try to work alongside men, they would face a virtual 
double shift, consisting of their full-time careers and the responsibilities involve in 
managing a family and a home, and would feel guilty for not spending that time 
with their children, since men do not share parenting duties (Lorber, 1997: 24).  
 
Japanese men, however, are still dreaming and searching for their 
Yamatonadeshiko, and women are still searching for a prince. Women wait to 
meet the perfect man, especially those who have a higher education or are older 
(Ono, 2002). According to Sakamoto (2002), as age increases the ideal partner 
terms also increase. Her analysis is that the partner generally does not turn out as 
the woman wishes, yet the women do not want to think of themselves as failures. 
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It appears that once they are married, these women have to force themselves to 
change and to take on most of the responsibilities of housework and childcare. 
Hara (2008: 53) found that single women in Japan do not want to lose their 
freedom, so they prefer not to marry. 
 
If I were beautiful I would marry a rich man and then I could be 
Yamatonadeshiko, because I would want to maintain that lifestyle. But 
this is the twenty-first century, so I cannot become a Yamatonadeshiko 
unless someone makes me into one. (Chiyomi, single, and has a job) 
 
 
Chiyomi denies the possibility of beauty. She maintains she is not 
Yamatenadeshiko, yet would prefer to have a wealthy husband, so she can lead a 
more comfortable life. The money received by a wife is unrelated to her 
household chores, but is instead tied to how much money her husband makes; a 
woman who performs fewer chores but is married to a wealthier man receives 
more than a harder-working woman married to a poor man (Rahman and Jackson, 
2010: 69). Chiyomi is part of a new generation of Japanese women who have 
decided that they will not behave like Yamatonadeshiko, unless someone makes 
her conform to that behaviour; however, many of my respondents already 
mentioned that, if they changed after marriage, it is more likely to be a change to 
become a more traditional Japanese woman in the mold of ‘Yamatonadeshiko’. 
Chiyomi and my other participants are members of the same generation, women 
who choose to marry someone who is more likely to try to reshape them into 
Yamatonadeshiko.  
 
It was believed that it was better for women not to pursue higher education 
because it was believed that higher education would destroy their 
Yamatonadeshiko-like behaviour. According to Suzuki (1998), higher education 
allows a woman to become more independent, delaying marriage. It does seem as 
if highly-educated women have fewer opportunities to meet their ideal partner, 
leading to fewer marriages. Suzuki (1998) believes that women avoid marrying 
because they realise they will have to do more housework than their husbands. 
They will choose to remain single until they can find their ‘perfect’ partner 
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(Suzuki, 1998). However, research shows that although Japanese women are 
highly educated, they are more likely to quit their jobs after marriage and/or 
giving birth (see OECD, 2011 and MHLW, 2010, 2011 and 2012). My participants 
told me that they were more likely to leave work to be a housewife after marriage.  
 
One reason for this is stability. When people in Japan marry, they usually stay 
together for life. Japanese people are raised with a teamwork ethic that is 
important in the culture. This is exemplified by the uniforms women wear 
throughout their lives, starting in kindergarten, continuing throughout school and 
into the workplace.
14
 Another example of the teamwork principle can be seen in 
corporate activities. Every morning since the 1930s, the famous radio programme 
‘Radio Taisou’ (Radio Exercise) has been played in many Japanese workplaces in 
order for the workers to exercise together (Lo, 1990). When I took a sociology 
class and learned about companies and organizations in the U.S.A., a professor 
asked me why Japanese people exercise together at work. In the U.S.A., it is 
impossible ask all workers to exercise together in the workplace. For Japanese 
people it is normal; if or when the company asks you to do so, everybody should 
do so at work. In addition, many companies’ workers travel together for ‘Shanai 
Ryoko’ at least once a year. ‘Shanai Ryoko’ has been decreasing, however: in 1994, 
88.6% of companies and organizations participated, while by 2009, only 51.6% of 
companies and organizations were choosing to do so (Nikei Research, 2012). 
Some colleagues at work are chosen to organise one or more nights of the trip by 
a department or the entire workplace. Some companies even arrange overseas 
trips for colleagues to get to know each other better. For them the value of the 
workplace supersedes that of the family. Bearing this in mind, when people start 
to have families, women start to feel the pressure of having more work to do 
because their husbands are not there to help with their families. Japanese men are 
more focused on work, and shoulder fewer responsibilities, relying on someone 
else to do domestic work after marriage. Long working hours affect all facets of 
family life and responsibilities. According to the Durex Sexual Well-being Survey 
                                                 
14
 In Europe and other Western countries, it is mostly blue-collar workers who wear uniforms, as well as some customer 
service jobs like bank workers and flight attendants. In all such cases both men and women wear uniforms. In Japan, 
however, while both blue-collar men and women and customer service workers also wear uniforms, unlike their Western 
counterparts only white-collar women and not men have to wear uniforms. 
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(2007 and 2008), Japan was the country with the least sexual satisfaction (see 
Chapter 1). Is this true and if so how and why? Is it affecting lower fertility?  
 
 
Intimacy & Sex Life 
 
Since 1960, sexuality has become more liberalized in the west, and the open 
pursuit of sexual pleasure is seen as part of a balanced lifestyle and identity 
(Jackson and Scott, 2004; 2008). On the other hand, for some women, sexual 
intimacy is merely part of reproduction, and there is great pressure for women to 
have a child in some cultures, religions and countries (Morgan et., al, 2008). 
Japanese women and men’s attitudes toward sex have been changing, aligning 
more with a westernised view. Sex might be an essential part of marriage, but it is 
not restricted only to marriage. According to the Durex Sexual Well-being Survey 
(2007 and 2008)
15
, the mean age of the first age of sexual experience (having sex) 
was 17.3 for Austria, 18 in the U.S.A., 18.3 in the U.K., and 19.4 in Japan. Japan 
was the one of earliest ages in Asia. What were my respondents’ perspectives on 
sex? Does less frequency result in less opportunity to become pregnant? Before I 
had asked participants about their intimate lives (How important is it for you to 
have a good sexual relationship?), I used a vignette: ‘Mrs. A has a great husband. 
But Mrs. A is not sexually satisfied with her husband and their sex life. What 
should she do?’ It was a good judgment to use a vignette because I believed that 
more direct questions would have made the interviews awkward.  
 
Before our marriage my husband and I had a wonderful sex life, but after 
the wedding the ‘Cinderella Story’ was over! My husband was always 
working and coming home very late, causing us to have less sex. I also 
felt that we were doing it only because we wanted to have children. After 
I had my child our sex became less frequent. He is always tired and so 
am I. I sometimes feel he looks at me as the mother of his children, not as 
his wife or woman companion. I feel that though he is the father of my 
children, he is not my dream man. I know why: It was because my 
                                                 
15 The Durex Sexual Well-being Survey could be limited because samples are voluntary. For instance, 
according to NATSAL (2000), in the U.K. first age of sexual experience (having sex) was age 16. However I 
used the Durex survey because it seems its data for Japan are not so far from Japanese data. According to the 
Japanese Association of Sex Education (2011), over half of all men and women between ages 18 to 22 are 
sexually active.  
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husband cheated on me after I had our children, but I did not want to 
destroy my family, especially for the sake of my children. (Kumiko, 
married, with children and housewife) 
 
Men’s long working hours affect sex life. Even after working a long day, men are 
expected to go out with their colleagues and business partners for drinks, an 
important part of the Japanese business culture ‘settai’ (Sato, 1999). It is 
important for men to drink together; drinking with colleagues is part of the culture 
and part of being a member of a workplace and taking customers for drinks. 
Japanese businesspeople believe it is important to drink together (Linhart and 
Frühstück, 1998). Moreover, working such long hours negatively impacts men 
and women’s sex lives because the husband come home late, often drunk and tired. 
According to the Global Sex Survey (2007 and 2008), the average annual 
frequency of sex was 103 times per year. Japan, however, was in last place at 48 
times per year.
16
 This research shows that the excitement and satisfaction felt by 
Japanese people were lowest. Most married respondents with children reported 
that they had less sex than before having children, the frequency of sex becoming 
less and less as time went on. The Japan Family Planning Association in 2010 
described married couples who have sex less often than once a month are 
classified as ‘sexless’, and 34.6 % of Japanese married couples are sexless. 
However, there is a large and varied sex industry in Japan. Kumiko’s case is that 
her husband has used the sex industry, so he does not feel so bad even though he 
cheated on her, since it was just fun and not an emotional attachment. After 
Kumiko told me this, I asked, ‘How would your husband react if you used the sex 
industry to cheat on him?’ 
 
I cannot imagine going there because it would affect our relationship, 
and I do not want the children involved in this mess because he would not 
forgive me. I love sex but I love my children more. If I forget about sex 
and forget my husband cheated on me, everything will be fine, but I do 
not love him anymore.  
 
                                                 
16 On the other hand, the rate of unprotected sex with an unfamiliar partner was lowest in Japan (27%), while 
the next lowest was Spain (43%). In 1999 oral contraceptives were legalised in Japan, forty years after the 
United States. Yet today the rate of oral contraceptive pills is only 1.3 percent, in contrast with condom use at 
75.3 percent. Respondents talked about their sexual lives and use of contraceptives. Most used condoms 
unless they were planning to have children. 
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Kumiko is ignoring the satisfaction of her sex life in favour of her pride and her 
children; most people would find this decision difficult. There many kinds of sex 
industries in Japan. Women endure less frequent sex and unsatisfying sex at home, 
while Japanese men using the sex industry. The following is a table comparing the 
various sex industries in Japan.  
 
Table 9: Explanation of Sex Industries 
 
  Source: http://www.lovefactory.jp/statistics_4.php 
 
The total number of sexual industries in Japan registered and accepted by the 
government was 402,433 (National Police Agency in 2011). There are 33,258,000 
Japanese men between the ages of 20 and 59 (Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications in 2010) which works out to be 82 men per establishment. I 
chose this age range, because in Japan, men and women 20 years of age can 
legally have access to sex industries, and the retirement age is 60. Soapland men 
can choose from a catalogue containing pictures and profiles of female employees. 
Usually any of those sex services can be observed by men from catalogues. 
Customers are also expected to buy drinks for the female employees. All of those 
Name Service Price Time 
Kyabakura 
A place where 
men go to sit and 
drink with them. 
Approximately ¥7,000 (£55). 
Plus choosing a woman can 
affect price. Drink prices vary; 
one drink is approximately 
¥1000 (£7.80) 
Per hour 
Men usually 
stay there about 
2-4 hours. 
Osawari  
(Club) 
The men can 
both drink and 
touch the female 
employees. 
Approximately 
¥10,000 (£78). One drink 
approximately same as 
Kyabakura or a little more 
expensive.  
Half an hour  
Men usually 
stay there about 
2-4 hours.  
Pinsaro 
Female 
employees 
perform oral sex. 
Approximately 
¥10,000 (£78) 
Approximately 
15 minutes to 
half an hour. 
Soap-land 
A female 
employee from a 
catalogue with 
whom to have 
sex in a room 
Approximately 
¥40,000 (£313) to 
¥60,000(£469), possibly more 
Approximately 
Between one 
hour and two 
hours. 
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services are provided a place, rental of which is included for a price.
17
 Kurosaki 
(2002) explains how it is very common for male colleagues (and often their 
bosses) to go to a ‘kyabakura’ after work or a meeting. It may be that men 
(husbands) who report not having sex are actually indulging themselves in the 
commercial sex industry. There are also ‘Love hotels’, which are facilities for 
couples to stay overnight or for just a few hours. Love Hotels are part of the 
Japanese sexual culture, a place to rent a room to have sex, which does not mean 
always prostitution. It is more often used by unmarried and married couples 
because there is little space in the house, especially when many people live with 
their parents have little privacy. They find a Love Hotel useful to have sex (Basil, 
2008). Rooms can be rented for ‘kyukei’ (a two or three hour rest) or ‘shukkuhaku’ 
(overnight stay) by way of a series of buttons in an anonymous lobby area where 
patrons do not come into contact with other people or have to furnish 
identification. Those who make reservations on the internet need only provide a 
reservation number when they check in (Lin, 2008). Preserving patrons’ privacy is 
a high priority, and it is common in urban Japan for these places to be used for 
sexual intimacy (Lin, 2008). Many Japanese couples use these Love Hotels 
because single women and men are living with their parents. Single people enjoy 
their sexual life more. Most single participants have positive opinion about their 
sex lives.  
 
 
When I have a boyfriend I have to enjoy having sex, otherwise why I 
would I do it? If your sex life isn’t satisfying then it is not a completely 
healthy relationship, I believe. (Akiko, single, full-time employed) 
 
I enjoy having sex; if I did not, I could not see the point of having a 
relationship with someone. (Chiho, single, full-time employed) 
 
 
 
Single people think it is important to have a good sex life with one’s partner and 
to be satisfied, but after marriage it changes to becoming an obligatory routine 
either because they want to become a pregnant or feel the pressure to become 
                                                 
17
 Those figures were obtained from the internet between 2010 and 2012. Researching the prices was 
difficult because the activity depends on a location.  
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pregnant.  
 
I used to enjoy having sex with my husband and my boyfriend before him, 
but now I feel more pressure to become pregnant. I sometimes I feel I 
have to become pregnant each time after I have sex with my husband, 
which is sad. (Kayo, married without child, full-time employed) 
As I’ve become older I have felt more pressure to become pregnant than 
ever before. I cannot enjoy having sex with my husband anymore. I feel 
more responsibility for our family. (Kazuko, married without child, 
full-time employed) 
 
 
After having one or more children they tend to have less sex because both partners 
are busy and tired. It is the long-hour working culture that leads to less sex. Or 
men are using sex industries only to satisfy themselves. According to Yamakawa 
(1997), as of fifteen years ago many companies have employees work six days a 
week with very long hours. He also explains that on the one day of the week they 
have off, all they can do is rest, which is not conducive for a healthy sex life 
(Yamakawa, 1997). However, one respondent, Keiko (Married with children, 
housewife) said, ‘I feel I am not attractive anymore because there is no sex’. One 
participant (Kumiko, married, has children and housewife) explained how she was 
suffering and struggling since having her first child. She said that she and her 
husband were evolving more into the roles of being parents than that of male and 
female lovers. As a result her husband had been cheating and indulging himself 
after work, while she struggled alone in a sexless marriage, working both inside 
and outside the home.  
 
Saito (2004) observed this no-sex phenomenon and noted that 20 % of married 
couples had not had sex for over one year. She explains that after marriage, and 
especially after having their first child, couples engage in less frequent sex than 
before, chiefly due to the busy lifestyles and long work hours for both men and 
women (Saito, 2004). According to Saito (2004), it is very difficult for couples 
with children to shift back into ‘lovers’ mode after being in ‘parents’ mode for a 
good while. As for the married participants without children, only one of them, 
Eriko (a married housewife without children) said that she was enjoying her sex 
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life, while the rest felt pressure to become pregnant and were thus experiencing 
less enjoyment. Kazumi (married, without a child, has a full-time job) said, ‘I 
want to tell parent’s in-law I cannot become pregnant by myself ‘(see Chapter 4). 
Eriko mentioned her own concerns about sex after pregnancy and having a child, 
because she has seen her friends experience major changes in their enjoyment of 
their sex lives.  
 
Sex becomes another part of the responsibility of having a child; after that, 
Japanese couples seem to complete their responsibility to create children and 
become sexless couples. One government study shows that between age 35 to 49 
over 50 % of Japanese women indicated that they were ‘not interested in having 
sex’ or had ‘negative feelings toward having sex’ (The Japanese Association for 
Sex Education, 2011)
18
, usually after having children. Jackson and Scott (2004; 
243) noted that ‘routine’ and ‘dull’ sex, and sex solely for reproduction are 
regarded as ‘bad’ sex, whereas sex is meant to be thought of in terms of 
spontaneity and passion. For Japanese couples, sex is often regarded as a 
responsibility rather than spontaneous or passionate. Japanese women are under 
enormous pressure to have a child after marrying (Tsuya, 1991). If the pressure to 
conform to society by marrying and bearing children is dropped, lower levels of 
fertility need not be the result. If women can still expect a satisfying life, or 
material benefit, from becoming wives and mothers, they will still marry and have 
children (Mason and Jensen, 2003). One major exception to the evolving 
definition of a family in most industrialized countries is that traditional gender 
divisions within the family unit are not changing much (Mason and Jensen, 2003). 
Japanese women live with gender inequality, but they are still marrying, and most 
single participants want to marry and have a child someday. Why are they still 
choosing to marry and have children? There are many issues causing Japanese 
women to postpone marriage and having a child, but the majority of them to 
choose to marry and have a child. Even my single respondents mentioned that 
their intention in the future is to marry and have a child. What is the meaning of 
marriage for them? Moreover, what are family values for Japanese women? The 
                                                 
18
 The study was conducted by survey and random samples in Japan. Sample size was 869 women and 671 
men.The mean age women was 34.6 and men was 34.5.  
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next chapter will focus on that topic, because family values are important for 
Japanese people, and during interviews I found that many respondents mentioned 
feeling that pressure.  
 
 
Summary 
 
A strong male-dominated patriarchal society has been forcing Japanese women to 
do unpaid work, which means losing financial independence and leads to gender 
inequality, as well as women’s loss of self-esteem. There are many inequalities: 
when girls are born, they are treated differently, and are raised to believe that the 
differences are natural, not the result of inequality. Women and men notice some 
of the inequalities in their society and fail to notice others. Some of my 
respondents realised the inequality behind men’s behaviour, dictating when men 
can do but women cannot do, but what can women do to bring about changes in 
culture and behaviour? It would be very difficult to change, and even nowadays, 
when countries such as Korea and Japan have weaker traditional family values 
than before, certain family ties and values might be difficult to change, or will 
only change very slowly, or not at all (Suzuki, 2008: 33).  
 
My research shows that single women want to remain in the labour force even 
after marriage and having a child, but after marriage or having a child, many 
women are leaving work or are being forced to leave a job; they simply cannot 
keep a job because it is too much to take on both paid and unpaid work in Japan. 
Many quantitative researches show (see Chapter 1) that women want to take care 
of child, and that Japanese women are choosing to leave a job; however, some of 
my respondents wanted to leave or left a job because they could not have the same 
career path as men, thanks to inequality in the labour force. They had or they have 
only a job with fewer responsibilities, or a meaningless job, so they decide to 
leave. Of course some respondents gave the same reasons as seen in quantitative 
research: that they want to take care of children or wanted take care of children 
because they feel guilt and believe in the myth of ‘sansai ji shinwa’, which (see 
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Chapter 1) is part of the responsibility of being a women and mother in Japan. 
Japanese men do not support raising children even if the government tries to 
balanced work and family life. My respondents’ husbands took advantage of the 
system to enjoy themselves. This government policy to try to balance work life 
and family life has been helping in some developed countries such as 
Scandinavian countries; however, these measures might not work in countries 
such as Japan and Korea, which value such strong family ties (Hara, 2008; Suzuki, 
2008). Hara (2008: 59) argues that women cannot find career fulfilment or 
financial stability unless they are freed of the traditional roles that go with having 
children. But this requires government and society to support, or risk having fewer 
children or a zero birth rate. Countries which have developed such child care 
systems as babysitting, tutors and child care workers overcome the problem of 
low fertility (Suzuki, 2008:36), while those whose traditions force women to 
fulfill traditional maternal roles do not (Suzuki, 2008).  
 
Men with the same level of education can remain in one job or with one company 
for a lifetime and be taken care of by a wife, but if women want to the same 
opportunities as men, they must have a much higher education of skills enabling 
them to be totally independent, such as one of the respondents (Kiyomi, who has 
married, has a child and kept a job as teaching at University). Women have to still 
face the possibility of making the decision to marry and start a family, even after 
marriage, women cannot enjoy their sex lives because they feel the 
responsibilities of reproduction. Gender inequality affects attitude toward fertility 
decisions, and more women are having fewer children or none. Countries 
suffering from low fertility rates have less female participation in the workforce, 
strong traditions regarding family ties, and strict rules regarding marriage (Suzuki, 
2008: 32).  
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Chapter 4: Marriage and Family Values 
 
Introduction  
 
In the past, marriage in western countries was regarded as a lifetime commitment, 
but lately there has been a greater prevalence of divorce, cohabitation and single 
motherhood, which has caused some to declare a deterioration of family values 
(Featherstone, 2004). In recent years, moreover, the number of married couples 
has been declining, and there has been an increase in the percentage of single 
(never married) people, childlessness, and divorced people (Hara, 2008: 43). The 
idea of family has been gradually evolving from the traditional formal structure 
toward a new, more informal arrangement of closeness and commitment without 
strict legal bonds (Bird, 2004). In East Asian countries such as Japan and South 
Korea, although family ties are not as strong as they used to be, they still 
influence in family life (Atoh, 2008: 20, Suzuki, 2008). In Japan there is a strong 
emphasis on family relationships and values, especially pertaining to marriage 
(Sato, 2000; Atoh, 2000; 2008; Ochiai, 2008). Parents still influence and affect the 
marriages of their offspring to a large degree (Sato, 2000; Atoh, 2008; Suzuki, 
2008). One of my challenges in this study was to explore, how strong family ties 
and the patriarchal structure affect women’s fertility decisions, which is closely 
connected with Japan’s lowest-ever fertility rates. 
 
 
Marriage 
Advantages of Being Married 
 
 
Before the Meiji period (1868-1912), even though Japanese men could legally 
marry only one woman, they would often be involved with multiple other women 
(Omekake). Wives were not protected by law, and men were not punished for 
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taking multiple lovers (Hendry, 2010). Japanese women were not able to apply for 
divorce, even if their husbands had an affair. Men, on the other hand, could 
divorce their wives for any reason they wished. Hendry (2010) explains that, in 
the past, it did not matter to Japanese men who they married for themselves; it 
mattered to their family. Today, however, things have changed. Japan has one of 
the latest-marrying populations, but one thing that has not changed is a strong 
desire to marry. According to MHLW (2010) 89.4 % of women and 86.3 % of 
men
19
 express a desire to marry in the future. The top reason women and men cite 
for wanting to marry is to have a children and start a family. (Atoh, 2008: 18). 
Marriage is no longer necessary to have an intimate sex life in Japan
20
; the 
freedom to have a sexual relationship is now an advantage of being single (see 
Chapter 1; see also Tokuhiro, 2010; Atoh, 2008). 
 
Figure 15: The Benefits of Being Married 
 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2010. 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/shingi/2r9852000001wmnj-att/2r9852000001wmt0.pdf 
 
 
                                                 
19 Single and married Japanese women and men between age 20 and 49; based on random sample about 
70,000 random sample, with a roughly equal number of women and men. The ministry has conducted this 
same study every three to four years over a long period of time, and the rates have hardly changed. 
20 There are various sex industries in Japan (see chapter 4). One is the ‘love hotel’ industry. Japanese single 
women and men who live with parents can utilize these ‘love hotels’ to have sex.  
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Japanese men gain respect from society by marrying; twice as many men as 
women consider this to be a major benefit of marriage. Bernard (2002: 208) notes 
that, in the west, marriage is also a boon to men’s reputation and stature. 
Bernard’s findings also apply to Japanese society, because more men are 
connected to society by working outside, but fewer women are connected to other 
women. According to Benokraitis (1993), in Japan to retain the loyalty of 
unmarried employees in the under40 age bracket, several companies had started to 
offer the prospect of marriage as a new incentive and had engaged matrimony 
brokerage firms to act as matchmakers. The respondents 51.9 % of the men and 
49.5 % of the women said they wanted to married around a certain age (which 
happens to be around the mean age of first marriage in Japan) (MHLW, 2005). 
One of the major concerns was the desire to find a ‘perfect partner’ before 
marrying, with 46.7 % of the men and 49 % of the women mentioning this. 
Tokuhiro (2010) explains that Japanese women’s attitude toward marriage has 
changed more than that of men because of inequality: it is better to postpone 
marriage to wait for an ideal partner, rather than marrying early. Tokuhiro’s study 
noted that Japanese people care a great deal about the timetable for marriage, 
including the ideal ‘tekireiki’, or marriageable age, for their first marriage 
(Tokuhiro, 2010: 48).  
 
Quantitative studies have often examined the economic based on women’s 
attitudes toward marriage (see Chapter 5). The results of the quantitative research 
are unclear as to what kind of financial reasons are compelling women to marry. 
Tokuhiro’s (2010) qualitative research discovered a generally negative opinion of 
the Japanese tax system among married career women, though fewer single and 
non-career women held that opinion. When Japanese women work after marriage, 
they will be taxed more unless they are working on a part-time basis (see Chapter 
5). Moreover, quantitative studies might have missed some of the other nuances of 
Japanese women’s attitudes toward marriage. The majority of Japanese women 
and men want to marry, yet, paradoxically, they believe staying single is a better 
option for both women (87.6 %) and men (81 %), with a greater number of 
women holding this opinion than men (MHLW, 2010; see also Chapter 1). Recent 
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generations in most developed countries have found greater benefits to being 
single, such as greater freedom, independence and autonomy, compared to being 
married (Hodkinson, 1993: 43; Athoh, 2008; Hara, 2008; Suzuki, 2008). Some of 
my highly-educated respondents, Kiyomi and Eri in Japan, and Sakiko and 
Suzuko in the U.K., said that it is important for partners in a marriage to share 
similar values and support each other. Kiyomi’s case is unique (see Chapter 3 and 
6) in that she is the only married woman in my study who says she is happy after 
marrying (see Chapter 6).  
 
 
I married my husband because we had common values. I did not marry 
my husband only for love, since I thought that love was not more 
important than sharing the same values. So now I was happier than when 
I was single, because most people do not expect men to change, but they 
will. My husband and I had some differences, but eventually I had, in 
addition to a very good job and financial independent, a beautiful child 
and an understanding husband, sort of (Smile). He never stopped me 
from working. If he had not been happy and I had not been happy, we 
could have gone on to lead separate lives. But I did not want to choose 
living separately because of my child, and my family. I thought I had 
been wise not to choose only ‘love’ marriage. (Kiyomi, married with a 
child and has a job) 
 
Kiyomi had married a wealthy, understanding and supportive partner, but she said 
she loved him because they both had the same values and the willingness to share 
responsibilities. Compared with other participants, Kiyomi feels very fortunate to 
have her husband, but even in her interview, she said ‘understanding husband, sort 
of’ with a smile. I asked her ‘What do you mean “sort of”?’ She said ‘He is not 
perfect, but I am pragmatic and did not expect too much from my husband; rather, 
I knew what I wanted and what to expect from him before marrying him’. She is 
an exception in that, unlike the other respondents, she was able to purse a career 
as well as having a family. She has enjoyed more independence and has had more 
choices available to her in her life. Although she does not intend to separate from 
her husband, she is independent and knows that she has the option to leave if she 
ever so desires. According to Hasegawa and Nagase (2006), many highly 
educated women are averse to marrying, believing that raising even one child 
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while pursuing a career would be problematic, and they are not willing to change 
their lives. Fewer than 30% of mothers in Japan continue their careers after giving 
birth (Hasegawa, Nagase 2006). In contrast, in Sweden more than 70 % of women 
continue their careers after having a child. While in Japan, marriage and children 
are hurdles which women must deal with if they hope to pursue their careers, 
these hurdles are much lower for highly-educated women in other developed 
countries (Kimura, 2008; Ochiai, 2008). Ema is single, has higher education, and 
she knows what she wants.  
 
 
When I was younger, I wanted to have all for my partner, focusing on 
material things, such as a beautiful car, gorgeous looks, a high education, 
and higher salary, but now I feel I need more moral support, 
understanding and kindness, and not the material things he has to offer. 
(Ema, single, employed full-time). 
 
 
She is independent and is looking for more than just financial support but that is 
proving to be harder for her to find her ideal partner. These are weak areas in 
Japan, so it is difficult for an independent woman like Ema to be happy with her 
partner after marrying like Kiyomi. Are there many supportive and understanding 
men seeking marriage in Japan? It seems not. It could be very difficult for Ema 
because Japanese men often look for women with a lower level of education than 
themselves to be the dominant person at home (see Chapter 1). As women grow 
older, their attitudes toward marriage change. The number of younger women who 
would like to marry is high, but after age 30 the number of women who feel that 
way is significantly smaller (Segawa, 2006). The gap between younger women 
who want to marry and women over 30 who want to marry is 16.7 %, compared to 
men with a gap of 3.6 % (MHLW, 2010). What is stopping women from choosing 
marriage even when they would like to marry? According to Figure 14 (Benefits 
of Marriage), one of the top reasons stated was to start a family and having 
children. When women cannot have children, however, they cannot see any 
benefit to marrying, so after age 30 the intention to marry declines. Men seem to 
have no comparable age limits to having children. Or it might be that seeing and 
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hearing other women’s negative impressions of marriage may cause women to 
avoid marriage for fear of the freedom they would lose (see Chapter 3). 
Quantitative research does not clarify the decision making processes involved. In 
my research, I have found why and how women lose interest at a later age, which 
I will explain later in this chapter. More and more Japanese women and men are 
staying single longer. What is the advantage of being single? 
 
 
The Advantages of being Single  
 
 
Though it is almost unimaginable by modern standards, seeking marriage soon 
after graduation was a status symbol of success for American college educated 
women in the 1950s and 1960s (Cherlin, 1992: 8). ‘A ring by spring or your 
money back’ was a popular saying for that generation, during which it was not 
uncommon to see women marrying at the age of 21 in the U.S.A. (Cherlin, 1992). 
Now, most women and men in developed countries are postponing marriage and 
remaining single longer (Cherlin, 1992: 8; Holloway, 2010). In Japan there is an 
expression, ‘dokushin-kizoku’ (single nobility), which refers to the fact that single 
Japanese people have more freedom and live more comfortably than their married 
counterparts, and are supported by their parents longer (see Chapter 1). Morihara 
(2006) found a gap between being single and being married, explaining that 
Japanese women and men enjoy being single because they are spoiled by their 
parents. Children live with their parents for a long time, until they are married, 
which is common in Japan since parents have still the economic power to support 
their children. Yamada (1997) called these adult children ‘parasite singles’, whose 
mothers support them by cooking, cleaning, and washing their clothes for them at 
home. Atoh (2008: 26) argues that living with one’s parents for a long time until 
marriage can cause some to postpone marriage, because life with their parents is 
very comfortable, especially when their mother does domestic work for her 
children. However, after marrying they find the new reality to be quite different, 
with issues ranging from family and financial concerns to changed spouses. It 
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benefits a son’s image when his mother takes care of domestic work, and even 
after marriage, many men expect to continue this same pattern with their wives 
providing domestic work. My research echoes Atoh’s theory on how a patriarchal, 
male-dominated social structure will eventually lead to a low fertility rate. 
 
Figure 16: From the Patriarchal System to Gender Role Responsibility to Fewer 
Children 
 
 
 
 
 
Atoh’s theory states that the expectation of men is that women and mothers will 
do all domestic work, specifically men’s mothers (before men marry) and men’s 
wives (after men marry), making it very difficult for women to maintain a career. 
My own findings confirm that without any support from either the government or 
their husbands (see Chapter 3), women must finally leave their jobs and rely on 
their husbands. Some single participants are aware of this pattern, meaning that 
some of them cannot decide whether to marry or not and even some married 
participants are afraid to become mothers, because of the overwhelming 
commitments and responsibilities of being a mother. Women are also enjoying 
being single; however, there are different reasons (and some similar reasons) that 
Japanese women and men take advantage of the single life. 
 
146 
 
Figure 17: Advantages of Being Single 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2010. 
http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/shingi/2r9852000001wmnj-att/2r9852000001wmt0.pdf 
 
 
It is hard to choose between a comfortable single life and a married life with less 
freedom and more responsibilities. When I saw this research (Figure 2)
21
 it 
reminded me of two things; one was the scheduling of my interview around Saki’s 
busy schedule (see Chapter 2 and 3). She did not have any time for herself, she 
wakes up earlier than husband, takes care of family and sleeps later than husband, 
and on average was sleeping only 6 hours. The other reason was that the majority 
of married respondents complained about their husbands spending days off with 
friends, while my respondents had no days off and were constantly working full 
time at domestic work and, for some of them, part-time jobs (see Chapter 3). Men 
might be less concerned about spending time with friends and family (see Figure 
16), because this might not change after marriage. Women are more concerned 
about having relationships, careers and their standing in society than men (see 
Figure 16). 
 
I have a great relationship with my mother. She is not only my ideal 
mother but she is also a great wife. She would have done anything for me 
and for my brother. She worked when she raised us, even though she did 
                                                 
21 Samples are the same as the benefits of marriage (table 1) in this chapter.  
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not care for her job, which was making envelopes at home. She chose the 
job because she did not want my brother and me to feel lonely after we 
came home. Though her job was very low-paying and was not satisfying, 
she did it all for us. She did almost all of the housework too. She was a 
wonderful mother. She gave us everything we asked for, both emotionally 
and financially. When I needed someone to talk to about important 
matters, I was able to talk with my mother. I am not sure if, when I do 
marry and have a child, I can be like my mother (Chiho, single, 
employed full-time). 
 
Her mother was always there to do everything for her, and Chiho realised that her 
mother had had to give up a lot in raising her and maintaining the family. She felt 
a great deal of pressure and worry about marrying and having children. According 
to Okazawa and Ozawa (2010), many women from the younger generations 
experience this same kind of stress, making it difficult for them to marry and have 
children. That is, they are afraid of having to make the same kinds of sacrifices 
their own mothers had to make. Young women growing up take note of gender 
roles in the home, with fathers considered the ‘head of the household’ and 
generally more important, while their mothers spent their energy on their 
husbands; these young women now do not identify with or want to emulate their 
mothers’ roles (Murray, 2000). During the interviews most of the participants 
expressed good and positive views of their own mothers and their relationship 
with them, with no differences between single and married participants. None of 
my respondents’ mothers had a higher education level than their daughters. Since 
those mothers had difficulties in accessing higher education, it perhaps influenced 
their attitudes in focusing on education and saving every penny to raise their 
children (see Chapter 5). Yet some participants felt very negative toward the 
cultural archetype of motherhood. 
 
It was a while ago that I became a mother for the first time, but I was 
very worried about being a mother. I knew it was a big commitment. I 
knew that even a dog or a cat has to be taken care of it until it dies, but a 
child is a much larger commitment. I cannot give up on them; I will have 
to take care of them as my responsibility until I die. It is therefore not 
appropriate for me to do something fun by myself. I feel that I have to 
have fun with my family. Sometimes since becoming a mother I have gone 
out to be with my friends, yet I felt guilty spending the time and money. I 
still feel that using money only for myself is kind of wasteful. If I had to 
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choose one word about being a mother it would definitely be ‘patient.’ To 
have one’s own children is a precious thing but it is hard, and so before I 
became a mother I was worried about taking on such a responsibility. 
(Keiko, married with children and housewife) 
 
Most of the respondents used phrases like ‘big commitment,’ ‘pressure’ and ‘huge 
responsibilities’ to describe motherhood (see Chapter 3). There were no apparent 
differences in views between single and married participants, since everyone felt 
at least some degree of apprehension toward being a mother, or more accurately, 
being the archetypical Japanese mother. I found that many participants indicated 
that they felt pressured to be like their own mothers when they themselves had 
children, because their mothers set a high standard of responsibility. They felt that 
their mothers had been perfect and still were (see Kamamoto, 2001). For some 
participants, marriage and motherhood means they must transform themselves 
into traditional Japanese women ‘Yamatonadeshiko’ to take care of their husband 
and children (see Chapter 3). It also involves pleasing their parents, so some 
respondents decided to marry someone for wealth or higher income instead of 
love. Kamiko (Married with a child and housewife) chose to marry into wealth, 
but came to regret it because her husband changed. What, then, are the differences 
between those who marry for love and those who plan their marriages more 
strategically? Those who had married for financial reasons thought that they 
should have married for love instead, assuming that they would at least have love, 
while those who married for love felt they should have married for wealth, so that 
they would at least have had enough money to take care of themselves and their 
children.  
 
 
Ren’ai : Love Marriage  
 
In Japan after World War II, the number of arranged marriages steadily decreased 
as the number of marriages based on love increased (Atoh, 2008: 18). Japan also 
has fairytales about looking for the perfect partner, or Japanese men are looking 
for ideal Japanese women ‘Yamatonadeshiko’ (see Chapter 3). It is also widely 
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believed that in Japan everybody has a red thread on their little finger which is 
connected with the little finger of their future spouse; this belief is known as 
‘Akai-ito’ (a red thread), and many people believe they are destined to meet their 
ideal partners.  
Figure 18: Akai Ito 
 
   
Source: http://www.ciel-reserve.com/blog/s264.JPG 
  
Some participants mentioned this red thread; Ema (single, full-time job) said, ‘I 
do not know my akai-ito was been cut?’ She has not met yet a man to be her 
husband, and had difficulty in meeting a man who shares similar interests and 
values. One married participant, Keiko (married with children, housewife), said, 
‘my akai-ito has to be mistaken or tangled to marry with my husband because it 
was simply a mistake’. I could not tell if they actually believed in the ‘akai-ito’ or 
just using it as a metaphor. So, I asked them ‘Do you believe in the akai-ito?’ Most 
of them laughed or smiled but they said ‘I believe it’. Ema said, ‘If I do not 
believe that, I feel there is no hope and become more miserable about my chances 
of being forever alone’. She added that she feels a great deal of pressure.  
 
Marriage is frequently defined as a relationship between two equal partners based 
on love, companionship, and physical intimacy (Jackson and Scott, 2002: 203). In 
most developed countries reasons given for seeking marriage include the appeal 
of spending one’s life with a perfect partner, a feeling of security and commitment, 
and companionship (Dryden, 1999). As Japan started experiencing higher 
economic growth, this way of thinking gradually emerged as people started to 
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marry more for love. In developed countries as young people started to earn their 
own wages and become more economically independent from their families, it 
became less important for them to choose a spouse based solely on what would 
please their parents (Robyn, 2011). Japan’s case, however, is still different: Figure 
1 shows one of the major reasons Japanese women and men consider marriage to 
be advantageous is to make their parents happy, and my respondents often 
mentioned pleasing their parents by marrying and having children.  
 
Lewis (2001) states that it is quite rare for Western couples to marry for reasons 
other than falling in love. Two types of marriage exist in Japan: ren’ai, which 
translates as ‘love’ and means a marriage with modern-based sensibilities, and 
omiai, which translates as ‘arranged’ and is more traditionally family-oriented 
(Holloway, 2010). My grandparents were married as ren’ai which was very rare at 
the time. When I was a child, I heard the story many times from neighbours of the 
same generation. I am not sure of my grandmother’s date of birth, but my 
grandfather was born in 1912, just after the end of the Meiji period. Unfortunately, 
my grandmother passed away before I was born and I never met her, but she was a 
very modern woman. Both families were against their marriage, yet they 
persevered. All of my respondents described their marriages as ren’ai. Although 
Kimiko chose her husband for pragmatic reasons such as wealth and education, 
she talked about how much her husband had changed and how she had become 
like a maid, expressing regret about marrying him and wishing she had cohabited 
with him before marrying. 
 
I cannot respect him anymore. He treats me so bad. I have to pick up his 
dirty clothes. He loves to show me off to his colleagues and take them to 
our home, meaning I have to cook for them almost every week. We have 
hardly enough money to keep going, yet he does not want to me to work 
outside either because it would be shameful for him, he says. If I had a 
wonderful job, on the other hand, he could have told his colleagues so 
and pretended his wife had chosen to work outside the home, but I have 
not been able to do this. I would only be able to get a job working at a 
shop or factory or as a cleaner, and he does not want me to have such a 
job. His colleagues and supervisors would think we were struggling 
financially. There is no way he can reveal such a thing. I hate him so 
much. (Kimiko, married with a child and housewife).  
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Several other respondents expressed regret about marrying their husbands. One of 
them, Saki (married with children, employed part-time), had quit her job, married 
and had children, because she loved her husband. But she regretted having to 
return to work at a factory in an unsatisfying job after having given up her former 
career. Despite the fact that she is much busier than her husband and that she gave 
up her career for him, her husband does not contribute to any of the care work. 
She often asks herself if it was worth it (see Chapter 2). Another respondent, 
Kiriko (Married with children and has a part-time job), said that it was too late for 
her to divorce her husband now that they had children. She said she was focusing 
now more on her children, her daughter in particular, whom she was teaching to 
be financially independent so she would not need a husband. And Kimiko 
(married with a child and housewife), who was not working at the time, regretted 
choosing love over financial considerations when marrying her husband, 
reasoning that even if she became disappointed in a marriage to a man of means, 
she would still at least have money. But now she was mentally, physically, and 
financially exhausted by her husband.  
 
I asked them how they had met their future husbands in the first place. The 
majority of the respondents started to answer this but then quickly segued into 
complaining about their husbands and the disappointing situations they were now 
stuck in. Indeed, during the interviews it was very difficult to keep the 
conversation on track as to how they had initially met their husbands and then 
decided to marry; rather they were more interested in discussing the disappointing 
aftermath and how their lives had been negatively impacted.  
 
I met my husband at a party. It was a pivotal mistake. I was happy 
because I had just graduated from a two-year college and my soon-to-be 
husband had a university bachelor’s degree. When my parents got to 
know my boyfriend, I thought they were finally happy. Before I met him I 
had dated a man who had only graduated from high school. My parents 
were not happy about our relationship, and during the time I was dating 
him they often told me that I had to think deeply when I married. They 
would say things like, ‘We want your husband to have a higher education 
than you,’ and so on. I was sick of hearing things like this, but on the 
other hand I wanted to make my parents happy. So I met the new man 
and chose to marry him, but I now feel I should have married my 
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ex-partner. He was not a good student, but he always made me laugh. 
But my parents were more important than him I thought, so I thought my 
husband’s education would make both me and my family happy in the 
long run. I dated him about a year before marrying. (Kimiko, Married 
with a child, housewife). 
 
 
Kimiko’s case is hardly unique, for it is very important, even necessary, in 
Japanese culture to make one’s parents happy (see Ozawa, 2010). Kimiko had 
gone to a two-year college to please her parents. But they were not happy with her 
college boyfriend due to his low level of education. As pointed out previously in 
this study, it is uncommon to find Japanese couples where the man has a lower 
degree of education than does the woman (Mithukura, Ogwawa, and Retherford, 
2010). As Kimiko wanted to satisfy her parents, she found a husband with a 
higher degree of education but regrets it now. Kayo’s situation was similar. Kayo 
(married without a child, employed full-time) along with many other women, has 
experienced intense social pressure to marry.  
 
Compared to other developed countries, there are still there are many restrictions 
and much traditional behaviour in Japan, especially regarding relationships and 
marriage (Sakaiya and Kawamoto, 2001). In many cultures, love is assigned 
different meanings by people of different classes, ethnicities, ages and religious 
beliefs (Seidman, 1991: 101: Lorber, 2010). Everyone feels at least some degree 
of social pressure in Japan because nobody wants to be a ‘black sheep’ by being 
different, preferring to be among the majority and in a safe position (Sasagawa, 
2004). This notion of wanting to be ‘average’ and in the majority is highly 
ingrained in the Japanese consciousness and is reflected in the media; for example, 
many magazine articles focus on the ideal age of marriage (Sasaki, 2004). There is 
thus cultural, social, and parental pressure for Japanese women to be a part of the 
marital majority (Kudo, 2001).  
 
During their interviews two other respondents, Chiho (Single, employed full-time) 
and Ema (Single and employed full-time), mentioned how their own mothers had 
chosen their fathers over ex-partners who had a lower level of education. Both 
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participants still believed that education is a very important factor in choosing a 
partner, yet felt that their mothers had sacrificed their own lives just for them. It 
was their opinion that mothers have to make a trade off, letting go of some of their 
dreams in order to focus on raising children (Cleese and Bates, 2003). According 
to Cleese and Bates (2003), daughters want to please their mothers, yet they can 
somehow never do enough to satisfy them. Parents often interfere in their 
children’s and especially their daughters’ relationships.  
 
Figure 19: Strong Family Ties to Low Fertility 
 
 
 
Japanese tradition requires that young people obey their elders, especially their 
parents (Sasaki, 1998). Most parents are very focused on their children and try to 
control or influence their children’s judgments and decisions (Sato, 1997; Atho, 
2008). Because there are fewer children in Japan than before, parents can spend 
more time and money with each child, which contributes to parents’ controlling 
and obsessive behaviour (Kurozawa, 2001). This seems to be a common theme. 
Parents interfere in their children’s lives and strongly influence whom they will 
marry. When Japanese women reach a certain age when their parents feel it is the 
proper time to marry, they usually choose a partner who makes their parents 
satisfied and happy, despite any doubts they themselves may have. Many regret 
the decision afterward, especially since the majority of women give up their jobs 
to raise their children. If, however, women choose not to marry, they face 
disapproval from their parents, family and society in general, and have to live 
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with the constant guilt (Hertog, 2008).  
 
Additionally, if a Japanese woman decides to have children without marrying, 
their future will be profoundly and negatively affected (Tanaka, 2009). In Japan 
there is still discrimination against people with unmarried parents; they face 
unequal treatment when applying for jobs, for example (see Chapter 1). Hertog 
(2008: 205) notes in her research that women are expected to maintain the 
well-being of their family and are highly pressured to preserve the two-parent 
family for the sake of their children. In Japan it is believed that if parents are not 
together in a proper family unit, their children will be negatively impacted 
psychologically and develop skewed views on gender roles. Hertog’s single 
respondents wanted to marry for the sake of their unborn children after becoming 
pregnant, even if they had a negative opinion of their partners and would be 
consigned to an unhappy married life. She also found that her respondents felt that 
it is better for parents to remain together even if they do not get along, rather than 
children being raised by single mothers (Hertog, 2008).  
 
Women in Europe, on the other hand, face far less worry and fear in making it as 
a single mother or as an unmarried mother cohabiting with a partner (Tanaka, 
2009; Ozawa, 2010). In contrast, women and men in Japan would prefer to 
postpone marriage and enjoy their freedom of being single, and would prefer to 
wait until meeting an appropriate partner. Many dating companies have sprouted 
up, purporting to help men and women do just that (Kyogoku and Takahashi, 
2008).  
 
 
Omiai : Arranged Marriage and Dating Agencies As a New form of 
Marriage 
 
In the past decades so-called romantic love has become the foundation on which 
couples and families are based, yet omiai marriages persisted well into the 1970s 
and 80s (Ronald and Alexy, 2011; Athoh, 2008). Marriage in the East was 
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traditionally regarded as a family business, and was arranged by parents who 
strictly adhered to the social hierarchy (Haggins et al., 2002: 75). Arranged 
marriage was common during the Meiji period (1868-1912). Couples needed their 
parents’ permission to marry, and it was common in Japan for the bride and groom 
to have never met until the actual wedding day (Hendry, 2010). The cultural 
definition of love differs in the east and the west. Jackson (1999: 96) notes that it 
is impossible to separate love from its cultural and social contexts. However, in 
Japan, the belief that love can still grow after starting a family is known as ‘Aijo’. 
People who subscribe to this belief spend a longer time together and feel more 
accepting of each other and are more attached to each other (Hardly, 2001). ‘Aijo’ 
can be used after marriage when couples have histories and a family together, so 
they decide to remain as a family and stay together. Some respondents mentioned 
‘Aijo’. Keiko (Married with children, housewife) said that she no longer has 
romantic feelings for her husband but ‘I have still ‘Aijo’ because of children’. 
According to a 2008 IPSS study, the percentage of marriages that were arranged 
fell from 64 % to 29.4 % between 1982 and 2005 (Ronald and Alexy, 2011). Other 
Japanese government research shows that in 1965, 50 % of marriages in Japan 
were arranged, but by 2005 the number had fallen to 6.2 % (MHLW, 2005). These 
studies show different numbers, but Ronald and Alexy’s research counted 
Arranged Marriage as well as the practice of using Dating Agencies to meet and 
marry.  
 
People make use of such companies to search for a suitable partner with the same 
or similar values as their own. They also use them out of convenience because of 
their long working hours and lack of time and places to meet suitable partners. 
Today, dating companies are especially popular in Japan. According to one agency, 
it is common for women and men to become engaged within one month of first 
meeting and married within six (‘Rakuten’ Happy Life Club, 2007). One example 
of such an agency is called the Happy Life Club. This is one of the largest 
agencies and one of my respondents told me about it. They advertise on TV and 
the internet, in magazines, and on transport posters. This might be considered to 
be a modern form of (self) arranged marriage. While the marriage rate on the 
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whole has decreased, the number of dating companies has increased. Some 
participants have experience with using dating companies. 
 
I have been attending events sponsored by dating companies. I like 
walking in the mountains, so I joined outdoor events and gatherings so I 
could meet someone who has a similar hobby and hopefully meet 
someone who has the same values and same standards as me. But so far I 
have not met the right person. My friend recommended that I should meet 
someone privately. She said I can look at the book to find someone who is 
similar to me and to make an appointment. I want to pick the right person, 
regardless of my age. I like my life and where I am currently at. (Chiriko, 
single, employed full-time) 
 
According to Sakamoto (2002), as one’s age increases, the standards of women’s 
ideal partners also increases. Women want to be comfortable and to have more 
independence and freedom. They do not want to give up their enjoyable single 
lives. For men, paradoxically, it is the opposite. They gain more than women 
when they marry (Sainsbury, 1999), so as men become older, their ideal partner 
level decreases (Sakamoto, 2002). Dating companies are not only useful for 
finding partners, but are also regarded as providing a good chance to meet the 
‘perfect’ partner. Before meeting a prospective partner, a person will have had a 
chance to review his/her background in such areas as age, income, place of birth 
and educational level. If the person then feels that the prospective partner is not 
suitable, they will not meet; both partners must feel that they are suitable for each 
other. This can be considered to be a modern form of arranged marriage. While 
the practice of traditional arranged marriages has greatly decreased, the number of 
dating/meeting companies has increased. According to Ogawa (2006), there are 
approximately 3,100 of these companies. There are different varieties of dating 
companies, like those that provide parties, set up dates, and facilitate other events 
conducive to meeting people. There are even some dating companies which deal 
only with clients in select professions and a certain level of income. One such 
dating agency, representative of the industry as a whole, had, as of 2007, 60,000 
members total 53 % male and 47 % female. The women’s ages ranged from 20 to 
52 with a mean age of 31, while the mean male age was 36. The education level of 
the female members ranged between middle school graduate to doctorate. Table 1 
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shows the percentages of each education level.  
 
Table 10: The Level of Education of Males and Females in One Dating Agency 
  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Happy Life Club, Tokyo, 2007. (http://onet.rakuten.co.jp/service/event/) 
 
The mean income of the female members was ¥ 3,650,000 (£ 28,516 ) per year. A 
variety of occupations is represented by both the women and men members, yet 
there is a considerable gap between male and female income, the mean income for 
male members being ¥ 5,850,000 (£ 45,703) per year, a difference equivalent to 
approximately £17,000. However, it must be noted that 8% of the female 
members were unemployed. The mean incomes by age group for the Japanese 
population might help one understand more about participants in this dating 
agency.  
Table 11: Average Incomes by Age Group 
 
Age 
Group 
Male (￥) Female (￥) Average (￥) 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60~ 
3,880,000 (£30,313) 
4,830,000 (£37,734) 
5,670,000 (£44,297) 
6,270,000 (£48,984) 
6,680,000 (£52,188) 
6,960,000 (£54,375) 
6,830,000 (£53,359) 
5,080,000 (£39,688) 
3,000,000(£23,438) 
3,120,000(£24,375) 
2,960,000 (£23,125) 
2,830,000(£22,109) 
2,770,000(£21,641) 
2,740,000(£21,406) 
2,720,000(£21,250) 
2,410,000(£18,828) 
3,530,000(£27,578) 
4,280,000 (£33,438) 
4,830,000(£37,734) 
5,070,000(£39,609) 
5,190,000(£40,547) 
5,330,000(£41,641) 
5,340,000(£41,719) 
4,070,000(£31,797) 
Source: The Japanese National Tax Agency (2008) (http/://www.j-tjs.com/value/salary) 
 
Level of Education Male (%) Female (%) 
Middle School 0 2 
High School 1 23 
Technical School 24 31 
Two-Year College 1 27 
University 55 15 
Masters Degree and 
beyond 
19 2 
Total 100 100 
158 
 
The members of this dating agency tended to have relatively high incomes. The 
joining fee was ¥ 30,000 (£ 243), while the average annual fee was ¥ 237,600 
(£ 1,856), depending on one’s class level. There are three such class levels: 
Platinum, Gold and Silver. The Platinum Class is very exclusive and expensive, in 
which select people meet on an arranged basis. The Gold Class averages once a 
month for individual meeting, as well as allowing people to attend meeting parties. 
Silver Class members only attend parties. The mean period of membership after 
joining was eighteen months for women and twenty-six months for men. Most of 
the members (82 %) were working in Tokyo or its suburbs. To join in an event 
(party, date, or counselling) required an extra fee which averaged around 
¥ 132,000 (£1,031). There was also a ‘termination fee’ of ¥ 210,000 (£1,641), 
which was payable when two members became a couple. There was an average of 
2,700 events per year and opportunities to meet new people. There are also classes 
which provide training on how to approach prospective partners, as well as how to 
become a couple. This company offers classes to both men and women, but its 
main focus is on men who have a higher education 74 % of its male members held 
a bachelor’s degree or higher as of 2007. According to this agency, since 1986, 
133,076 people have become couples through their activities. Japanese people are 
more likely to meet a life partner in a group. Their goal in using dating agencies is 
not only to find someone to spend a good time with, but also to find a prospective 
partner with whom to start a family, which might be different compared to people 
in Western countries using dating sites. Gunter (2008) compares British online 
dating and U.S. online dating, and the U.S. research shows that women and men 
women are more likely to find a friendship, but men are 4 times more likely to be 
looking for a partner or sexual partner. Gunter (2008) said that twice as many men 
use dating sites in the U.K. when compared with women. U.K. research shows 
that 47 % of participants enjoyed sex and casual relationships through dating 
online, while only 9% of participants were looking for a serious marriage partner 
(Gunter, 2008:88). In the west it is much more common for people to look for a 
date, spending leisure time together, sex and more casual relationships on dating 
sites. According to Gunter’s research (2008), over two years U.K. respondents 
spent an average of only £ 200 on dating sites compared with one of Japanese 
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dating agencies (Happy Meeting Club), whose registration fee is more than £ 200. 
To meet new people and have opportunities is much more expensive in Japan, 
which means that looking for a partner is taken more seriously, leading dating 
companies to advertise that joining their agency makes it more likely to meet a 
partner who will have more social influence. Moreover, Japanese women and men 
are seriously looking for a life partner. Why the serious drive to meet a life partner, 
and why marriage?  
 
 
Why Marriage?  
 
Norms and Cultural Acceptance 
 
Many feminist scholars are critical of the system of marriage; men are taking 
advantage of women, using women like their property and as labourers to take 
care of them (Jackson and Scott, 2004; Collins, 1998; Bernard, 2002; Ochiai, 
2002). In Japan, it is typical for one to go to school, graduate and have a job, and 
once women are married, they quit the job and stay home to take care of family 
(see Chapter 1). Even in other East Asian countries, such as South Korea and 
Taiwan, women have more career options and are remaining longer in the labour 
force (Ochiai, et. al., 2008; see also Chapter 5 and 6). Moreover, women in 
western countries have more options and opportunities than in Japan, whether it is 
being a single mother, cohabiting with or without children, or being married 
without children (see Chapter 1). However, such ideas are still not yet culturally 
acceptable in Japan (Kawamoto, 2001). One respondent, Suzuko (single, has a 
full-time job), had a boyfriend in the UK but could not tell her family that she was 
living with him, knowing her parents would be upset. She said she enjoyed her 
freedom and having fewer restrictions and was glad she had the opportunity to 
live with her partner, regarding it as a better option than marrying. It is fortunate 
that she was able to explore that option, since women still living in Japan have 
much less freedom. As Ema said: 
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If I could I would prefer to live with my boyfriend before marrying, but I 
think it would be impossible because my family would be very unhappy. I 
know what they would tell me: ‘You are not young anymore. You have to 
marry, not play around like a young person. You have to behave like an 
adult.’ (Ema, single, employed full-time). 
 
When I asked Ema why she wanted to live with her boyfriend before marrying, 
she said that she wanted to know for sure if her partner was truly the one person 
she wanted to have in her life, realizing it to be a very big commitment. She also 
added that younger people do not think very carefully or deeply about their 
decision to marry (although she states she does not know if that is necessarily 
good or bad in itself), and as she herself had grown older and heard about her 
friends’ and relatives’ experiences, she had started to become frightened about 
choosing to marry. Her parents had told her they thought she should have married 
when she was younger, before she realised that marriage is not a perfect life. 
There are social barriers to cohabitation in Japan in that there is no accepted social 
status between ‘single’ and ‘married’ (see Chapter 1). Many of my respondents 
wanted to live with their partners, but did not because of its unacceptability (see 
Chapter 1). Besides, couples usually need their parents’ permission to live together. 
In addition, when people rent a place to live in Japan there are many restrictions; 
for example, they are required to list their parents on the application as guarantors 
for their rent. It would be very difficult to rent a place without parents’ guarantees. 
Kimiko had actually planned on living with her then-boyfriend, but they were 
forced to eventually marry because every rental place required a co-signer.  
 
Japanese families treasure their Koseki, special books that chronicle their family 
history. The modern Koseki, which was established in 1871, is the Japanese 
Family Registry, which contains information about paternity, adoptions, 
discontinuation of adoptions, deaths, marriages and divorces. Family members 
have to be registered in order to have legal status. The male head of the family 
holds the property ownership rights and is responsible for the whole family, and is 
succeeded by his son upon his death (Ronald and Alexy, 2011). According to 
Motoya (1999), Japanese Koseki registration makes it difficult for women to 
choose their family name after marrying, or to be a single mother. It used to be 
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very common for Japanese companies to consult the Koseki of prospective 
employees before hiring them. Any divorces or instances of cohabitation would 
disrupt the flow of the family narrative. The expression Koseki wo Yogosuna 
literally translates as ‘Don’t spoil our family history.’  
 
I wanted to live together with my husband before marrying him, but there was 
no way we could just live together because of our parents. They would have 
killed us if we had told them we wanted to do that. Not only our parents, but 
also our relatives would think we were crazy to choose to cohabit. I wish I 
could have lived with my husband before marrying him, because I would not 
choose to marry him now. He has changed a lot since we married. I was very 
young and a lot of my friends were getting married. I went to weddings and 
felt I wanted the same. Now I can see that I merely wanted to play like being a 
wife. I also feel I should have listened to my family when they said that 
financial security is very important for marriage. I should have chosen a 
wealthy husband—my parents were right. (Kumiko, married with children and 
housewife) 
 
Another respondent, Keiko (married with children and housewife), said that if she 
had been able to live with her husband beforehand, she would have never chosen 
to marry him because he had changed so much. It could be the same result: he 
could be very supportive when they live together, but after marriage his attitude 
could change dramatically anyway. It is understandable that women may feel they 
have more choices before marriage and no choices after marriage. Kumiko also 
mentioned a degree of social pressure, because all of her friends were married. 
She had looked forward to their playing the roles of wife and husband, but it did 
not take her long to realise the differences between real life and an imagined 
perfect life. In Keiko’s case she had become pregnant before marrying, so she had 
had little choice but to marry even though she did not want to.  
 
 
Parental Pressure  
 
Many of the respondents mentioned that they felt pressure from the families. Eri 
(single, employed full-time) and Chiyomi (single, employed full-time) were very 
similar in that they both wanted to marry. They also wanted to marry to please 
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their families. Chiyomi had joined a dating organization which organises events 
for people to meet prospective partners, but she had not yet met anyone for whom 
she would be willing to give up her comfortable single life. They struggle because 
they want to make their families and parents happy, yet what they want is not the 
same as what their parents want.  
 
I feel a lot of pressure from my parents, but I could never give up what I 
want for my partner’s sake. I have read that as women grow older, their 
standards for the ideal partner become higher and more difficult to attain, 
which I believe to be true. I want to make my parents happy, but I cannot 
give up so many things. I am living very comfortably, and I believe that 
my life should be even better after I marry. But most of my friends 
became unhappier than before. I couldn’t take that sort of life. I am very 
much struggling to maintain a balance between making myself happy and 
keeping my parents happy as well. (Ema, single, a full-time job) 
 
Ema’s standard of the ideal partner had increased as she grew older, and she was 
struggling between conforming to the mores of traditional Japanese society and 
pursuing her own happiness. She wants to be independent and not worry about 
finding a partner, and wants to focus on doing whatever she wants to do. She 
knows that after marrying, her life would change, and she would have to live for 
her family, not just herself. Although Ema wanted to please her parents, she felt 
she could not give up what she had, namely her financial comfort, freedom and 
independence. One respondent, Sakiko, said that her experience of living in the 
U.K. had changed her viewpoint toward Japanese society and customs. Living and 
learning overseas helps people to acknowledge cultural differences and increase 
international awareness and cultural understanding (Pickert, 1992; Milleret, 1991; 
Wagner and Magistrale, 1995). Sakiko (single, employed full-time, lives in UK) 
noted that her eyes had been opened to more freedom and opportunities, yet like 
Ema (single, employed full-time) she still felt that she should make her family 
happy. Similarly, Kawazura (2008) explained her experience of studying in the 
USA when her father tried to persuade her to come back to Japan to marry. He 
believed that studying abroad was not important for his daughter and thought she 
had made the wrong decision. Kawazura (2008) explained that her father believed 
what he thought was right in the context of living in Japan, but that she did not 
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share her father’s beliefs. People in Japan generally believe that women should 
marry men with stable jobs and then start families, especially when they reach a 
certain age (Kawazura, 2008).The single participants felt pressured to marry, yet 
they could not imagine having to give up what they already had. Most of them 
said that they would choose to marry if they had a partner, except for the one who 
was currently living in the UK. Sakiko (single, employed full-time, living in UK) 
told me that she would choose to live with her partner before marrying, or perhaps 
not marry at all. She felt that she had more options available to her living as she 
was, and faced less pressure in the UK than in her home country. She noted that 
there seemed to be more pressure for those in their thirties who had partners, and 
that it was essentially the same, in fact, as being married. Many of the single 
respondents talked about how they struggled with trying to pursue their own 
happiness while wanting to make their families happy.  
 
However, none of the respondents, either single or married, felt that they wanted 
to be single for the rest of their lives and were afraid of being alone in the future. 
Japanese people are also worried about the perceived time limit of marrying and 
waiting too long. It is ironic that even though women have more educational 
opportunities available to them today, they still worry about aging and being too 
old to marry. Less-educated women have fewer financial resources available to 
them and tend to choose partners who are on the same level as themselves 
(Upchurch, Lilland and Paris, 2002). Most of the single respondents mentioned 
their age and worried about marrying relatively late. Eri, (single, employed 
full-time job) for instance, believed that if she was not married by the time she 
was forty, she would have to give up all hope of ever marrying and having a 
family. 
 
I do not have any partner… but I could tell you that if I did have a 
boyfriend now I would feel a lot of pressure from my parents. They even 
told me they hoped I would become pregnant so I would marry. So I think 
that if I had a partner now, I would marry him to make my parents happy. 
I am not young anymore, so I think it would be my last chance to marry if 
I lost this opportunity. I am in my late thirties, and my chances are 
getting slimmer. When I turn forty I will probably give up my hopes for 
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marriage and having a family. Half of my life will be damaged, for I 
believe that there are two stages in one’s life: the first stage is being 
single, and the second is being married. But on the other hand it is very 
hard finding a partner, because I am very comfortable living in this 
moment and I don’t want to forfeit my comfort. But I feel guilty not being 
married when I think of my parents as well. (Eri, single, employed 
full-time). 
 
 
It is still considered natural in Japan to marry and have children, and the 
male-centered thought pattern cannot accept any other alternatives, such as not 
having children. However, elsewhere in the developed world, it has gradually 
become more acceptable for women to have children outside of marriage and 
more women have opted for single motherhood than ever before (Wagner and 
Magistrale, 1995). However, Japan still lags behind most western countries in 
acceptance of being single. Takuhiro (2010) note that Japanese couples choose to 
marry if the woman becomes pregnant out of wedlock, resulting in a low 
proportion of single mothers (1-2%) since 1960 (see also Chapter 1). If a woman 
becomes a single mother, it brings shames for her family. It is important to win 
parents’ approval and to please them, as my respondents described. Family is very 
important in Japan. 
 
It may be somewhat difficult to understand marriage in Japan if one is only 
familiar with Western marriage customs. For example, if a child is born outside of 
wedlock in Japan, it will always be considered illegitimate, even if the child has 
been properly registered just after birth. If, as an adult, that person wishes to 
change his or her surname or any other information on their birth certificate, they 
would not be allowed to do so (Hendry, 2000). Of course there could be always be 
an exception, but it would involve several legal fights. Many women become 
pregnant but choose to marry before giving birth (see Chapter1). When young 
women become pregnant, it is common for their parents to be involved in the 
decision-making process. Before and after marriage, the majority of women must 
accept the will of their families and the responsibilities that entails. 
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Family Values 
 
 Pressure and Relationships with parents-in-law 
 
After a couple marries their parents feel a sense of relief that their children will 
not be single for the rest of their lives, as well as looking forward to having 
grandchildren. The couple themselves, however, now face greater involvement 
with their parents-in-law, which can be a source of stress. This demonstrates the 
Japanese ideal of Yome: a woman not only marries her husband as an individual, 
but also the husband’s whole family (Hendry, 2010). Much of the pressure placed 
on women during and even prior to marriage comes from in-laws. 
 
My sister always told me that it is very hard to visit one’s parents-in-law, 
because their values are different. My sister’s in-laws want to know 
everything about her and their son’s married life. His parents emphasize 
saving money for the future, but not my sister. She used to live overseas 
and she loves to travel a lot, but she now she has to hide her holiday 
travel plans from her parents-in-law. If her parents-in-law found out that 
they had gone on a holiday somewhere, they would give my sister grief 
and make her feel guilty for spending so much money. I do not want to 
have such a life. I want to travel whenever I want. Why should I have to 
worry about two more people interfering in my life? It can be worse if the 
husband has a sister or a brother, since they could interfere in my life as 
well. My sister’s husband has a sister who is a pharmacist and just turned 
thirty, but she has saved a lot of money and leased a flat. My sister feels 
pressure because both she and her sister-and-law work even though the 
couple are still renting the flat. It is not fair that people think financial 
management is the woman’s responsibility in Japan. My sister feels a lot 
of pressure because she is still childless. She wants to enjoy more time to 
herself. I am not sure that my parents-in-law will be like my sister’s, or 
that they will affect the relationship between me and my husband (Chiriko, 
single, employed full-time).  
 
 
Even my single participants had negative views of having a relationship with their 
future parents-in-law, yet the married ones had very positive views of their own 
parents even after marrying. In Japan it used to be held that after marrying, a 
woman belonged to her husband’s family (Sasaki, 1996). It is less common in 
recent years for Japanese couples to live with husband’s parents immediately after 
166 
 
marrying. Traditionally, the oldest son and his wife and children would live with 
his parents and inherit the family home in the ie system (see Chapter 1), but in 
recent years it has become more common to live separately from the parents. In 
1975 the proportion of married couples moving in with one set of parents soon 
after marrying was 71.9 %, as compared to 2010 when the proportion had dropped 
to 18.6 % (Census, 2010). This is a major change in which there is much less 
support with childcare for mothers from grandparents in Japan. Many young 
couples live in large cities and parents still live in rural areas. Even if parents 
would like to take care of their grandchildren it would be impossible. A lack of 
siblings to help each other was the main cause of the weakening of the family 
network in the 1980s (Ochiai, 2008: 17). With fewer siblings around and parents 
living too far away to be able to help with childcare and domestic necessities, 
Japanese women are opting to have fewer children (Ochiai, 2008). South Korea 
women have much more support from parents and communities to raise children 
(see Chapter 3). However, Japanese couples tend to live with the husband’s 
parents as they grow older. The proportion of people over the age of 65 who live 
with one or more offspring is 52.3 %, while for those over 75 years old it is 
59.5 %, and for over 85 years old it is 65.6 % (Census, 2010). According to the 
2010 census Tokyo has the lowest number of people living with either set of 
parents after marrying. On the other hand, a much higher number of couples live 
with parents in the Japanese countryside. 
 
I do not want to live with my husband’s parents, but we may eventually 
have to take care of them and move into their house. It may be my destiny, 
I don’t know. So we had better just continue renting our flat for now, 
which my husband’s company almost completely pays for. At least I can 
save some money for my children’s education, and at the end of the day 
we will have a house. (Saki, married with children, employed part-time). 
  
 
Although Saki did not want to live with her husband’s parents, she felt it was 
inevitable that they will move in and take care of them. She does not have any 
time to take care of her parents-in-law now (see Chapter 2 and 3). She said ‘I even 
prefer my part-time job to taking care of them. I am sure one day I will have to 
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quit working to take care of them. Though wanting to postpone it as long as 
possible, she added that she sometimes felt pressure from them. She appreciated 
her husband’s company’s payment of their housing expenses, especially because 
she herself was a part-time employee with no benefits or support from her own 
company (see Chapter 5). Although she regarded living in her husband’s family’s 
house as a last resort, she at least had fewer economic worries than other people 
who did not have any other place to live. While women are pressured to help take 
care of their husbands’ side of the family and to live with the husband’s parents in 
the future, Saki dearly wants to avoid this, yet saw no way to do so. She seemed 
resigned to her fate, being sure she had no other choice in the matter.  
 
Sasaki (1996) pointed out however, that today in Japan women prefer to ask their 
own parents to watch their children for them. She explained that when a woman 
leaves her child at home they should ask their parents-in law to look after it, yet 
she found that most women think it is easier to leave a child with their own 
parents (Sasaki, 1996). Historically, however, it was very difficult for a woman to 
ask her own parents to watch the children, because after marrying she was 
considered to belong to her husband’s family (Sasaki, 1996). Nowadays, wives 
feel it is easier and more comfortable for them to ask for their own parents’ help 
and support, but they feel pressure and guilt if they do not see their in-laws often, 
especially around holidays, when it is considered a responsibility to see one’s 
parents-in-law. I found my participants feel pressure during holidays; it is not a 
relaxing time for them.  
 
 
Visiting Parents-in law 
 
It is indeed very difficult to take any holiday time in Japan. Less than half of 
Japanese people 48.1 % take all of their holidays, and on average, 8.6 days of 
vacation time are taken per year (MHLW in 2011). This figure was compared to 
other countries; especially in European countries, workers take more holidays, 
such as France (38 days), Spain (30 days) and Italy (30 days) and most European 
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countries’ worker use all of their holidays. When researchers asked for the reasons 
why Japanese employees could not take all holidays off, 67.3 % of respondents 
said that it was to avoid causing other people to have to work more. It should be 
mentioned that most companies pay money instead of giving holidays, even 
though that practice is illegal, so after a certain deadline passes, companies pay for 
unused holiday time, which is legal (Hashimoto, 2000).  
 
However, the Japanese system is different in that there are holiday vacation 
periods in the summer and winter. The summer holiday period, called ‘Obon’, 
falls on different days every year between the middle of July and August. It is 
believed that dead family members return to their homes, so people must visit 
their deceased loved ones and ancestors. The winter holiday period, called 
‘Nenmatsu’, welcomes the new year. In Japanese culture, it is important to see 
family during this time. During that time, many Japanese single and married 
couples visit both sets of parents and visit family gravesites, which is an important 
custom. During holiday time everything is overcrowded and traffic (cars, trains, 
buses) is very heavy. Everything is more expensive during these periods and 
things can be very stressful as everyone all over Japan wants to travel to their 
hometowns. This phenomenon is called ‘kisei-rash’. Before the period of 
‘kisei-rash’, there are warnings and expected long wait times on highways and 
roads, at airports, and for trains and buses to most destinations, covered like 
weather forecasts on television news channels.   
 
Figure 20: Kisei-Rash 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Translation and description: Waiting times and traffic jam locations 
Sources: Right Image: http://www.news24.jp/pictures/2009/08/13/090813029.jpg   
Left Image: http://actionjapan.jp/imgs/articleheadline/3511.jpg 
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It is always busy when we have holidays. We have to go to the 
countryside to visit my husband’s parents. I personally do not like to go 
there. It is very tiring and expensive to go there and undergo stress 
because of them. It is not a holiday at all. (Kayo, married, without a child, 
employed full-time job). 
 
 
Even when the husband has a day off or is on a holiday, women have more 
negative feelings because they are forced to be so patient and do so much for their 
families. The husband is happy to see his family during a holiday, even if he does 
not do anything for holiday preparations, similar to how the husband usually does 
not do any Child day’s preparation though men like to have a big party for it (see 
Chapter 3). Kumiko (married with children, housewife) said ‘I have to drive to my 
husband’s hometown, which is always a day of overcrowded and stressful driving. 
I asked her why he does not drive ? Kumiko responds ‘He likes driving when the 
car is on the road, however he said he is too tired and needs to rest his feet. 
Several of my participants have negative opinions of visiting in-laws. Women 
particularly face the pressure to visit their parents-in-law, and also to obey them. 
My respondents do not want to, but they have to, out of respect for their elders 
and family, which is yet another task for Japanese women.  
 
 
It is our responsibility to take the children to show to my husband’s 
parents during holidays. It is no fun for me at all. I cannot behave like my 
parents at their house. I do not have to worry what I do at my parents’ 
house, as they will do everything for my children and me. I do not have to 
ask for anything; everything is there for us. (Saki, married, has children 
and has a part-time job) 
 
They like visiting their own parents, but when they visit their parents-in-law 
they have negative feelings. During the interviews it seemed that the 
respondents had a very good relationship with their own parents, especially 
their mothers. Many my respondents mentioned certain verbal expressions 
describing how to be a good traditional Japanese woman and wife which is 
expected of them by men and by their families. Japan has very strong family 
relationships, with many obligatory commitments. There are many events, 
gatherings and parties for which women are expected to cook food and other 
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preparations Japanese men give no support (see Chapter 3). One respondent 
described her husband as if he were another child, and some participants also 
had negative opinions of husbands who spent time at home, representing one 
more person to take care of, and they expressed displeasure that their husbands 
expected them to perform the same duties as the husbands’ mothers (a typical 
ideal Japanese woman is the mother who does everything for her children) (see 
Chapter 1 and 3). Such an expression, of course, has negative connotations. 
Some Japanese men develop a ‘mother complex’ (mother-con), becoming very 
attached to their mothers such that they are unable to become independent from 
them, creating an ‘idealized woman’ which young women find difficult to live 
up to (Ochiai, 1994 and Taniguchi, 1994). 
 
After married I quit my job. I want to have a child as soon as possible, 
especially now because I have been asked by everybody when I am 
planning to have a child. It annoys me. I want to have a child more than 
they do. Plus my husband is never asked such a question. He does not 
feel any pressure. My parents are fine, but when we visit my husband’s 
parents they ask and tell me that they want to see a grandchild soon, 
because they do not have much longer to live. They make me feel guilty 
for not having a child for them. I do not want to visit them anymore, but 
my husband insists on it. I sometimes feel he is a ‘mother-con.’ (Eriko, 
Married, without a child and housewife) 
 
 
Once a couple is married there is usually pressure from the family to have a child. 
In Japan there is a traditional saying that if a couple does not have any children 
within three years, the wife should leave. Sechiyama (2008: 82) says wives need 
to ‘secure’ their place in society by having a child within three years, reflected in 
the saying ‘If there is no child after 3 years, the bridge is gone’. Even though there 
could be a problem with the man, the pressure is still put on the woman. Some of 
the participants mentioned this pregnancy pressure, especially from the 
parents-in-law. Almost all married women adopt their husband’s surname (see 
Chapter 3). It is still important to preserve the family name from one generation to 
the next. As a result, Japanese women feel pressured by their parents-in-law. One 
of my participants told me ‘This is the 21st century, but I feel pressure to have not 
only a child, but to have at least one son at to keep my husband’s family happy 
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that the child will bear their name’ (Kayo, married without a child, employed 
full-time). Another participant who is married without a child feels similar 
pressure: Kayoko told me, when we discussed the ideal number of children, ‘It 
might be that women have to feel pressure to have a boy for the husband’s family, 
but women want to have girl, and that’s why the ideal number is high in Japan’. I 
had never thought about this because I had never found any literature mentioning 
Kazuko’s point of view, although some quantitative studies may show that 
Japanese women prefer to have a daughter rather than a son (MHLW in 2010). 
One of my respondents told me they want to have a daughter, and if their first 
child is not a daughter, they will try until they can have a daughter (Eriko, married 
without a child, employed full-time). I asked about this strong desire to have a 
daughter; Kazumi said ‘To be honest, men are useless’ (married without child, 
employed full-time). Even single participants desire to have a daughter for 
themselves, despite the family pressure to have a son. Akiko (single, employed 
full-time) ‘I want to have a daughter. A boy is troublesome, but I am sure I will try 
to have a son as well because of my husband’s family, right? My sister told all 
about it, to keep the family name and the old system’.  
 
Other participants feel pressure from parents-in-law; Eriko said ‘In-laws are 
worried about whether their family name will be kept, and they hope to see and 
enjoy their grandchildren. I feel they are selfish and annoying’ (Married 
housewife, without child). There is thus a huge gap between the relationship with 
one’s own parents and with the in-laws regarding fertility. It is assumed that even 
if both sets of parents ask the woman the same pregnancy-related questions, 
respondents’ feelings will be completely different between the two. When her own 
parents ask or tell her about pregnancy, she takes it positively (they’re simply 
worried about her), but from her parents-in-law she takes it negatively and feels 
more pressure because women feel that their parents-in-law are only worried 
about keeping the family name, not worried what the couple wants to do.  
 
Every time I have been asked when I am planning to have a child, I feel I 
want to tell them that I cannot become pregnant by myself. I hate it when 
I see my husband’s parents always feel pressure if they even mention it. 
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They used to annoy me by asking about pregnancy all the time. So I 
stopped visiting them, and then they realized I was annoyed. And I want 
to have a child too, more than anyone can imagine. (Kazumi, married, 
without child, employed full-time) 
 
My parents do not ask me anything about my pregnancy. I will ask my 
mother to tell me about it because she knows everything and I really want 
to have a child soon. (Kayo, married, without child, employed full-time) 
 
 
The respondents thus felt pressure from other people, especially from 
parents-in-law regarding pregnancy. They expressed a belief that men do not feel 
the same pressure as women about fertility. Parenthood is always defined as 
motherhood, and women are always described as mothers (Glover, McLellan and 
Weaver, 2009). Yet even though in Japan people still think it is natural to have 
children, more and more are starting to regard it as more of a personal decision. 
Despite the cultural pressure to preserve the family name, people are having fewer 
children today.  
 
Nonetheless, it is common for a son’s parents to be involved with his family, and 
is also common for parents to help their married children financially. Parents still 
have the power to be involved with their son’s family, compared with somewhat 
less involvement with their daughter’s family (Suzuki, 2003). Kayoko told me that 
‘Honne’, which means true voice, is a part of Japanese culture where someone 
thinks of something usually a negative opinion but feel it is better not to say 
directly, so as not to offend or harm someone (Condon 1984; Lebra, 1976). It is 
frustrating for women to have to visit their husbands’ parents’ house out of respect, 
but in the meantime they are uncomfortable while visiting them. One other 
respondent mentioned that she is unsatisfied with intimacy in her life, and she 
wants to tell her husband’s parents, in ‘Honne’, ‘How I can be a pregnant when 
your son is always out?’ (Eriko, married without a child, housewife). Eriko wants 
to tell her in-laws in her true voice that it is their son’s fault that they have not 
seen a grandchild, but instead she has to listen to their complaints. Child birth is a 
responsibility that is pushed onto women, even if their husbands are absent from 
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home or they have little or no sex life (see Chapter 3).  
 
Ironically, the parents-in-law who pressure their daughters-in-law to have children 
generally experienced the very same pressure from their parents-in-law; the cycle 
of pressure continues with each new generation. Women especially felt pressured 
to have sons. Even if parents-in-law do not intentionally exert pressure, their 
daughters-in-law nevertheless feel it. Kayo (married without a child, has a 
full-time job) said she felt that fertility plans are a private matter, mentioning that 
her parents-in-law had been repeatedly pestering her about it, making her feel very 
uncomfortable. As for my participants who were married with at least one child, 
they said their parents-in-law no longer mentioned anything about fertility plans 
because they had already succeeded in that matter. They talked more about the 
children’s discipline and family life.  
 
I hate it when my parents-in-law tell me how to discipline my own 
children. They are my children, not theirs. I want to make the rules for my 
family. They should be happy just to see their grandchildren. Yet I wish I 
could make a rule against showing them their grandchildren. My 
husband, though, does not seem to care at all, even when I have been 
complaining about his parents. (Kumiko, married with children and 
housewife) 
 
Kumiko said that after having her first child, she started to realise that her 
husband and his family were very inconsiderate people, and that her husband does 
not say anything to his parents or intercede with them on her behalf. Kumiko also 
told me that when she asked her husband to go visit her parents, he always say 
‘He does not want to go; He is not using my family name, so he does not belong to 
my family.’ And he laughs about it. ‘He thinks that I and children belong to his 
family. I hate his attitude.’ Kimiko complained that he does not care for her family, 
but she has to care for his parents and we have to go there to pretend to be a happy 
family. Many women would prefer to go their separate ways from their husbands, 
yet they choose not to do so. Why are these women staying with their husbands 
and not opting for divorce? 
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Divorce  
 
 
History of divorce and attitude towards divorce in Japan 
 
 
During the Meiji period (1868-1912), wives were allowed to initiate divorce 
proceedings against their husbands and to take them to court. There were still 
many restrictions, however. Many issues that would be grounds for divorce in 
today’s society, such as a husband’s affair, would not be an acceptable reason for a 
woman during the Meiji period to ask for divorce. Following the Meiji period in 
1926, the doctrine of ‘teisou gimu’ (responsibility of chastity) was established. 
This allowed women to file for divorce based on a husband’s infidelity (Ohtsuka, 
2003: 34).  
 
During the Meiji Period, if a husband initiated a divorce, the wife had to leave the 
household. Wives had no rights at that time, and many had to leave their children 
behind with the husband’s ie (family) (Ochiai, 1999; Hendry, 2010). Women could 
be commanded to leave their households for any reason by their husbands or even 
by their husbands’ families (Othuka, 2003: 34). At that time, the divorce rate was 
higher than it is now (between 2.6 to 3.6 per 1,000 people) because women were 
seen as ‘labour’, and if women did not bear a child within three years of marrying 
(see Chapter 2), men would often divorce their wives and marry new ones 
(Yuzawa, 2005).  
 
Divorce rates in Japan declined after World War II, but slowly began to increase 
after 1964 (Suzuki, et. al., 2001). The lowest rate was in 1951, 0.97 per 1,000 
people; for more than a decade, the average of 2.0 per 1,000 people has been 
stable (MHLW, 2012). 
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Table 12: Japanese Divorce Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2012 
 
In developed East Asian countries such as Japan, and Taiwan, the divorce rates 
have increased but compared with western countries, the rates are still low 
(Chapter 1). According to the Asahi Sinbun, in 2005 Taiwan had the highest 
divorce rate in Asia, prompting the Taiwanese government to announce that they 
would start teaching family values at school.  
 
In Japan, the family is a very important unit. People think more in terms of the 
unit rather than of the individual, and thus do not want to destroy the unit of the 
family (Yuzawa, 2005; Othuka, 2003). People regard divorce, like single 
motherhood and cohabitation, as threats to the sanctity of marriage and the family 
(Brid, 2004). There does, however, seem to be a pattern in Japanese divorce. The 
people who divorce tend to have fewer family commitments, such as couples who 
are childless and older couples whose children are grown. With fewer 
responsibilities and fewer restrictions, they do not have to worry about causing 
any harm to their children. Three respondents who are married with children 
wanted to divorce their husbands, but they chose not to because of their children. 
They regretted having married for ‘love,’ because now they had to support their 
families and work at home as well. They now knew that husbands change after 
marriage, and they believed that since such change presumably could not be 
prevented, at least financial wealth would have mitigated things somewhat. These 
Year 
Rate per 1,000 
Population 
1951 0.97 
1963 0.73 
1971 1.0 
1983 1.26 
2008 1.99 
2009 2.01 
2010 1.99 
2011 1.87 
2012 1.88 
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three obviously needed their husbands for their children to have better lives. As 
with marriage, divorces involve not only the husband and wife but also the entire 
family. Couples agree to remain together for the sake of their parents and families 
even if they do not get along well. During my interviews most married 
respondents with children mentioned that if they had not had children they would 
have chosen to divorce. It might be that Japanese men become worse after 
marriage and after their wives have children, but it is hard for Japanese women to 
take any action because, after marriage, they worry about the reputation of their 
parents and their children, and choose not to divorce, even though their own 
situation grows bleaker after having a child. They choose to be patient and remain 
married.  
 
 
Being patient and remaining married  
 
Throughout the Meiji Period and through the end of World War II, Japanese 
women were told that, once they were married, it was their ‘destiny’ and was 
meant to be. Husbands behaved any way they wished; even if they perpetrated 
acts of domestic violence, had other lovers, and/or simply never came home, their 
wives were expected to be good and patient wives and mothers and to always stay 
with the family (Othuka, 2003: 38; Rosenberger, 2001). Although this view has 
weakened, it has still persisted to this day. 
 
I have found my research that after marrying it seems more difficult for Japanese 
women to pursue their own happiness. There is an expression, Nintai-ha-bi-nari, 
meaning ‘Patience is beauty,’ which Japanese parents and teachers often teach to 
their children (see Rosenberger, 2001). In my research, I have found that the 
Japanese male-dominated patriarchy is closely linked to family ties, especially 
between mothers and children since the responsibility of the traditional gender 
role of taking care of the family weighs on women, making them feel like they 
have to be patient even with an unhappy married life, thinking of the rest of the 
family and not themselves. 
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I have started to feel that if those family ties were weaker, Japanese women could 
more easily make their own decisions. I feel that my research into Japan’s 
male-dominated society suggests that there is a strategy to keep the patriarchal 
system in place, so that women have to be patient about the inequality of gender 
roles, giving up the freedoms they enjoyed when they were single, while men do 
not have to change anything.  
 
My father was born into wealth, but my mother wasn’t. I can imagine it 
was difficult for my mother to be involved with a totally different family 
culture. She told me that she suffered because of the differences, but my 
father was too busy to give her support. Many times she thought it would 
be better to separate from my father, because of those differences. What 
stopped her was me. I was already born, and she was focused on me to 
have a higher education …. When I have a child I do not want to divorce. 
I know that I will be able to afford to raise my child because I am 
independent. But because I really do not want to choose to divorce, I am 
very scared of marriage (Ema, single and has a job). 
 
 
Ema’s mother suffered because of the differences between her and Ema’s father, 
so Ema hoped to avoid the same fate. She wanted a partner who was more highly 
educated than her and had a higher income, yet she wanted her partner to share the 
same values. Japanese society is trapped in a cycle now where Japanese women 
are searching for a partner who is like a father and more, while Japanese men are 
looking for a partner who is like a mother (Kawamoto, 2001; Kobayashi, 2001). 
Most Japanese men’s mothers stayed at home and took care of them while they 
were growing up, so the notion of a wife as mother is deeply ingrained in them 
(Okazawa and Ozawa, 2010). The ‘three year myth’ (see Chapter 1) states that 
Japanese mothers should stay at home to take care of their children from birth to 
the age of three, which is believed to be the most critical developmental time for 
the children. Ema’s mother’s negative marriage experience made her reluctant to 
marry and give up her comfortable lifestyle. Even though she was not yet married, 
she was already concerned about her future children. Kimiko’s mother, on the 
other hand, believed that it is important to marry a man who is financially 
wealthy: 
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My mother always told me that a man needs money, and how important it 
is to have money for one’s livelihood. She therefore told me to choose a 
man with money. My family was middle-class, but my mother worked very 
hard both inside and outside the home to raise me. She sometimes told me 
she envied some of her friends who stayed at home to take care of their 
children. Yet I dated men who did not have a higher education, which 
means they were low-income. But they were very good to me and I loved 
them, but in my mind somewhere I had decided to marry someone with a 
higher income. So I married a man with a high education, but I am not 
happy now. I wish I had known that I should have been more independent 
financially and so have more choices. My parents sent me to a two-year 
college, but I do not have any higher skills. I also quit my job when I 
married. I thought I could make my mother proud, but if she ever finds 
out I am not happy with my husband, she will be very disappointed. I 
cannot tell her about my unhappy married life. (Kimiko, married with a 
child, housewife) 
 
 
Kimiko explained that she already had a child, and so she did not wish to divorce 
her husband. If not for the child, however, she would have chosen both to divorce 
and to develop the skills needed to be independent. She also stressed that she 
wanted her child to be independent, and so she was saving money for her child’s 
education (see Chapter 5). Kimiko does not want to her mother to be disappointed 
or to see her fail in her (superficially happy) marriage. They have a close 
relationship, but she feels bad that she cannot reveal the truth to her mother. She is 
being patient and following in her mother’s footsteps just as she had been raised. 
During the interviews I asked respondents who were married with at least one 
child if they would divorce their husbands if they did not have children. Most of 
them said they would. 
 
I am not happy in my married life. I would consider divorce if I still had 
no children. But men are not stupid, because the majority of my friends 
have told me of similar situations. When a couple has a child, the 
husband starts to change. If I divorced, it would make my children’s lives 
more difficult, and they would be negatively judged by society and other 
people. Thus there is no way that I could choose to divorce my husband. I 
want to make my children independent so they will have more choices in 
their lives. Therefore I will live for my children. (Keiko, married with 
children and housewife).  
 
179 
 
Keiko, like many other women, stayed with her husband for the sake of the 
children, even though she would have preferred to divorce. Saki agreed with this, 
pointing out that she must sacrifice herself for her children. Some respondents 
regretted that they themselves were not financially independent yet would like 
their children to be so, thus placing a high degree of importance on their 
children’s education, knowing from their own experience how important that was. 
The respondents’ ages were between thirty and thirty-eight. Their parents had 
already focused on giving their daughters a higher education, which has been 
common since at least the mid 1960s. Before that, however, and especially before 
World War II, only men and wealthy women had access to education in Japan. 
When selecting a partner, it has become critical for women to balance financial 
and material considerations with feelings of love. Such choices tend to be made 
when women have few career options (Farrer, 1998). Women’s desire to marry 
tends to be situated in the context of their culture and families (McNay, 2000). It 
has to be noted that Kiyomi has self-confidence and self-esteem because she has a 
full-time career and retains her independence. It would be easier for her to divorce 
her husband than it would be for most of the other respondents. There are more 
choices for her, but on the other hand, it is a hard change for many women, 
because even if it is easy to get a divorce from their husband, independence brings 
other difficulties. Even if a woman is financially independent, there is a stigma 
against divorce and the woman and their children face discrimination as a result. 
However, financial independence has been helping women to be freer and offer 
them more choices. In the next chapter, I will focus on economic factors for 
Japanese women.  
 
 
Summary 
 
These interviews have revealed that Japanese women are subject to much pressure 
and confusion. They have to sacrifice so much when they marry, and they often 
lose their independence, self-identity and financial and other opportunities. The 
family tied and patriarchal system limits individual women’s decisions. Atoh 
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(2008: 26) suggests that future Japanese couples could free themselves from the 
traditional family roles, allowing for more equality, and they could choose to have 
their ideal number of children. Nevertheless, most single respondents expressed a 
desire to please their parents by marrying in the future. Those still single feel the 
pressure of aging and are in a race against time. Eri (single and has a job), for 
example, said that if she was not married by age forty then she would give up all 
hope of marrying and having a family, believing it would be difficult for her to 
have and raise children in her forties and beyond. Perhaps Japanese women are 
more worried about not having children more than not marrying. But if they do 
not intend to have children then what is the point of marrying? They would lose 
more than they would gain if they married. Chiyomi (single and has a job) echoed 
these sentiments, adding that she had no desire to be her husband’s maid now that 
she was financially and emotionally comfortable, yet she did want to have a child. 
She said it was very difficult having to decide whether to meet someone and 
marry right away or to just wait and see a little longer, though she was worried 
about her time limit for having children.  
 
After marrying, many women find the reality of married life to be quite different 
from whatever notions they may have had beforehand, as they must deal with 
family, financial and emotional issues that they had never expected. Women to 
choose not to seek a divorce from their husband, but for men, this offers security 
because most Japanese women will not choose divorce because of the family ties; 
they do not want to cause concern for their parents or children. Japanese women 
have to adjust to a new family unit with its customs and must obey their new 
parents-in-law after marrying. Japanese men, on the other hand, stand to gain 
everything when marrying, for they will have someone to take care of them both 
physically and emotionally. Once they have had a child, Japanese women have 
virtually no chance to leave their husbands. Furthermore, there is still very little 
help and support from the Japanese government for women who wish to do so, 
which will be discussed further in Chapter 6. Even though there are many single 
parents in the UK and other European countries, it is still not a socially acceptable 
option in Japan, so many women feel they have no choice but to marry and accept 
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their fate of being maid and de facto mother to their husbands if they ever hope to 
have children. In Japan, the divorce rate is low; although it is legal to seek a 
divorce, it is a difficult choice for women, since it will result in the same pattern 
of job loss (see Chapter 3). Japanese women find it difficult to make their own 
decisions, especially on important matters such as keeping a job, marriage and 
divorce, because of all it derives from the male-dominated society and patriarchal 
system. It is ironic that this system affects women’s fertility decisions. As 
Holloway (2010) says, it is less important to focus merely on the declining 
fertility rate than on the social condition of women in Japan.  
 
However, quantitative research shows that Japanese women desire to have 
partners who are highly-educated with a healthy income. Single people are 
looking for partners who share the same hobbies and similar values and who can 
provide more support like Kiyomi’s husband. Women want to have the same 
opportunities as men. Women who marry men of a higher status, but do not 
receive the support they were hoping for, regret not marrying purely for love. On 
the other hand, those women who do marry for love often do not receive moral 
support, and regret not marrying a more affluent husband for material reasons. It 
seems no one can be happy, except for one of my respondents who is educated 
and is in a mutually-supportive marriage. This kind of relationship tends to be rare 
in Japan. Moreover, women can choose to divorce and try to regain total financial 
independence and confidence, but it is still rare to find circumstances similar to 
those reported by Kimiko. It is important even if they do not want to choose 
divorce, but in these cases there are choices such as ‘insurance’ and more 
confidence for women. The majority of women do want to marry but want to wait 
until they find a perfect partner. Since this is very difficult, this results in fewer 
marriages which in turn results in fewer children being born.  
 
Finally, Chiyomi and Eri (both are single), felt it was very unfair for women to 
have such a short time to decide whether to marry or not. When women graduate 
from university around their mid-twenties, they start to enjoy a life independent 
from their parents, yet they soon face the pressure to marry from both their 
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parents and society. They actually have a very short time about five to ten years 
before aging out of their window of opportunity to enjoy living comfortably and 
independently, and to decide whether or not to marry and have children. Atoh 
(2008: 26) suggests that Japanese young people should become more independent 
from their parents earlier, in order to learn how to live independently and learn 
how to cohabit with a future partner, which might bring about more gender 
equality, a departure from the system of family ties, and the ability to make their 
own decision about who to marry. However, it is not so easy to break free from 
family ties. Atoh (2008) argues that being independent is important for young 
Japanese women and men. However, Japanese women have to work longer hours 
to compete with Japanese men, and even if they decide to remain single and 
devote their lives to their careers, they still face inequality in income and job 
promotion ( see Chapter 3). Such inequality causes women to lose hope and any 
interest in staying with their jobs. The next chapter will focus on economic factors 
in the struggle of Japanese women for financial independence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 
 
Chapter 5: Economic Resources 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Because of inequalities in gender roles and relationships, women had fewer 
opportunities to work outside the home in the past. Traditionally, women have 
often been treated as being less intelligent and less economically important than 
men, an except when it comes to raising children, which has been regarded as a 
being activity natural for them (Lober, 2010, Mickelson, 1989 and Smith 1987). 
Economic reasons notwithstanding, most feminists are not satisfied with the 
‘natural, God-given’ traditional arrangement that the woman’s sole responsibility 
is to take care of the children and the household (Lorber, 2010). The proportion of 
working mothers has been increasing together with the growth of the global 
economy (Somerville, 2000). Yet, there is still gender inequality within the 
household, which has been expanding over time (Blossfeld and Drobnic, 2004). In 
addition, even in developed countries the earnings gap between women and men 
is substantial and lingering (Mumford and Smith, 2007). Even though 
dual-income families have become more common, women’s wages are still often 
considered to be just an ‘extra’ supplement to the family’s income, so women are 
still expected to do the housework in addition to their jobs outside the home (see 
Chapter 3). As this in equitability increases over the course of the marriage, the 
wife becomes more dependent upon her husband, who thereby becomes more and 
more dominant (Kymlicka, 2002). 
 
However, there are differences between Western countries and Japan. In Japan, 
even though there are a greater number of women who have pursued higher 
education they are staying at home to be housewives after marrying and having 
children ‘dehousewifezation’ has occurred very slowly (Ochiai, 2008). Since 
the1970s and the collapse of the bubble economy of the late 1980s (see Chapter 1), 
the number of single-only households doubled, and the fertility rate and the 
number of housewives have decreased (Reibeck and Takenaka, 2006; Suzuki, 
2008; Yamada, 2008). In Japan, childcare and homemaking are two large 
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determinants of a woman’s decision as to whether or not to remain in the work 
force (Yu, 2010). Japan is also one of the most expensive countries in the world in 
which to live, particularly considering housing and education costs (see Chapter 
1). In this chapter, I will consider the impact of women’s fertility decisions on 
them, and discuss financial responsibilities with the family.  
 
 
Gender Discrimination in the Work Force  
 
Job Opportunities  
 
Britain’s Equal Pay Act, passed in 1970, was a step toward equality, setting into 
law comparable pay in comparable jobs between men and women (Daly et., al, 
2006: 167). Similar ideas began to appear in 1972 in France, but did not become 
part of law until 1983, with carefully defined criteria determining how ‘work of 
equal value’ could be determined between men and women. Equal pay legislation 
came to Japan during the postwar American occupation, but this has had little 
effect on the wage gap between the genders. The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Law was introduced in 1985, prohibiting gender discrimination at any stage of 
employment, from recruiting to promotions to dismissal (Daly, et. al., 2006). Yet 
even after the passing of this Act, hoped for equality was still not achieved (Smith, 
1987; Molony, 1995). In most cases men have more financial power and security 
than women do, thus making it more likely for women to be treated as sexual 
objects, domestic servants and childcare providers (Kymlicka, 2002). There is 
substantial inequality between women and men in terms of wage gaps, education, 
and experience and promotion patterns (Daly, et. al., 2006)  
 
The majority of women in Japan work on either a temporary or part-time basis 
and thus do not normally receive support from their companies (see Chapter 1). 
They also face many other inequalities like low wages and lack of holiday pay, 
sick pay and retirement benefits (see Chapter 6). Such women therefore tend to 
accrue a smaller retirement fund from their outside jobs than might otherwise be 
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the case (see Chapter 3). It is thus evident that when a woman decides to start a 
family, this creates more disadvantages for her; the result is that women tend to 
opt for having fewer children, postponing having children, or not having any 
children at all. After having children most Japanese women return to the labour 
force on a part-time basis (see also Chapter 1 and 6).  
 
There are differences between women and men in the way they are hired, trained 
and promoted (see below and Chapter 3). Some countries even require women to 
provide a sterilisation certificate, submit to a pregnancy test, or show proof of 
their marital status (Tzannatos, 1998). In Japan, most employers require potential 
employees to disclose their age and provide a face photo. It is very popular to use 
professional photographers to take and edit photos for use in one’s C.V. Many 
participants had this experience when they were looking for a job. Akiko said, ‘I 
remembered I went to down town Tokyo and professional photographer took my 
photo for my C.V., but not my brother’s’ (single, employed full-time). I asked her 
how she decided to use a professional photographer for her C.V. Akiko said ‘A 
beautiful face has a better chance of getting a job, but when companies see men’s 
C.V., they look more at skills and knowledge, but not for women, so my brother did 
not need (a photo)’.  
 
There is a very prevalent age bias in hiring by companies, which mainly recruit 
20- to 25-year-olds who have recently graduated or are about to graduate from a 
training school, collage or a university. One respondent, Kimiko (married with a 
child, housewife) said, ‘my female friend is working at a large international 
cosmetic company. She has been promoted, and she also has a child and is happy’. 
Kimiko’s friend is educated and working for a larger company, and because she is 
protected by the labour union, she has a greater opportunity to enjoy gender 
equality, for larger companies are more acutely aware and concerned about their 
reputation in Japan and globally. But it is important to mention that Kimiko’s 
friend is working in the cosmetic industry, and not in the computer or automobile 
industries which are significantly larger. Deeply-rooted gender discrimination in 
Japanese culture still persists, resulting in a deficit of women in the economic 
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sector (Ferber, and Nelson, 2003).  
 
Smith (1987) described one job traditionally filled by women only, ‘bus girls,’ 
tour guides who were expected to wear feminine uniforms and hats, use very 
polite language, and sing songs to entertain sightseeing tourists. Another example 
is the ‘elevator girls’ hired by very upmarket department stores which was 
considered an ideal job for women in the 80s and 90s in Japan, and became the 
subject of a TV drama in 1992. These are beautiful young Japanese women who 
guide customers on ornate elevators to their desired floor and use very polite 
language. These particular women’s jobs have been decreasing since the busting 
of the bubble economy (see Chapter 1) but though they still exist today in smaller 
numbers. One of my respondents, Kumiko, was a bus girl when she was single: 
 
It was fun for a while to travel around Japan, only I had to be a hostess 
and make the men happy. I first started when I was 19 years old and was 
quite popular through my mid-twenties, but I could no longer do it by the 
time I reached my late twenties. Even if I were still single, I would not be 
able to do it anymore because I am too old and not attractive enough. I’m 
sure that if I hadn’t quit after a certain point, I would have lost my job not 
long afterward. (Kumiko, married with children and housewife). 
 
Figure 21: Bus Girl                 Figure 22: Elevator Girl 
 
 
Sources: Right: 
http://image.search.biglobe.ne.jp/search?q=%E3%82%A8%E3%83%AC%E3%83%99%E3%83%BC%E3 
%82%BF%E3%83%BC%E3%82%AC%E3%83%BC%E3%83%AB&sm=vtp_hty# 
Left: http://hisakobaab.exblog.jp/iv/detail/index.asp?s=9099724&i=200910/13/28/a0050728_2246327.jpg 
 
Kumiko is 36 years old now. The majority of Japanese companies prefer to keep 
only young women in their jobs (see Chapter 3). There is still much gender and 
age discrimination in Japan because culturally the Japanese still believe there are 
things men and women need to do by a certain age, such as marrying and having 
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children (Nakata, 2008). Once past the age considered appropriate for marriage, or 
past the ‘young, beautiful’ age, Japanese women like Kumiko lose these jobs. She 
could not keep the job even if she wanted to due to her age. It is not just certain 
jobs traditionally held by women; even when working in office jobs and for larger 
companies, women are forced to leave their jobs or, it is made difficult for them to 
keep a job (see Chapter 3). Women have to be young and beautiful to keep a job, 
and worry about losing their jobs once they are past their youth. The length of 
time that Japanese women remain part of the labour force is short, which means 
women are more losing a chance to earn income.  
 
Rebick and Takenaka (2006) also point out different limitation on job 
opportunities for Japanese women. According to a 2000 survey by the Japan 
Association for the Advancement of Working Women, women at the time 
comprised only 4 % of all management track (sogo shoku) positions, and in large 
companies this number was only 2 % (Rebick and Takenaka, 2006: 9, also see 
Molony 1995). Sogo shoku positions require longer work hours plus a willingness 
to relocate, even overseas if necessary (see Chapter 3). This makes it difficult if 
not impossible for Japanese women to either keep such jobs or return to them after 
marrying or having a child (Rebick and Takenaka, 2006: 9; Molony, 1995). 
Japanese women working in Sogo-shoku positions alongside men still face 
discrimination and negative reception from society because those women are rare 
and do not conform to “appropriate” Japanese women’s behaviour (see Chapter 1 
and 3).  
 
 
Against Gender Appropriate Behaviour 
 
Gottfried (2000) conducted research which studied how the male-breadwinner 
gender contract compromised women’s positions and how standardized 
employment contracts revolved around the needs, interests and authority of men 
and corporations in Germany, Japan, Sweden, and the United States. He found 
that Germany and Japan follow a male-breadwinner/female care model, compared 
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to the dual-breadwinner/female care model in the U.S. and 
dual-breadwinner/social care model in Sweden. In Sweden there is greater 
equality, compared to the U.S. in which women have greater responsibilities in 
both areas (Gottfried, 2000).  
 
In Japan, gender roles are very specifically defined ( see Chapter 1 and 3). 
Molony (1995: 269) uses the term ‘Oyaji Giyaru’22 in Japanese, which translates 
as ‘Oyaji Girl’. Oyaji means ‘old men’ and Giyaru is a woman aged younger than 
30’s. Molony (1995: 270) explains that, although young women seem to be 
welcomed into a male-dominated work environment, they find they must become 
more like men in order to adapt, such as drinking energy drinks on the platform at 
train station before work, playing golf on days off, and so on. This concept does 
not challenge the idea of men’s behaviour and seems to suggest that masculine 
behaviour is not only restricted to males. She also notes that even if Japanese 
women are working in the same manner as men, they still cannot do everything 
that men do, such as going out after work to drink with co-workers (and spend 
time and money) because most Japanese working women are expected to rush 
home after work to attend to housework, husbands, and children (Molony, 1995). 
 
I am married and my job is not sogo shoku; I am more of a helper for male 
staff, so I do not think many people talk about me so negatively. Some 
women are single and working as sogo shoku and at a higher level than 
some male co-workers. One woman, who occasionally goes on business 
trips to the countryside of Japan with male co-workers of a lower position, 
told me that many people talk about her negatively because she is 
successful at work, especially men. They always say, ‘That’s why she is 
still single.’ I feel so bad that many male co-workers are jealous of her 
success. Even when she goes on a business trip, male workers 
automatically judge her co-worker, a male of lower position, as being 
senior and speak to him and ask his decision instead of hers. (Kazumi, 
married without a child and has a job) 
 
Japanese men automatically think that men’s positions are higher than that of 
women. This is why even though Kazumi’s colleague works in a Sogo shoku 
position, people still tend to speak to her male colleagues and not to her when she 
                                                 
22 Fujuwara Sachiko created the manga character ‘Oyaji Giyaru’ in 1989, which became well known just 
after ‘Oyaji Giyaru’ was chosen as one of the trendiest expressions in 1991.  
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travels on business. Although women’s employment has been increasing, and 
there have been more opportunities for women to obtain higher professional and 
management positions in the hierarchy than before, gender inequality still very 
much persists in the workplace in most countries (see Chapter 3). ‘Nenko’s 
joretsu’ is a system where workers are promoted automatically based on how long 
they have worked, but if women take a break from their careers, they lose their 
place in the system (see Chapter 2). If women do stay in the labour force and 
remain single for a longer period of time, they are sometimes referred to as 
“otsubone”.  
 
My senior colleague, who is single, is secretly called “Otsubone” . 
Anytime anybody is talking about her, she is always referred to as 
“Otsubone”, which means that she is abnormal to be single for her age 
and working still full-time, she is strange and different. She is a successful 
career-minded woman, but her image is always negative, which is too bad. 
Many younger junior female colleagues are afraid to be like her. If I were 
a single woman, I would definitely be called “Otsubone”, but I am 
married, so maybe not now. (Kayoko, Married without a child, employed 
full-time).  
 
 
Historically, during the Edo era (1603-1868), this term referred to women of a 
higher rank who organized the women serving the emperor or shogun. In 1989, a 
famous drama series aired throughout Japan which featured an otubone as a main 
character, and so this terminology entered the popular culture and people became 
familiar with using and hearing this word. Today, the term otubone is used 
(somewhat pejoratively) to refer to a woman who has been in a position of power 
in a workplace and who is also single. When men gain a higher position, they feel 
pride in their accomplishments; however, Japanese women in higher positions 
gain a negative image, and Japanese workplaces and Japanese men make young 
women fear success. Women are teased and given nicknames such as ‘oyaji garu’ 
and ‘otsubone’ by men. Because of men’s jealousy over women pursuing their 
careers, staying at work is difficult not only physically but mentally and 
emotionally. Societies tend to negatively view and judge women who work longer 
hours and work full time.  
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Inequality Between Full- and Part-Time Workers 
 
The gender pay gap has been narrowing for full-time workers, but not for 
part-time workers (Gregory and Connolly, 2008). An average of 40 % of British 
women work part-time, because the majority of care work is still done by women 
(Gregory and Connolly, 2008). Some have suggested that the gender earnings gap 
in Britain could be virtually eliminated if women working part-time or full-time 
were able to receive the same dividends to their characteristics as their male 
counterparts (Mumford and Chzhen, 2011:837). In Britain, the majority of men 
who work part-time are at the younger and older ends of the age spectrum, with 
very few workers in their prime. In contrast, the ages of women who work 
part-time are more evenly distributed across the age range (Mumford and Chzhen, 
2011). There is a particularly high number of women working part-time between 
the ages of 35-44, the peak years for childcare, and also for women working in 
higher-level jobs, a critical time when they are building their careers and aiming 
for the top jobs (Gregory and Connolly, 2008: 3). Japan is very similar to the U.K. 
in this regard. Men who work part-time are mostly students and retired workers, 
whereas female part-time workers are women who are raising children and/or 
whose children are starting to attend school (see Chapter 1). In Britain and Japan 
more women are working as a part-time than other in developed countries.  
 
Figure 23: Part-time Employment as a Proportion of Total Employment for Women in 
2011. 
 
Source: OECD Full-time and Part-time employment in 2011 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-factbook-2011-2012/part-time-employment_factbook-2011-60-
en 
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Italy, Japan, and the U.K. have a higher proportion of female part-time workers 
than the OECD average. Many women in the U.K. are deciding to work on a 
part-time basis after having a child, which usually means they are taking on 
less-skilled work and are downgrading their jobs. It is difficult to balance both 
domestic duties with paid work outside the home, especially after having the first 
child (Gregory and Connolly, 2008). Gregory and Connolly (2008) argue that the 
underutilisation of the human capital of these women directly conflicts with the 
nation’s stated goal of increasing educational participation and strengthening 
skills in the workplace. This is very similar to what is happening in Japan: more 
women than ever before are highly educated, yet they are often compelled to 
downgrade to lower-skilled, part-time jobs. In Japan part-time work is not 
considered to be indicative of the ideal of professional work, even though manual 
jobs are more common (Molony, 1995). Now compare South Korea to Sweden, 
where women have the chance to become more independent. South Korean 
women follow a pattern similar to Japanese women’s ‘M- curve’ pattern of life 
(see Chapter 1); however, when South Korean women return to the labour force 
after they are married and have children, more of them work full-time (Ochiai, et. 
al., 2008). Fewer Japanese women are working full-time because their country’s 
tax system, which is determined by the men in a male-dominated society, might 
affect their decisions. This tax system is supposed to be beneficial for a family, 
assuming that women should take care of family while men work outside, and 
favours financial support for married couples (see Chapter 6).  
 
Another factor affecting women’s fertility decisions might be the decline in the 
economy. The economic decline has further affected many Japanese women, and 
the rift between full-time and part-time workers has been ever-widening (Census, 
2010). One government study shows that the top reason that employers use 
part-time workers is because they are cheaper than full-time workers (MHLW, 
2010). Part-time labour in Japan is defined as less than 35 hours a week (MHLW, 
2010), compared to the OECD definition of part-time labour which is 30 hours. In 
Europe, even a little less than 35 hours a week would be considered full-time. 
Technically, even if Japanese women are working part-time hours, it is similar to 
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European women’s and men’s full-time hours. Women who work only part time 
lack job security, make less money, and do not receive benefits such as bonuses 
and face the risk of suddenly losing their jobs (see Chapter 6). Full-time workers 
receive, on average, an annual bonus which is equal to from three to six months’ 
wages in Japan. Civil servants receive an equivalent of four months’ wages. 
 
As it is, some women do keep their full-time jobs even after marrying or giving 
birth, but that kind of situation is fairly rare (Kiyomi is the only example of that in 
this study). I found that many respondents felt guilty they were being pushed out 
from their workplaces. 
 
 
I felt so terrible to ask for any days off because my co-workers had to work 
that much harder when I was taking days off. I felt guilty and worried 
about what other co-workers thought about me after I married, especially 
because I had gotten pregnant before marrying. I was ill and had to take 
days off. I did not want to give up my work. I particularly didn’t want to 
lose my bonus, which was very good, but there was no way I would keep 
my job (Keiko, married with children, housewife).  
 
 
I asked my participants about their and their husbands’ bonuses. All of those who 
were working full-time received bonuses which were an average of 5 months’ 
worth of wages a year. My participants’ husbands’ average bonuses were 6 
months’ worth of wages a year, which was the highest amount possible. Bonuses 
are usually divided into two annual payments, once in the summer and once in 
winter. According to research conducted by Japan Economic Newspaper (2011), 
the average winter bonus was ¥ 719,401 (£ 5,620) in 2010
23
. Japan has less of an 
income gap compared to the United States and other developed countries (Pickett, 
2005: 670); however, Japan also has a higher gap between men and women’s 
income when compared to these developed countries.  
 
 
 
                                                 
23 The research surveyed 102 companies and mean age was 39.6.  
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Figure 24: The Gender Wage Gap
24
 and Incidence of Low Pay25 
 
 
Source: OECD in 2012; Employment Policies and Data: Distribution Gross Earning of Full-time Employees 
and Gender Wage Gap. http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/onlineoecdemploymentdatabase.htm 
 
As can see in Figure 24, Japan and South Korea have wider gender wage gaps 
between women and men, and between full-time women and men. Italy and Spain, 
also countries with long-term low fertility issues, have smaller gender wage gaps. 
Those two countries are below the OECD average, and below Sweden, a country 
with a much greater degree of gender equality; even among other developed 
countries, such as the U.K., U.S.A. and South Korea, there is a significant gender 
gap. South Korea has the highest income gaps between full-time women and men; 
however, South Korean women are working full-time more than Japanese women 
(Ochiai, 2008). The graph would seem to indicate that South Korean Women have 
more financial independence than Japanese women, but this is not so easy to 
determine because the gender gap is wider in Japan, which means more women 
are working in low wage conditions. Most workplaces in Japan have minimum 
and maximum wages, which cause fewer income gaps when looking at averages 
of earned income (see Frank, 2005; Chia, 2008). Some countries, such as Italy and 
Spain, where women work full-time or can keep a full-time job, see more equal 
                                                 
24 The gender wage gap is unadjusted and is calculated as the difference between median earnings of men 
and women relative to median earnings of men.  
25 The incidence of low pay refers to the share of workers earning less than two-thirds of median earnings.  
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pay between women and men; however, Japan and South Korea indicate that 
women are working in lower responsibility jobs, and women have less access to 
reach higher positions occupied by men, even if they work full-time. As a result, 
they lose interest in working. If Japanese women had the same opportunities as 
men to keep a full-time job, they would have more chances to be promoted to 
higher positions, because staying in one place longer usually automatically leads 
to promotion via ‘neiko-jorethsu’ (Chapter 2) and ‘the escalator system’ (see 
Chapter 3). Women have less time to participate in the labour force, and this could 
be one of key points for Japan’s low fertility crisis. However many quantitative 
researchers have found that one of the top reasons for low fertility is high 
education expenses for children, a problem not only in Japan but also for other 
East Asian countries, especially South Korea (see Chapter 1). 
 
 
Education Expenses  
 
In Japan education expenses are very high, public school is cheaper when 
compared with private schools, with only a few expenses such as books, lunches 
and uniforms, Japanese parents spend considerable money on expensive extra 
private studies outside of normal school hours. According to the 2010 census, 
Japanese people are worried about their children’s educational expenses. In 
Sweden, for example, both entrance fees and tuition are free from elementary 
school through university, and students can access loans for their living expenses 
from the government (Segawa, 2000). Japanese parents feel responsibility for 
their children’s living expenses, and most parents help with their children’s 
expenses even when they go to higher education, whether college or universities. 
One government study shows that a mean parental contribution to a college or 
university of expenses when the child lives with the parents was ¥ 1,085,600 
(£ 8481) for a public university and ¥ 1,692,700 (£ 13,224) for a private university, 
per year (Ministry of Education of Japan, 2012). The cost for children who did not 
live with their family was ¥ 1,709,800 (£ 13,358) for a public university, while a 
private university was ¥ 2,363,200 (£ 18,463). Japanese parents seem to bear a 
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heavy burden of financial responsibility for their children. Even before children 
enter the higher education system, there are 15 years of education expenses from 
nursery to high school, whether they receive a public school or private school 
education, and many students mix the two: public education until joining a private 
high school, going on to private after-school classes, and so on.  
 
 
Table 13: The Average Expenses of Education Fee Private and Public School, from 
Nursery till High School in Japan 
 
 
 
Nursery 
(3 years) 
Primary 
School 
(6 years) 
Junior 
School 
(3 years) 
High 
School 
(3years) 
Total 
Private 
￥1,170,000 
(￡9,141) 
￥5,290,000 
(￡41,328) 
￥3,000,000 
(￡23,438) 
￥2,040,000 
(￡15,938) 
￥11,500,000 
(￡89,845) 
Public 
￥440,000 
(￡3,438) 
￥580,000 
(￡4,531) 
￥500,000 
(￡3,906) 
￥710,000 
(￡5,547) 
￥2,230,000 
(￡17,422) 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Education Culture, Sport, Science and Technology-Japan in 2012  
http://www.mext.go.jp/result.html?q=%E5%AD%A6%E8%B2%BB 
 
The same study shows that the mean Japanese income in 2012 was 
approximately ¥ 5,500,000 (£42,969) per year. One can see just how difficult it is 
to save such a huge amount for education expenses per child. Usher and Medow 
(2010) studied affordability and accessibility of higher education in 15 countries: 
Australia, Canada, England and Wales, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Latvia, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden and the United States. They 
found that the U.S. and Japan were two of the most expensive countries in the 
world for higher education. Norway, Denmark, France, Sweden and Germany 
were more affordable in comparison, and Japan was the most expensive among 
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developed countries (Usher and Medow, 2010). As well as having the highest 
education expenses in the world, Japan has demanding academic standards, yet it 
provides the least support for individual families and students. Usher and Medow 
(2010) explain that in order to obtain a higher education, there are five main costs: 
education costs, living costs, grants, loans and tax expenditures. There is 
tremendous pressure, particularly financially related, that Japanese parents face 
when raising children. This kind of pressure could be reduced if Japanese society 
began to regard raising children as part of its societal responsibility, which would 
help create a healthier balance for parents (Obuchi and Okazawa, 2010; 129). 
 
 
Figure 25: Relative Proportion of Public School Expenditure as a Percentage by Level of  
Education  
 
 
 
Source: OECD Directorate for Education and Skills; Financial and Human Resources Invested in Education 
in 2012 
http://www.oecd.org/edu/educationataglance2012oecdindicators-chapterbfinancialandhumanresourcesinveste
dineducation-indicators.htm 
 
 
The countries suffering from excessively low fertility Japan and South Korea 
invest less in education, especially nursery and higher education. It could be more 
difficult to access higher education in Japan, South Korea and the UK financially. 
Usher and Medow (2010) note that the education and living expenses of Japan are 
very high compared to western countries. Japan is unique in that there are no 
grants or loan systems in place to offer support to students. Lack of a system 
places more financial pressure on parents who are trying to provide a higher 
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education for their children. According to Usher and Medow’s research, most 
European students have access to grants which reduces their costs. Denmark and 
the U.S. have the most generous grant systems, followed by Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and Finland. Education fees are very high in the U.S., but there are 
many grants and loans available. When students graduate and reach a certain wage 
level, they must begin returning any money they borrowed (Usher and Medow, 
2010). Universities in the U.K. have started to charge students fees, adopting a 
system of loans similar to that in the U.S. Loans are available in Japan only on a 
commercial basis. Borrowers in Japan must be over 20 years old, which means 
most parents are responsible for loans. Japan has the highest cost of education and 
the least amount of government support. This makes it very financially difficult to 
have children for Japanese people. As parents are unwilling to compromise on 
their children’s education, the common choice for them is to have fewer children 
(Atoh, 2008). A good education is seem to equal a good job; because of the 
intense competition in Japan, skimping on one’s education is simply not an option 
for most parents (Hunter, 1993). Korea has a similar tendency toward extreme 
academic competition, with ‘extreme education fever’ and fierce competition to 
entrance into colleges and universities during the economic boom of the 1980s, 
when teachers and scholars were revered according to Confucian traditions 
(Suzuki, 2008:33).  
 
During the interviews I asked the participants the following question: If finances 
were not an issue, how many children would you like to have? This is important 
to know, because many studies have shown that women do want to have more 
children, yet this has not been happening (see Chapter 1). Finances have been one 
of the most-mentioned reasons in regard to this issue (Suzuki, 2008). Several 
respondents had the same response: ‘It is impossible not to think of finances’. 
These women did not know how to address this hypothetical question because of 
their very real and all-consuming household financial responsibilities (Paul, 
2011).Most respondents, including Kumiko (Married with children and is a 
housewife), had difficulty responding to the question, yet they did mention 
financial concerns. Since many respondents answered similarly, I decided to try a 
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different approach and used the following vignette with them: Your good friend 
wants to have a second child, but she and her husband are worried about their 
finances. They can cover the expenses of one child fairly well, but things would 
be harder if another child came along. What worries her the most, and what advice 
do you give her? This use of vignettes turned out to be successful, revealing 
sensitive, personal and powerful opinions regarding fertility decisions by helping 
to identify the common theme of education expenses. Responding typically, 
Kimiko (Married with a child, housewife) talked about how expensive it can be to 
raise a child, how mothers want to give their children the best of everything, and 
how financially risky it can be to have a second child. 
 
I would say their biggest concern would be educational expenses and 
whether they would be able to financially provide for their children or not. 
If I were her I would have difficulty deciding if I should have one more. I 
would want to provide my children with the best education, which is very 
expensive. But at the same time I could never cut corners; I want my 
children to have a good education so they can have a better future. 
(Kimiko, Married with a child, housewife) 
 
Although my respondents worried about educational expenses they considered 
them a vital investment in their children’s future. There are differences between 
before and now; historically, a child was an investment for the parent’s future to 
take care of them and provide supporting labour, but parents are investing for 
children now, not for themselves in the future. In countries with similar low 
fertility issues, such as Japan and Italy, there are strong family ties between 
parents and children, and Italian women have fewer children because Italian 
society values ‘quality’ over quantity (Tabuchi, 2008: 73).  
 
Most parents hope their children will develop special skills. The Japanese 
Ministry of Education (2008) found that parents’ ideal jobs for their children were 
mainly those of doctors, lawyers and teachers. For instance, the cost of education 
for becoming a doctor in Japan means private medical school fees in excess of 
¥ 30,000,000 (£ 234,375) and public school fees of ¥ 3,500,000 (£ 27,344) 
(Ministry of Education Culture, Sport, Science and Technology Japan, 2012). As 
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parents’ desires and hopes increase, so do education expenses. But even if 
education were free in Japan, Japanese parents would still spend money for 
private supplementary schools for a future academic career.  
 
 
Table 14: Annual Cost of Supplemental Education among Japanese Children Per Year 
 
  
 
Primary 
School 
Junior 
School 
High 
School 
Total 
Public 
￥90,000 
(￡703) 
￥125,000 
(￡977) 
￥229,000 
(￡1789) 
￥444,000 
(￡3,469) 
Private 
￥296,000 
(￡2,313) 
￥188,000 
(￡1,469) 
￥181,000 
(￡1,414) 
￥665,000 
(￡5,196) 
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Source: Ministry of Education Culture, Sport, Science and Technology-Japan in 2012  
http://www.mext.go.jp/result.html?q=%E5%AD%A6%E8%B2%BB 
 
Table 14 is only the cost of ‘juku’ (private educational institutions) after school to 
help children prepare for their future academic careers (Hirano, 2001). Both 
public and private school children’s parents spend a large amount of money on 
their children’s ‘juku’. Until high school, private school children’s parents spend 
more money on their children’s ‘juku’ than public school children’s parents, but 
after high school, public school children’s parents spend more. This could be 
because attending better universities in Japan means a better career and better life, 
so parents want to ensure that their children have the best chance to compete for 
the most competitive exam
26
 (see also Suzuki, 2008 and Hara, 2008).  
                                                 
26
 Universities and colleges set a date for entrance examinations once a year. If prospective students fail, 
they must wait to take the exam the following year. According to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
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This ‘juku’ system has been expanding in Japan. ‘Juku’ can be expensive. In my 
own personal experience, when I was a child most of my classmates attended 
different kinds of such establishments. I myself attended ‘juku’, learned Maths 
and English, took supplementary English speaking lessons, and took swimming, 
piano, Kimono lessons (which is not part of ‘Juku’; it is part of ‘Naraigoto’, 
which mean lessons), so Table 14 does not include the fees for those activities. 
Japanese parents are not only giving the children the opportunity to learn through 
studying, they are also exposing them to some skills relevant to a job or hobbies in 
the children’s future. As Japanese people feel strongly that children who do not 
attend such private courses will fall behind the rest, the result is quite a financial 
burden on parents. 
 
When I was a child I attended many supplementary lessons. Now I can see 
how expensive they were for my parents. At the time I thought my mother 
was very tight with money, but I know now it was very hard for her to keep 
sending me and my brother to such lessons after school. My mother used 
to work both outside and in the home; she not only did housework but also 
mended clothes to earn extra money at home. I have a comfortable life 
now because I am still single. I do not think I will be like my mother when 
I marry or have a child. I do not want have to sacrifice myself. If I have to 
change my life style, I really don’t have any desire to marry anyone 
sometimes. I think that it takes patience to be a mother, and that marriage 
is a sacrifice—but only for women. (Ayako, single and has a job) 
 
Ayako felt her mother was tight with money and had negative feelings toward her, 
adding ‘At the time, I thought my father was sweeter because he secretly gave me 
some pocket money, but now I know it was easy for him to do because he did not 
manage the household finances. He did not think about it so much, he just spoiled 
me’. Ayako’s memories of her mother were always of a woman who was very 
careful with spending money. Since her mother had dealt with all the financial 
matters, she had also had to deal with much worry and stress. Ayako understands 
and now has some negative feelings toward her father, who she feels did not 
support her mother enough. Other participants who are married have to be careful 
spending money now, and experience stress like Ayako’s mother when she was a 
                                                                                                                                     
Science and Technology-Japan (2010), 16.4 % of all current university students took more than one year to 
enter Universities.  
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child.  
I have a small child now, and so it is very hard for me to work outside the 
home. I am very worried about education expenses. I cannot afford to buy 
anything for myself because I feel it is wasting money. I feel so sad that I 
have to regard buying something for myself as a waste of money, but I do 
have to worry about my children’s education expenses. If I didn’t then no 
one would, because my husband never does. Lately he has taken a defiant 
attitude, and he told me that he cannot do anything and that his salary will 
not change. But if he helped out more at home, I could work outside the 
home and earn extra money - but he does not. Only I work at home, and I 
am mentally and physically tired. How then can I pay for my children’s 
education expenses? Those are the highest expenses I have to worry about. 
I can save on food, but not on education. (Kumiko, married with children 
and housewife) 
 
This was a typical pattern of my participants who cannot work or could not keep a 
job: women want to work for mental and financial reasons, but husbands are not 
supportive (see Chapter 3, 4 and 6). I felt that some of these women were awaiting 
some ‘permission’ from husbands to make decision, a holdover from the 
male-dominated patriarchal structure which demands that women still have to 
obey and listen to what their husbands say. Before marriage, Kumiko had to ask 
her father’s permission, but now she has to ask her husband before making her 
final decision. Even though Kumiko feels it is necessary to work for her family, 
she has to ask for her husband’s permission. I felt so bad listening to her story: she 
cannot work and she feels that buying something for herself is wasteful. It is a 
vicious financial circle of capitalism, patriarchy and job segregation by sex (see 
Chapter 3) which the patriarchal structure creates, pushing women out of paid 
work and making them responsible for domestic work. Pahl (1995: 363) argues 
that economists fail to take into account that married women treat money that they 
have earned for themselves differently from money earned by their husbands to be 
spent on necessities. It could be reduce women’s worries and stress, if husbands 
would help women to make financial decisions. In Kiyomi’s case, the ability to go 
out and work has a positive effect for her mentally, and a positive financial effect 
for her family. But most Japanese men do not share responsibilities of domestic 
work (see Chapter 3 and 6) and financial responsibilities of the household. 
Nursery care is expensive in Japan, so people are faced with the choice of working 
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outside the home in order to afford such an exorbitant cost, or else stay at home to 
take care of the children in order to save money (see Table 13). Even women who 
do not want to follow such a patriarchal structure are choosing to stay at home for 
financial reasons.  
 
During the interviews I also asked my respondents the following question: If you 
were Prime Minister, what policies would you introduce that would allow women 
to have their ideal number of children? Many of them talked about changing the 
nursery care system (see Chapter 6) and easing the financial stress it causes. ‘My 
husband is hopeless when I ask him to share childcare duties, but the government 
support is hopeless to make us suffer more for financially raising a child’ (Keiko, 
married with children, housewife). The UK has this same problem as well, where 
most women must work outside the home and leave their children in a nursery, 
which is rather expensive (Cox, 2006). It can also be difficult to find a nursery 
that is compatible with one’s work schedule if the person has to work many long 
hours. One study found that only 2 % of children under three years old in the UK 
had access to subsidized nurseries, and that less than 1 % of women were 
receiving subsidies; in comparison, the rate in France was 20 % and in Denmark 
was 85 % (Cox, 2006). Everything about raising a child is very expensive in many 
developed countries, and there are fewer opportunities for women to work 
because of a lack of well-developed support systems. Compared with other East 
Asian countries, Japan has a lack of child care facilities and opportunities that can 
be found in places such as Taiwan and South Korea (Ochiai, et. al., 2008: 45-64). 
Taiwanese women tend to be more educated, and fewer women quit their jobs to 
become housewives and take care of children, because Taiwanese women and 
men share more responsibilities of child care together, and their parents and 
relatives are more involved in taking care of children. South Korean women share 
a similar pattern, but there is less sharing of child care responsibilities with their 
husbands, but their parents, like Taiwanese grandparents, help take care of the 
children (Ochiai, et. al., 2008). Married Japanese couples are now living 
separately from their parents and live, causing more pressure for Japanese women 
for child raising (see Chapter 4). Another top concern of financial issues after 
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marriage is housing.  
 
Housing Expenses  
 
It is very difficult for a Japanese person to afford rent without financial support 
from their employers (Nakata, 1998). Whether people decide to rent or purchase a 
home, most companies support their workers, except for part-time or temporary 
workers. According to the Institute of Labour Administration in 2011, 50 % of 
employees are receiving housing support (money) from their employers; other 
companies provide for a place to live such as house or flat. Some companies own 
apartment buildings ‘shataku’ which means ‘company’s house’; it is more like a 
university dormitory if they like employees can live there for a very reasonable 
price.  
I lived in Shataku when I was single but it was good for me financially. I 
think I paid ¥20,000(￡156) per month for all included bills. I saved a lot 
back then, but now I and my husband chose to get financial support from 
his company, not mine, because he wanted to be a man to be the main 
house-holder, ‘Setai-nushi’ and his company gave us better financial 
support for housing. I am sure received more support because he has 
worked for a longer period than me. He is already asking me to leave my 
job (Kazuko, married without child employed full-time).  
 
Figure 26: Shataku 
  
 
Source: 
http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://codan.boy.jp/danchi/saitama/NTT_musashifujisawa/NTT_musa
shifujisawa026.jpg&imgrefurl=http://codan.boy.jp/danchi/saitama/NTT_musashifujisawa/index.html&h=533
&w=800&sz=119&tbnid=2o8G3-uFh36xqM:&tbnh=87&tbnw=131&prev=/search%3Fq%3D%25E7%25A4
%25BE%25E5%25AE%2585%25E3%2581%25AE%25E5%2586%2599%25E7%259C%259F%26tbm%3D
isch%26tbo%3Du&zoom=1&q=%E7%A4%BE%E5%AE%85%E3%81%AE%E5%86%99%E7%9C%9F&u
sg=__0uyHtld5FXRb4vqTcQdEHk-NWYM=&docid=MWa-vzcnKYWQeM&sa=X&ei=8cYAUq6vAcaN0w
WGuIGAAw&ved=0CEMQ9QEwBw&dur=585 
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When Japanese couples who both work full-time marry, they have to chose 
whether the wife or husband will be the main house-holder ‘setai-nushi,’and 
register with the local council. The husband or wife then also have to register with 
the company who will be the ‘setai-nishi’ to receive financial support for rent, and 
if they have a child, for child support also (see Chapter 6). In Kazuko’s case, it 
was more financially beneficial to choose her husband’s company’s support rather 
than hers, because he might be able to have higher housing support from his 
company when he is promoted. There is no mandated standard level of support; 
comanies themselves decide how by much to support their employees. According 
to a study conducted by the Asahi Shinbun (2008), employers on average 
provided ¥ 90,000 (£ 703) per month to their single employees and ¥ 120,000 
(£ 938) per month to married couples for rental support, as well as ¥ 25,000 
(£195) a month to those who owned their own dwelling. Another study shows that 
the average monthly supporting fees for renting are ¥ 30,114 (£ 235) and for 
house payments are ¥ 23,504 (£ 184) (Institute of Labour Administration, 2010). 
There is some disparity between the Asahi Shinbun in 2010 study and the one 
conducted by the Institute of Labour Administration, but the Institute of Labour 
Administration notes that employees are financially responsible for making up the 
differences in gaps of rent support, and larger companies support their employees 
more generously. Asahi Shinbun’s study was focused primarily on large 
companies, where as the Institute of Labour Administration was a larger scale and 
more inclusive study.  
 
I asked my respondents about housing support. It was a sensitive question, 
because it might reveal what kind of companies their husbands are working for, 
which is detailed private information. However, they did share the approximate 
amounts of support they were receiving, allowing me to derive an average amount 
of housing support received. The average amount of monthly housing support my 
married respondents had received was approximately ¥ 90,000 (£ 703), and the 
average amount the single respondents had received was approximately ¥ 40,000 
(£ 313). All of my respondents are either working themselves, or their husbands 
are receiving housing support from employer. Most of my married respondents 
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who are renting a place said the support they receive would cover most of the rent, 
but the single respondents said that the support only covered some of their rent. 
Three participants have experiences of living in ‘shataku’. Kazuko told me that 
‘actually, after I moved out from shataku, we bought a house. So I could not get 
my bank mortgage, it had to be in my husband’s name to purchase a house and be 
the main house- holder ‘satai-nushi’. At this moment, her husband’s company 
provides less than half of the housing support that it used to provide when he lived 
by himself. His rent was all paid. The resulting finiancial difficulties made them 
decide to buy an affordable house in a far suburb of Tokyo. Kazuko said, ‘I know I 
would be same as my friends quit a job and rely on my husband soon because 
since marriage, we chose a place to live close to my husband’s workplace, which 
is further for me to commute and do both an outside job and work at home, which 
is very tiring’. Kazuko lived in ‘Shataku’ and her commute was only 10 minutes 
away from work; now her commuting time is over an hour and a half (see Chapter 
1). Kazuko told me her daily schedule was very busy and all of her time off at the 
weekends is taken up by domestic work, and she cannot do so much longer. Her 
husband’s commute is about an hour; however, he does not have responsibilities 
of unpaid work and even over the weekend he goes out with his colleagues for 
golfing, and explains to her how important it is to have relationships with his 
colleagues for promotion prospects, and a better life for her and him. Kazuko said 
‘I do not believe in a better future; I would prefer it if he would help me and we 
could share responsibilities of the finances and I could work too’. If Kazuko and 
her husband were renting a flat, it would be more affordable than buying a house, 
and they could live closer to work. However, the majority of Japanese people 
dream of purchasing their own home, which is one of their main goals in life 
(Suzuki, Takayama, and Yamada, 2001; Rosenberger, 2001).  
 
I found that most of my married respondents were saving money for their ‘dream 
house’. I have a child now, so I need to save some money for a house (Kamiko, 
Married with a child and housewife). Kazumi’s and Kamiko’s desire to own a 
home seemed especially strong because of their desire to provide for their children. 
It is much easier for a couple to save money before buying a house because of 
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their employers’ financial support for their living accommodations. After 
purchasing a home, however, the long-term mortgage makes it exceedingly 
difficult to save money. According to Hirata (2000), the average mortgage in 
Japan covers some 25 years, and some people continue to pay on their mortgages 
even after retirement.  
 
An average of 61 % of houses and flats are owned by their residents. The 
proportion is higher in the countryside, while the lowest proportion is in Tokyo, 
with 41 % because the capital is most expensive (Census, 2010). One respondent, 
Saki (married with children, employed part-time), said that she and her husband 
had not yet decided whether to buy a house or not. Her husband was the only son 
of his parents, and so the possibility existed that they might move into his parents’ 
house when they became older (see Chapter 4). It seems that buying their dream 
homes can cause women to worry more about finances, simply because women 
are taking care of most of financial matters.  
 
Women’s Responsibility for the Household Finances 
 
The management of household finances between husbands and wives is a very 
sensitive issue that cannot be ignored and usually reveals the power dynamic of 
the relationship (Early and Lesh, 1998; Gallie and Vogler, 1994) with money 
management habits rooted in different economic and cultural ideas (Nyman, 2002; 
Roman and Vogler, 1999; Singh, 1997; Early and Lesh, 1998). Management of 
money in a marital relationship is based on shared trust, but it can also highlight 
the gap in equality between men and women (Singh, 1997). Pahl (1989: 66-77) 
identified and categorised five ways of managing family finances between women 
and men, but her classification may need to be updated since the pattern has 
changed. Pahl (2004; 2005) notes that studies conducted in the U.K. show that 
1950s financial planning revolved around the male breadwinner system, but by 
1980, more couples were pooling their financial resources, and by the1990s 
family members were managing their finances independently; these patterns 
continue to change over time (Pahl, 2005; Vogler, 2005). The Partial Pooling 
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System has become more popular in recent years (Pahl, 1995; 2005; Kenney, 
2006). However, Pahl’s original classification is still useful in understanding 
household finances.  
 
The first of Paul’s types is the ‘Wife Management’ or the Whole Wage System, 
where wife is responsible for all payments and bills, except for her partner’s 
personal expenditures. The husband gives all of his wages to his wife and receives 
an allowance from her, or else takes out his own spending money and then gives 
the rest to his wife. The main disadvantage of this system is a potential shortage of 
money, resulting in more financial pressure and stress for women with little or no 
money left over for themselves. In the Allowance System, the husband gives his 
wife a pre-agreed amount of money for certain expenditures, at the same time 
agreeing to pay for other expenditures such as basic bills. Main disadvantage is 
that it is difficult to save money and the wife has no money left over for herself. In 
the Pooling System or Shared Management, the husband and wife have a joint 
account from which they can both draw money. Both of their total wages go into 
the account, and each withdraws and uses the money as he/she sees fit. It gives the 
appearance of financial equality, and the lower-wage earner (usually the wife) 
may feel a sense of guilt or inequality, while the higher-wage earner may feel 
resentful. The Partial Pooling System is similar to the pooling system, but only 
part of each of the women’s and men’s wages go into a joint account, the rest 
going into their respective individual bank accounts. This has been very popular 
with cohabiting couples (Elisabeth, 2001). The main disadvantages is that women 
usually earn lower wages than their husbands and feel more financial stress and 
pressure after bearing a child. It is also difficult to buy expensive items together 
(Elisabeth, 2001). Finally, in the Independent Management System, both the wife 
and husband have jobs and each agrees to pay for certain bills and other expenses. 
They each have their own bank accounts. This system is usually more common 
for cohabiting couples or couples without children. The main disadvantages could 
be that couples may have problems when purchasing items together, such as a 
house or car, as well as deciding what is fair after children are born. It is 
unworkable that when women start having children they have to stop working yet 
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still have financial responsibilities, putting tremendous pressure on them. It is 
much easier for men to save up extra cash. 
 
There are similarities and differences between Spanish and Japanese couples; 
couples in both countries believe the money belongs to the family, rather than to 
either of the individuals, but there are differences: the majority of Spanish couples 
use the Pooling System (Diaz, et. al., 2007), yet most Japanese couples use the 
Whole Wage System. Japanese women are in total control of the family budget 
(Lam, 1993; Hunter, 1993). However, I have found in my research that women are 
struggling to manage financial matters and they harbour negative thoughts about 
taking full responsibility for financial matters.  
 
My husband doesn’t have to worry about any financial issues in our family. 
I have been stressed and worried about our future because of our huge 
mortgage payments, car payments, and the education fund for our children. 
But he just shrugs and says, ‘I can’t give you any more than what my 
company gives me.’ He seems not to care. I am talking to a stranger, so I 
no longer discuss such matters with him. I do it all on my own for my 
children. My husband has an easy life. He’s got pocket money and he can 
do whatever he wants, going out and he doesn’t think about anyone else. 
He’s like another child, concerned only about his pocket money and going 
out his days off. (Kiriko, married with children and has a part-time job) 
 
 
Women in Japan women are frequently pushed to take responsibility of financial 
matters when the budget is tight, causing many to seek employment outside the 
home (Ochiai and Molony, 2008). Kiriko has financial concerns and stress but she 
did not have any support from her husband. She explained that she had to take the 
initiative, and so she decided to take on a part-time job, even with her two small 
children. Her husband did not have to worry about the finances; his supportive 
wife took care of everything. He was concerned only about his pocket money to 
go out after work and on the weekends. Women tend to be practical and realistic, 
spending less money at the market in order to save more money for the future 
(Lundberg, Starz and Stillman, 2003). For instance, Kumiko felt spending money 
on herself was wasteful, as did Kamiko and Kiriko. 
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I haven’t even a penny to spend on myself. Even when I buy cosmetics I 
have to buy them at a discount shop, but when my husband wants to buy a 
car or motorcycle, he gets what he wants. I feel that I am either a banker 
or a mother with an extra baby. I have to spend money from our savings, 
which I had been keeping for our children. (Kamiko, married with a child, 
housewife)  
 
 
Kamiko and other respondents, especially those who are married with a child or 
children feel that they must restrict their spending on a day-to-day level, using 
their money only for family necessities (see Pahl, 1990). Men ignore the financial 
consequences of their spending, leaving it up to the wife to cope with the 
aftermath. In the west, Elisabeth (2001) found that money is often loaned between 
partners, but women borrow more often than men because of their lower wages; 
however, in my research, the same loaning of money between partners went the 
opposite way, with men seeking loans from women.  
 
My husband goes drinking and occasionally spends more of his pocket 
money than he should, so he sometimes borrows money from me, but he 
must return it to me by the next month. We do not have any extra money, 
and we need it for the children. (Saki, married with children, has a 
part-time job) 
 
 
Pahl (1995) argues that personal spending patterns reveal the power dynamic of 
the couple’s relationship. In my participants’ case, men use the power to keep 
control, taking whatever money they want or think they need, leaving women to 
worry over financial matters for themselves. Men do not seem to care about their 
behaviour and attitudes causing stress and financial crisis for their wives, taking 
more money from the family budget for personal use, even if this means nothing 
is left for their wives. However, among my married participants without children, 
Eriko’s, Kayo’s, and Kazumi’s attitudes toward household finances were more 
relaxed because they have fewer worries: they do not have a child yet. Their 
husbands would borrow money from their wives but would often not return it. 
Eriko (married without a child, housewife) said, ‘every month he loans money 
when they we have a child he said he will not do it, but I am not sure. But 
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everybody has the same experience, so... (smile) .  
 
Eriko’s story was more surprising because her husband secretly bought a car and 
she said he borrowed money from her. At first I was confused; I could not 
understand how it worked. She smiles and explained it to me: ‘we had money in 
the bank account; he used it and he would repay me every month from his pocket 
money’. At first I could not tell if she was smiling because it was a funny 
experience for her, or for some other reason. But after she told me, she was 
embarrassed to tell me about financial matters, so the story she told me was not 
funny. Eriko’s experience was similar to Kazumi’s, saying she became a ‘banker’ 
at home. Whereas men can unilaterally decide on making large purchases such as 
a car without any qualms.  
 
Smith found that in an equal and controlled pooling system, women feel more 
comfortable when the financial management is shared with their partners (Smith, 
2006). Only one of my respondents, Kiyomi, has been using even the Partial 
Pooling System with her husband, which is very rare.  
 
My husband and I have separate bank accounts. I pay a certain amount 
and he pays a certain amount; we pay nearly the same amount for our 
expenses. So far we haven’t had any problem with this system. I have 
security in my own bank account, and I like it. (Kiyomi, Married with a 
child, has a part-time job) 
 
 
Kiyomi had grown up in a wealthy family. Although her mother did not work 
outside the home, she urged Kiyomi to be independent, which she was. She was 
very careful and fiercely protected her security. She did not feel financially 
stressed, not only because of her comfortable university teaching job but also 
because she did not have to worry about her family’s financial matters alone. Her 
partner did his share and that was a great help to her. Sakiko and Suzuko, both 
living in the UK, felt similarly. Sakiko also said that she did not have to deal with 
financial matters by herself, and Suzuko expressed her preference for having a 
separate bank account from her partner for her own security. Women could have 
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better jobs be more independent and more opportunities if more and better support 
systems existed, and also if more men participated in child-rearing and housework 
(Saul, 2003).  
 
 
Summary 
 
In order for the status of women to improve, women need be able to have 
unobstructed access to paying jobs, though this in itself is not enough. Even 
during the time when Japanese women are young and beautiful, they do not have 
the same opportunities as men. When women are blocked from equal 
opportunities with men, it is hard for them to enjoy their jobs (Smith, et. al., 2003). 
Women cannot imagine a bright future in their careers, for there is little for them 
to look forward to. Even if Japanese women can work and stay for a long time at 
the same workplace, they are typically viewed negatively or with jealousy by 
male co-workers and society, and women may feel uncomfortable staying there. In 
the meantime, women feel the pressure of time limits of marriage and having a 
child if they decide to marry Japanese men. In my research, I have found that it is 
more difficult for women to keep a job because they have to do all unpaid 
domestic work at home. Women lose substantial personal income as well as their 
autonomy and independence, their connections to their social networks, and their 
self-esteem, while their knowledge and skills atrophy to a certain degree. Many 
highly-educated Japanese women come to the conclusion that the price of 
sacrificing everything they have to raise children would be too high (MacDonald, 
1997; 2002). Women bear the responsibilities of household financial matters, 
which makes them more worried and stressed, because most of the time money is 
tight or they are saving up for major expenses, such as the cost of raising children 
or the dream of purchasing a house, without the husband’s support or help. 
Japanese women’s indirect costs and direct costs are steep. Japanese women are 
impacted in both ways: they could contribute to the family finances, as well as 
earning extra pocket money and savings, but it cannot be achieved with nothing 
more than a part-time job, and the unpaid work of supporting and influencing a 
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family. These patterns have been passed generation to generation, and many of my 
participants feel it is unequal and unfair; however, they are trapped in a cycle of 
discontent and dependence that cannot be broken because of strong family ties 
and the male-dominated patriarchal structure in Japan.  
 
According to Knudsen and Wærness (2009: 41), Nordic countries were pioneers 
in making gender equality part of law. Nordic marriage law has tried to dismantle 
the patriarchal family model as early as the 1920s, attempting to redefine marriage 
away from the traditional roles of a male breadwinner and a housewife. In the 
1970s, Nordic welfare laws concentrated on returning mothers to the workplace 
rather than special benefits for housewives, though Norway was slower to adopt 
the reforms (Knudsen and Wærness, 2009). Those are very important points, but 
Japan has deeper issues; Japan needs to make it possible for women to keep a job, 
and the next step should be supporting employment for mothers rather than 
benefits to entice them to become housewives. Giving women a greater share of 
participation in the labour force, and allowing women to continue their careers 
after motherhood, has been central to Nordic welfare policy (Knudsen and 
Wærness, 2009). Giving women independence from the male-breadwinner model 
has become a key part of gender equality. When women have greater participation 
in the workplace, it is a major step toward the goal of gender equality (Knudsen 
and Wærness, 2009). Improvements in the workplace and in government 
programs are accordingly necessary in order to support Japanese women and their 
children (MacDonald, 1997). Pahl (1995) suggested that a better system would 
allow both parental leave and flexible work hours for both parents. The next 
chapter covers Care and Welfare Policy. It explores what Japanese women would 
like and need from support in terms of support and welfare.  
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Chapter 6: Care and Welfare Policy 
 
The nature of care work should be defined as a labour in its own 
right, and should be defined so we can examine how the work 
itself, and the responsibility to undertaking it, has helped to keep 
women in a disadvantaged position. (Daly and Lewis, 2000: 
283) 
 
 
Introduction  
 
Daly (2002) explains ‘care’ as a system that looks after the needs of the ill, the 
elderly or young children which involves women more than men in three areas: 
moral orientation, life course and economic and social relations. In the West, the 
criticism of unpaid care work is well-entrenched in feminist literature, and has 
been the focus of much feminist research (Lewis and Daly, 2000: 281). Daly and 
Lewis points out that care work is often pushed onto women, and will remain at 
the center of women's responsibilities if attitudes regarding gender inequality are 
not changed. Women and men have always worked, but in the past it was for the 
necessity of daily living and maintenance. After the Industrial Revolution, the 
focus of work became financial payment, and paid work began to be considered 
more valuable than unpaid housework (Clevaland, Stockdale and Murphy, 2000; 
Crompton 1999; Lewis 2001). Many European countries are welfare states, yet 
career women in those countries still face a predominately male breadwinner 
system (Kremer, 2006). Care work is usually low paid or unpaid showing that 
those tasked with child care are not treated as important, such that the majority of 
women engage in more care work, which means fewer important jobs for women 
(Kremer, 2006).  
 
The degrees of importance placed on paid work among women and men has 
changed over time, with women adding more unpaid care work to their paid work 
as men have added relatively few household or care duties, despite the fact that 
the amount of time they spend on paid work has decreased (Gershuny 2000; 
Pascall and Lewis, 2004; Gardiner, 1997). Reactions vary greatly within academia 
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to the gradual shift from the ‘male breadwinner’ model toward a model in which 
both adults in the family work (Giullari, Lewis, 2005:3; Lewis, 2007; Nyman and 
Reinikainen, 2002). Giullari and Lewis (2005) argue that the distribution of care 
work in a family in which both adults work full-time is a major issue, claiming 
that women who work full time will still put unpaid care work first (Duncan and 
Edwards, 1999; Barlow and Duncan, 2000).  
 
In Japan, providing care is mostly the responsibility of families, though very 
strong family ties ensure that women still assume the majority of the 
responsibility of care (Eto, 2001), and that families feel ashamed to ask for help 
by relying on care (MacDonald, 1998: 2002). Japan’s case is one which places 
more responsibility upon women as part of the norm of male-dominated society. 
In most countries, there is still a belief that care work is a huge emotional 
investment undertaken by women because of their natural love for their children, 
and men are still not expected to be deeply involved in child care (O’Brien, 2007: 
159). Norway was among the first to legislate gender equality in an effort to help 
women increase their participation in the work force. Introduced in the 1920s, the 
Nordic welfare system set out to abolish the traditional patriarchal family model 
(see Chapter 5) and to share welfare and care responsibilities among families and 
government agencies, allowing women and men to share both care work and 
participation in the workplace (Knudsen and Wærness, 2009: 41). Norway is a 
pioneer welfare state, however in Japan it would be difficult to abolish or even 
weaken the patriarchal family model, bringing about de-housewifezation (Ochiai, 
2008); instead of that, Japanese welfare policy is more focused on financial 
support.  
 
 
Financial Support 
 
 
In 1972 the Japanese government issued a policy of support for raising healthy 
and better balanced children after the second child. With the birth of the third 
child the family was entitled to receive ¥3,000 (£23) a month up to the age of five. 
In 1986 households received ¥2,500 (£20) monthly for a second child, and ¥5,000 
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(£40) for the third child up to the age of five. In 1992 this was increased to ¥5,000 
yen (£40) for both the first and second child and ¥10,000 (£80) for the third child, 
again up to the age of five. These figures remained unchanged for some years but 
in 2004 a household could receive support for each child up to the age of ten; this 
changed again in 2006, such that children receive support up to the age of twelve. 
In 2007 all children received ¥5,000 (£40) of support up to the age of three, and 
¥10,000 (£80) afterward. In 2010 all children received ¥13,000 (£102) of support 
annually until they were fifteen years old (MHLW, 2011). The Japanese Ministry 
of Health thus encouraged families to have more than two children by offering 
families extra money, yet the policy has not worked. During the interviews I have 
found that most of the respondents were not sure what kind of support they had 
received, nor could most of them recall how much money they were receiving 
from the government.  
 
 
I believed and I still believe children are the responsibility of their 
parents. It would be nice if the government offered more help and child 
support, especially financially, because I cannot make money like when I 
was single, but I do not expect they will change things dramatically. I 
wish I could have a career job; now I do not hope to get money from 
anywhere. I am sure I am receiving some financial support, but it is a 
very small amount of money because I do not even remember it. I have 
never had any concern about it and I don’t want to rely on it. (Keiko, 
married with 2 children and housewife).  
 
 
Historically in Japan, it was believed that children are the responsibility of the 
family and parents, and so naturally people do not rely on financial support from 
the government (Yamada, 2000). However, a small but growing number of 
Japanese people believe that raising children is now not only be the responsibility 
of parents, but the responsibility of Japanese society as a whole if it hopes to 
resolve its low fertility issue (Obuchi and Okazawa, 2010). Keiko is one of my 
typical respondents: a ‘mix’ of traditional and contemporary, she feels that the 
responsibility of taking care of children falls to the parents and family; however, if 
she could receive some more financial support, it would be better than nothing, 
but on the other hand she feels ashamed to rely on to benefits. Keiko did not 
believe that the Japanese government would make any changes to welfare support 
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anytime soon, allowing women to maintain a career. She and other participants 
were looking for financial independence for themselves as individuals, rather than 
taking money from the government.  
 
Historically child support and benefit was established for poor families in Sweden 
in 1937, but in 1948 they were expanded to all families. As of 2010, 
approximately 2,000 Swedish kroner per month (£178)
27
 is provided for all 
children (Bettio and Plant 2004), unlike Japan, where different amounts of 
financial support are provided based on how many children a family has. In Japan 
child support started fairly recently in 1972 and developing very slowly (Segawa, 
2000). However, one of my respondents told me her positive opinion of in the 
UK.  
 
I think it is much better in the UK in regard to child support and policy, 
because I have lived here over one year and have found that women have 
less pressure and fewer worries in raising children. They are treated as 
individuals and have more job security, and so women can have more 
children more easily. I am sure there are still problems in the UK, but it is 
better than in Japan. I also know that Scandinavian countries have it 
even better than the UK. (Suzuko, living in the UK and single) 
 
 
In Suzuko’s opinion, Japanese women face more responsibilities in having 
children than in the U.K. Her experience in the U.K. has shown her that women 
have more opportunities and greater equality and are treated as more fully-realized 
individuals than in Japan. In Japan, single mothers are rare about 2 % (see Chapter 
1), and teenage single mothers are even rarer; out of all single mothers in Japan, it 
is estimated that only 0.3 % are teenage single mothers (Ministry of International 
Affairs and Communications in 2010). However, 81 % of all single mothers are 
working and only 14 % of single mother are claiming benefits
28
 in Japan (MHLW, 
2012). In the traditional family and ‘ie’ system in Japan, single mothers are 
against Japanese tradition, so they too need the ability to work. A study by the 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare shows that High proportions of women 
                                                 
27 1 pound equalling 11.24 SEK as of 9 May 2012.  
28 Benefits excluding child support.  
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who participate in the labour force feel shame to receive benefits to raise a child 
or children. Keiko also told me ‘My friend is a single mother and she feels very 
ashamed for her family to be a single mother, and she would be more ashamed if 
she received benefits from the government. She is working so hard.’ 
 
Japanese people perceive the family unit in the context of the ie system (see 
Chapter 1). Because Japanese people think that children are the responsibility of 
the family they have given up on relying on the government for child care policy 
changes. Any financial support they may receive is seen as negligible. Japanese 
parents cannot count on that money alone to be able to raise children. It is also 
worth mentioning that when I was interviewing Keiko, she always used ‘I’ instead 
of ‘we’ when referring to receiving financial support from the government. This 
indicates that most of the responsibilities for children were undertaken by the 
women, rather than these responsibilities being shared between the mother and 
father (see Chapter 5). At first only a small amount of financial support was 
offered to have another child (see above), but women need more than that to be 
independent and treated equally.  
 
 
I would love to have children but I want to keep my job if at all possible. I 
would not say my job is an ideal job, but at least I know what I am doing. 
I really do not want to quit my job, have children and then go back into 
the labour force, since working in a factory is something I’ve never done 
(Chiho, single, full-time job). 
  
 
The Japanese government wishes to see more children born in Japan, but they 
think only in terms of direct financial support without establishing a social 
security system that will directly benefit women (Ato, 2000). It is very difficult to 
change the system and the laws to counter this discrepancy. In Japan, women 
account for only 11.3 % of the seats in the National Diet, which is very male 
dominated and cannot focus on women’s needs (Statistics Japan, 2012). Japanese 
men, moreover, since they do not take part in the care work at home, do not know 
what is wanted of them or what needs to be changed.  
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Most members of Parliament and were born into wealth, especially if 
they are men. They do not know what we need, they think a little bit of 
money would help in having more children or something, but there are 
many more issues: women’s rights, job security and the difficulty of 
raising children. If I did not have to worry about the essentials of raising 
a child, personally my ideal number of children would be higher, but 
there are too many things I have to worry about. Even though I am 
married, I have not even had one child yet (Kazuko, married without a 
child, has a full-time job) 
  
 
There are obvious gaps between the wealthy, women and men, and the majority of 
the population. Moreover, women lack a political voice in Japan. The Japanese 
parliament feels they know what the people need, and the government offers 
financial support thinking it might help, but this has not been working. They do 
not know what women want because of the male-dominated social structure 
everywhere in Japan. For instance, 60 % of single mothers have never received 
child support from their children’s father (MHLW, 2012). It is shocking that 
women are neither protected nor supported by men or by the government. 
Japanese authorities want women to have more children, but do not want to work 
toward change; instead, they hand out money and wait for changes to happen. At 
what point are women bearing too many responsibilities? When I asked myself 
this question, I remembered the rare example of Kiyomi, who is happy with her 
marriage. Her virtuous circle is working. 
 
Figure 27: Kiyomi’s Virtuous Circle After Marriage 
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The key to Kiyomi’s happier life is job security, which would help women to 
enjoy more and better jobs, as well as enjoying being parents. Ato (2000) states 
that financial support alone will not encourage Japanese women to have children, 
but rather more child care policies, men’s support and gender equality are needed, 
while reducing women’s responsibilities could help to resolve Japan’s low fertility 
rate. I would call this Kiyomi’s virtuous circle, to follow how my other 
participants have a different circle to Kiyomi’s virtuous circle. Government 
support of non-traditional bread-winner structures, sharing the responsibilities of 
care with a partner, could help women keep their careers and give them the 
support they need to raise children together with less pressure. Doing this would 
set an example of gender equality and change relationships between women and 
men for the next generation. The starting and key point is the male-dominated 
society (see Chapter 3), which is different for Kiyomi than it is for other 
participants.  
 
 
Male-Dominated System 
 
Breadwinner 
 
Within McDonald’s (2000) 'equity theory', low fertility can be attributed to 
increased gender equality in institutions serving individuals, combined with less 
gender equality in institutions focusing on families, perpetuating the male 
breadwinner family structure. McDonald (2000) also claims that traditionally 
structured families resist any attempt to even the workload of domestic work and 
child care among the parents. Lewis (1992) categorised three types of 
breadwinner countries. The first, the strong male-breadwinner state, has an 
unequal tax system, with few low-tax or tax-free allowances, and very few 
allowances for child care (Lewis, 1992: 162-165). Historically, in strong 
male-breadwinner states, women are wives and mothers, and rely on their 
husband and partner. They are in support roles, which mean less of everything for 
them: lower wages, fewer benefits and less support from others (Lewis, 1992). 
This continues to be the case in Japan. Second, in modified male-breadwinner 
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countries (Lewis, 1992: 165-167), women’s participation in the full-time labour 
force is strong, and participation is focused on benefiting families with or without 
children. Third is a ‘weak’ male breadwinner society which, with more women 
gradually entering the paid workforce, has evolved into a dual-breadwinner one 
with separate but equal tax and child care benefits (Lewis, 1992).  
 
In Japan, however, there is a family tax system. If a wife and husband separate, 
they have to pay higher income taxes and lose various forms of support from 
companies and the government. The system helps to maintain and further 
perpetuate gender inequality (see Appendix IV). As a result, women are working 
only part-time jobs, which is commonly undertaken to support the family 
financially. The government policy favours having women work and earn less 
than ¥1,000,000 (£7,813) per year, which means they pay fewer taxes and 
virtually belong to their husbands (see Chapter 5 and Appendix IV). Nordic 
countries, on the other hand, focus on supporting women, not only financially but 
in helping women maintain a job, and by introducing and expanding maternity 
leave, flexible time, reducing gender inequality and encouraging women’s 
partners to share the responsibility of care with help from government authorities 
(Knudsen and Wærness, 2009: 41). But rather than focusing only on women’s 
needs in the labour force, the Nordic system focuses on the children’s needs also 
(Lewis, 1992), which has not occurred in Japan. In strong male-breadwinner states, 
lack of shared responsibilities and ties to gender roles push domestic work onto 
women, causing them to lose opportunities to work and gain independence (Daly 
and Lewis, 2000), as in Japan. Financial support is the easier option: just give 
money and help financially, which has not working in Japan (see Chapter 5); 
however, it is more difficult for men to share responsibilities in countries with a 
strong male-dominated patriarchal structure.  
 
 
Lack of Shared Responsibilities  
 
Within a short span of history, the shape and traditions surrounding the family 
have undergone dramatic changes throughout western Europe. Lower fertility 
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rates, aging population, rising employment among mothers and higher proportion 
of divorce and separation among parents have raised questions about the future of 
the traditional family (Ellingsaeter and Leira, 2006: 2). Changes in cultures and 
economies lead to changes in welfare needs and risks, which also raises questions 
about the degree to which a welfare state should intervene on behalf of parents 
with young children (Ellingsaeter and Leira, 2006). Japan is a strong 
male-breadwinner state, more men work outside and women do care work after 
marriage (see Chapter1). However, many women are now working outside the 
home, but Japanese men have not changed their habits as quickly as more 
Japanese women have been joining the labour force. The welfare system has not 
changed, however, so despite the changes in the nature of child care, Japanese 
women are receiving inadequate help, leading them to decide to have fewer 
children or none. After having a child, who is taking care of the child? There are 
fewer people living with their parents after marriage nowadays in Japan (see 
Chapter 4). Japanese husbands are spending very little time on unpaid domestic 
and care work (see Chapter1 and 3). It is vital to maintain domestic tasks, but 
these demands are often ignored (Anderson, 2000). Gerstel (2009) found that 
working-class families might arrive at arrangements for child care that increased 
men’s parenting time, but that study did not include men taking on such chores as 
cleaning, laundry and grocery shopping. Even my research found that my 
respondents’ husbands were not helping with child care, even on their days off if 
their wives were working outside (see Chapter 2 and 3). Do Japanese women 
‘naturally’ want to do care work and stay at home? My respondents said ‘No’ to 
this question (see Chapter 2); however, they are doing it because it is necessary, 
and they fear the work will not be done if they do not do it themselves. It might be 
because they feel guilty not to be the ones taking care of their children. One 
respondent was struggling without help from other family members, specifically 
without help from her husband without either welfare or child care, to work 
outside the home in an attempt to gain freedom and independence.  
 
I want to go outside the home and work because I want to do different 
things rather than always staying at home, and to be more active and 
socialize with people other than my family. I also think it is good to have 
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your own money. But that is very difficult because I have three children 
and lack my husband’s support. I do not think he would be happy if I 
worked away from home, and so he would not help me at all. He might 
even make it difficult for me to find work. No one will help to raise 
children; I have to by myself. (Kumiko, married with 3 children and 
housewife)  
 
 
There are two issues that need to be addressed. First, Kumiko wants to work 
outside the home to gain confidence and feel that she is a part of society. The 
other issue is that her desire to do paid work has been thwarted and she cannot do 
so because she lacks support. Her entire world is comprised of her family and 
home, which has caused her to lose her self-esteem and self-confidence. 
Self-esteem, self-confidence and a purpose in life is important for people to be 
involved in their societies (Martinez and Dukes, 1997). Losing a job can also have 
a major effect on self-esteem (Waters and Moore, 2002: 172). Women are more 
likely than men to lose a job in Japan because of being pregnancy or raising a 
child (see Chapter 3). Moreover, there are still many women having difficulties 
maintaining a full-time career because of the lack of support. One of the 
respondents mentioned to me that she had lost her confidence and her 
self-identity: 
 
When I was working full time outside the home, I felt I was needed in 
society and that I really existed, but now I feel that I am not needed and 
so do not exist.(Keiko, married with children, housewife). 
 
 
When women are working under the same conditions as men they have more 
confidence, but when they lose their equal positions they are more likely to lose 
confidence. One study indicates that after childbirth many women experience 
depression and lose self confidence because most of them have quit their jobs to 
stay at home and have thus begun to feel unnecessary (Beghi, et. al., 2004). I was 
surprised to discover how hard it is to find Japanese literature mentioning the 
effects of losing a job, such as a loss of self-esteem or confidence, but many 
respondents in quantitative research believed that this was because it is thought 
that Japanese women are satisfied and want to raise children and stay at home (see 
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Chapter 3). The correlation between the loss of self-esteem, child-bearing and 
child care, and the dissatisfaction Japanese women experience in their lives, has 
not been studied due to the lack of qualitative research, and should be examined 
more closely.  
 
I wanted to ask my respondents for their ideas about keeping a job after marriage 
or having a child, as in Kiyomi’s case. Some participants had already left their 
jobs, so I felt it would be a better idea to use vignettes to depersonalise the 
questions, so they could answer honestly using their experiences to say what they 
felt would be best for women. I used the following vignette as an example: 
 
‘Miss A’ cannot decide if she wants to marry or not because she likes her 
job and wants to keep her job even after marrying or having a child, but it 
will be difficult for her to do that.  
 
After I used this example, one interviewee started to talk about her past 
experiences, telling me, ‘I was like “Miss A.”’  
 
I would say it is not a good idea to quit one’s job if she likes it and wants 
to keep it, so she should do it until she feels she is ready for everything, 
because after getting married and especially having a child, she would 
regret and not feel satisfied to lose almost all, like me. I now feel nothing. 
(Eriko, married without children, and housewife).  
 
 
Eriko felt a profound lack of confidence because she used to have a job and was 
happy, but she felt she had lost nearly everything she had after marrying and 
having her child. She also mentioned to me that she felt ‘so guilty’: she was happy 
to have her child, but she was not completely happy or satisfied with her own life. 
One of her friends had been trying to become pregnant but without success, so she 
felt that she was in a better situation than her friend was. During the interview I at 
first felt that Eriko’s situation was totally different from her friend and that her 
friend was not happy being childless. But the big issue was that she had quit her 
job and was not happy, yet she had tried to adjust and accept her choice to have a 
child at the sacrifice of her job, unlike her friend.  
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Another issue is wives who cannot take paid work (see Kumiko’s quote above) 
because like kumiko their husbands do not want them to work, and deliberately 
withhold support and help. I have found in this research that Japanese men are 
afraid that if the wife goes outside, likes her job and keeps on working, then the 
housework and care work will have to be shared between the two of them. ‘My 
husband told me if you need work, do a part-time or Naishoku
29
 at home which 
does not affect domestic and child care work’ (Keiko, married with children, 
housewife). The attitude of Japanese men has been changing toward women’s 
work choices; where men once preferred for women to stay at home, more 
Japanese men now prefer their wives to work outside. 39.1 % of Japanese men are 
hoping women will contribute to work outside ‘after having children’ (MHLW, 
2010). Although, according to this government study, Japanese men prefer women 
to work outside, after having children women are expected to take up part-time or 
temporary work. And, Japanese men do not help with or share domestic work with 
their wives, so Japanese women cannot continue to keep a job even if their 
husbands wish for them to contribute financially. Japanese women are following 
Japanese men’s desires. In my research, I also discovered that even when 
employers or the government try to reduce working hours so men can share the 
responsibilities of care work, domestic work and child raising, my respondents’ 
husbands still would not do their share of that work even if they came home 
earlier or had more days off (see Chapter 4). ‘Money talks:’ theoretically women 
who become more financially independent and can earn the same amount as their 
husbands are responsible for half of the housework, and many researchers in 
Japan have found that this does have a small effect on the sharing of housework 
responsibilities (see MacDonald, 2000, Ochiai, 2008; Kyogoku and Takahashi; 
2008). When men earn much more than their wives, however, there is a dramatic 
effect on the wives’ housework responsibilities (Bittman et al, 2003). In my 
respondents’ cases, women are permitted to work outside part-time, but it should 
not influence care and domestic work, and this means double the workload for 
Japanese women.  
 
                                                 
29 See Chapter 4 
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I am working both at home and outside the home but my husband does 
not help or support in the housework at all. He has not changed since I 
started working. There is so much work to be done, but what I can I do? I 
cannot get back the job which was in my field and was my career before I 
had my child. Too much time has been lost in taking care of my family. 
(Saki, married with children, employed part-time) 
 
 
Pascall and Lewis (2004) point out that in the west women with children have to 
spend time balancing the family finances, exerting themselves physically and 
emotionally, but that men do not. It would be necessary to maintain that a strong 
welfare system to protect women who are bringing up children (Pascall and Lewis, 
2004). Only women seem to be at a disadvantage when it comes to having a child. 
In Japan current policies, however, have changed nothing: only women are 
suffering and spending all their efforts on raising their children. There are still 
many countries and many workplaces that do not ensure job security and where 
women are not treated the same as men, as especially reflected in women’s lost 
time and wages (MacDonald, 1998). Macdonald (1998) points out that many 
women lose both their pensions and unemployment insurance and are granted no 
maternity leave during pregnancy, leaving them socially insecure.  
 
Who can reconsider our women’s rights? I do not think the Japanese 
government will change so quickly so as to pass laws enabling our rights. 
I will probably be dead before the day women have more rights. (Sakiko, 
living in the UK) 
  
 
Thus Sakiko gave up on the possibility of the Japanese government’s changing the 
law to further women’s rights. During my interview with Sakiko, I was reminded 
of how many participants commented that they had already given up hope that 
their husbands, or government support for women, would change, thinking it 
impossible. Both single and married participants were willing to work outside. 
Married women wanted to go back to a job or regretted leaving a job they had 
before marrying or having a child (see Chapter 3). This vicious circle is created by 
men, because men do not want to deal with care and domestic work, apart from 
Kiyomi’s husband. Feminists have a tendency to regard domestic work as ‘the 
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great leveller’, a burden imposed on women by patriarchal society and lazy men 
(Anderson, 2000: 1). None of my married respondents other than Kiyomi 
maintain a career because it was difficult to do so without any support or help, and 
there are no laws to protect women’s job security (see Chapter 3).  
 
Women’s Job Security  
  
Difficulty of Keeping a Job and Career 
 
In Europe it has been realised how important it is to offer support and institute 
better policies for women to balance to work and family, yet there are still not 
enough policies to support women (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). In fact, in Europe 
most welfare policies have concentrated simply on child care rather than 
encouraging or supporting women who are willing and desire to work outside the 
home (Bashevkin, 2002). Many of my respondents mentioned job security as a 
major concern.  
 
If I still had my former job, which I had when I was single, it would be 
wonderful, because I could see to the responsibility of being a parent and 
also enjoy what I was doing at my job. Soon I am going to look for a 
part-time job, but I’m afraid it will only be a meaningless, boring job. I 
definitely want my daughter to have a better education, something that 
can carry her throughout her life. (Kimiko, married, one child and 
housewife) 
 
Kimiko had decided to quit her job because it was impossible for to stay on at 
work when she became pregnant. Japanese companies want to keep skilled and 
knowledgeable people, yet there are still many talented women who give up their 
jobs and cannot return to them after having their children. Their skills and training 
are wasted, which is not beneficial for anybody. Mizuno (2004) describes how 
important it is to have an education and for women to have rights. She argues that 
full-time Japanese housewives, because they share similar backgrounds (such that 
educated women meet educated men), face a serious loss of time, money and 
effort in seeking to realize their educational achievements. Moreover, an OECD 
(2008) study revealed that Japan ranks lower than the OECD average in child 
227 
 
poverty. Yet Spain and Italy are ranked lower than Japan, which indicates that 
women’s job security does not compare favourably in those countries with that in 
other developed countries. Just as women stand a greater chance of losing their 
jobs when they have a child, such that their financial independence suffers, so 
there is also a greater chance that their children will, in turn, be poor. The UK, on 
the other hand, ranks just above the OECD (2008) average in child poverty, while 
Denmark has the at least child poverty. Denmark is reportedly the happiest nation, 
because of the best balance of work and life (see Chapter 1 and 3).  
 
I could think more about marriage and having a child if I could keep my 
job securely, but that is doubtful because my company is small. After 
marrying or having a child, every woman leaves her job. Even if I had 
the right to stay on, I would be uncomfortable staying there, especially 
after having a child. I know that it is not the best job, but it is better than 
losing everything by going back to the labour force after my children are 
in school and so on. (Chiriko, single, has a full-time job) 
 
Leira (1992) described the mother as both earner and career woman, and stated 
that welfare states provide financial support and show a commitment to childcare 
arrangements. Bettio and Plantega (2004) stated that better family support policies 
can offer more support for women to become independent by providing nurseries 
and more jobs so that women can both work full-time and take leave time while 
caring for their children; this is a better arrangement than in the countries in 
Europe at present. Szelewa and Polakowski (2008) explain that, during the time of 
Communist rule in eastern Europe, women worked equally both in the home and 
outside, and so the former communist countries had better job security. Japan 
prior to the Meiji period was similar to how Szelewa and Polakowski described 
Communist rule in eastern Europe, because most women were working (see 
Chapter 1 and 4). This is an another issue that Chiriko mentioned, admitting that 
she would feel uncomfortable staying on at her job even if she could, because 
most work places are not welcoming to women combining work and raising 
children same time because of male-dominated attitudes (see Chapter 4); this 
makes it very difficult and uncomfortable for mothers to ask for maternity leave 
or more flexible hours. Women like Chiriko cannot think of any positive 
advantages to choose marriage and having a child, so she is postponing her 
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decisions regarding marriage and fertility, rather than changing her life style, 
because of the difficulties and working condition she would face at work.  
 
Working Conditions: Inequality, Tax System and Part-Time Work  
 
Lewis (2002: 338) argues that women are pushed out of the labour market because 
of social security entitlements and the tax system, so that women have to do both 
paid work and unpaid work without public support. There is no ideal model of 
equality between women and men yet. Nowadays in Japan many women work 
outside the home for financial support, such as at part-time jobs, because the 
majority of women have to take care of the household finances (Aoyama, 2004; 
MacDonald, 2002). Many Japanese women are not satisfied with working 
part-time jobs, which they have to tolerate due to their inadequate financial 
situations and lack of social support (see Chapter 5). As childcare givers, women 
must endure meaningless and boring jobs in order to be able to work close to 
home and have enough time to raise children (see Chapter 3). While single 
mothers in the U.K. have incentive to work part-time (over 16 hours for tax credit 
eligibility), they do not have much financial incentive to move up to full-time 
work (30 hours per week) (Tomlington, 2006). 
 
In Japan there are four types of tax systems for working wives. One is under 
¥1,000,000 (£7,813), the second is between ¥1,000,000 and ¥1,030,000 (£8,047), 
the third one is between ¥1,030,000 and ¥1,300,000 (£10,156), and the last one is 
over ¥1,300,000. If the wife earns less than ¥1,000,000, the wife does not have to 
pay any tax. Under the second option, between ¥1,000,000 and ¥1,030,000, she 
has to pay, but must pay only the council tax which is a relatively small tax (see 
Appendix IV). In the third tax bracket, she has to pay both income tax and council 
tax. And in the fourth and highest category, she must pay full taxes completely 
separate from her husband. This is very complicated, so I made a sample 
calculation of full-time wife’s tax deduction system and a table to compare all 
four types for wives. When a wife works, both her husband’s taxes and family 
support from his company might be affected. When wives earn less than 
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¥1,000,000, their husbands can receive dependent credits for their spouse and 
children from the company (varying depending upon the company). The mean 
dependent’s payment for a wife is ¥212,400 (£1,659) per year and per child 
dependent money is ¥96,000 (£750) per year (MHLW, 2012).  
 
Table 15: Annual Taxation for Wives30 
Wife’s income 
Per year 
Under 
¥1,000,000 
(£7,813) 
Between 
¥1,000,000 
(£7,813) to 
¥1,030,000 
(£8,047) 
Between 
¥1,030,000 
(£8,047) to 
¥1,300,000 
(£10,156) 
Over ¥1,300,000 
(£10,156) 
 
Sample Wage  
¥1,000,000 
(£7,813) 
¥1,015,000,  
(£7,930)31 
¥1,165,000 
(£9,102 )32 
¥2,679,00033 
(£20,930) 
Income Tax 
 ¥0 ¥0 ¥119,700 
(£935) 
¥215,600(£1684) 
Council Tax 
¥0 ¥57,200 
(£447) 
¥123,700 
(£966) 
¥219,600 
(£1,716) 
 
National 
Pension 
¥0, however 
eligible to receive a 
national pension  
¥0, however 
eligible to 
receive a 
national 
pension 
¥0, however 
eligible to 
receive a 
national pension 
¥280,000 
(£2,188) 
National 
Insurance 
¥0  
 
¥0 ¥0 National 
Insurance 
¥100,00034 
(£781) 
 
After Tax: 
Income 
¥1,000,000 
(£7,813) 
¥957,800 
(£7,482) 
¥921,600 
(£7,200) 
¥1,863,800 
(£14,561) 
Husband’s 
income 
influence 
¥0 ¥0 ¥0 Lose or reduced 
financial support 
money for wife 
and children from 
company.35 
Might affect 
housing support 
from company 
and tax increase 
for husband.36 
 
Source: Japanese Tax Agency 
http://search.nta.go.jp/cgi-bin/issearchs.cgi 
                                                 
30 See a sample calculation in Appendix.  
31 Mean of between 1,000,000 to ￥1,030,000 and used for a sample of calculation.  
32 Mean of between ￥1,030,000 to ￥1,300,000 and used for a sample of calculation 
 and used for a sample of calculation 
33 Mean income for women in 2012 in cities which use guidelines from the Japanese Tax Agency 
34 Depends on workplace; see chapter 1.  
35 See a sample calculation in Appendix IV 
36 See chapter 5 
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After the age of 20, all Japanese citizens have to pay a national pension, even for a 
student (which it usually the parents’ responsibility). However, if a woman stays 
at home as a housewife or earns less than ¥1,000,000 (£7,813), she is 
automatically eligible to receive a national pension even if she does not have to 
pay, which is not offered to women who work full-time or earning more than 
¥1,300,000 (£10,156). If the wife earns more than ¥1,000,000 (£7,813) she has to 
pay a council tax, from which she would not benefit if she earned more than 
¥1,000,000 (see Table 15). The Japanese tax system is very complicated and 
makes it difficult for women to gain independence. Simply put, it provides that a 
married woman has the automatic right not to pay taxes when she is a housewife 
or being supportive wife to have only part-time work (see Appendix IV). This 
system is supporting the sole male bread-winner system and male-dominated 
society.  
 
 
I feel that I am being punished after marriage. I do not have a child yet, 
but my tax has become heavy and my husband’s tax went sky high after 
our marriage; it would mean losing even more when we have a child. It 
would be the same or better if I would be a housewife. I am going to work 
until I have a child (Kayoko, married without a child, employed 
full-time)  
 
 
Over ¥1,300,000, she must pay full taxes, which sometimes means it is not worth 
trying to earn (see Table 15 and Appendix IV) or it will affect not only her income, 
but her husband’s income also. Kayoko is a member of a dual worker family, a 
family which is at a disadvantage under the Japanese tax system. Kayo told me ‘It 
is better, if you are thinking only of money, to be a part-time worker and make less 
than ¥1,000,000 (£7,813) but I want to earn my money! That’s why I am not 
quitting yet!’. Kayoko’s true voice is that she wants to work even though she is 
aware of the benefits provided to those who are not working. I felt so strange 
because Japan needs work power and economic power, and yet they do not want 
women to join in the work force. Yes, of course they need women to work; 
however, the male-dominated society does not want to risk women becoming the 
main provider or gaining higher positions, out of worry that it could destroy the 
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male-dominated patriarchal structure. If I can borrow Kayoko’s words: ‘women 
are punished’ because women are not following what men want them to be. A 
family with a sole-breadwinner or wife making less than ¥1,300,000 (£10,156) 
entitles the family to receive Dependents support ¥212,400 (£1,659)
37
, might lose 
also child Support (Dependents support from husband’s company) ¥96,000 
(£750)
38
 per child from husband’s company. Also, in dual worker families, the 
husband has to pay an extra 20%
39
 in additional council tax from his wages (see 
Appendix IV). Plus those dual families might lose housing support from the 
company (see Chapter 5). In Japan Dual worker family have a lot to lose it is not 
individual tax system.  
 
When the wife earns more in order to be able to receive the national pension and 
so have extra money when she retires, it makes very little difference for dual and 
single worker families. For instance, for 40 years a husband worked and retired at 
the age of 65, and a wife was a housewife or part-time, earning less than 
¥1,000,000 for 40 years; their mean national pension is ¥233,000 (£1,820) 
together (a husband for ¥167,000 [£1,305] and wife for ¥67,000 [£423]). A family 
with dual workers who both worked 40 years full-time would receive 
approximately ¥300,000 (£2,344) together per year (The Japanese Tax Agency in 
2010).  
 
My respondents wanted to work, but after marriage and especially after having 
children, this tax system made it financially advantage not to work, and in any 
case their hope for support from their husbands support would be diminished. 
There might be three types of wives who are willing to work, but have reasons to 
stop working: (1) they want to work but they cannot because lack of support from 
husband and society; (2) the tax system makes it preferable not to work; or (3) 
both of the above reasons.  
 
 
                                                 
37 Mean Dependent support (The Japanese National Tax Agency in 2012) 
38 Mean child support (The Japanese National Tax Agency in 2012) 
39 Under ￥5,000,000 extra 10% over is 20%.  
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One of my respondents, who has a part-time job, said:  
 
If I work (part-time) more than now, it will affect us in many ways. Who 
will take care of the children? Who will take care of my husband? Who 
will take care of the housework? There will also be an effect on the tax 
allowance. I would be an independent taxpayer because now I am paying 
a small amount of tax because I am dependent on my husband. It would 
be my responsibility before I work more than I do now; I have to be 
concerned: can I do it or should I do it? (Kiriko, married with 2 children, 
employed part-time) 
  
 
This tax system seems to help financially for a family or women to take advantage 
of tax deductions, however it does not allow women to be completely independent, 
creating the same inequality for Japanese women as before: their domestic work is 
an unpaid job, and yet they are still expected to do some kind of paid work. For 
Japanese men, it is better for women to do part-time work, because they believe 
women can do both jobs and the family will be better off financially. Also, my 
participants had little knowledge of child support, and did not know exactly how 
much they were receiving monthly from the government; however, their decisions 
were affected more by the financial support received from companies employing 
men with dependent spouses and children. It was interesting to find that, among 
my participants, children are believed to be their responsibility, not society’s, so 
they would not looking for help or support, even financially, even though they are 
looking for facilities such as nursing or protection of women’s work rights from 
the government. They expect to rely on income from companies to help them raise 
children.  
 
Burda, Hamermesh and Weil (2007) found in their research that in many 
developed countries, women work outside the home as much as men do, but 
because of the responsibilities of housework, women work even more. Women’s 
work has been described as a ‘benefit’, yet women still have to perform the 
majority of housework (Clevaland, Stockdale and Murphy, 2000: 9). Legerski and 
Cornwall (2010: 457) also found, in their study, especially women who have a 
part-time job, since they are working much more than men. Women are working 
part-time outside as it helps financially, however husbands are not changing their 
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habits to help or support women at domestic and care work (Legerski and 
Cornwall, 2010). 
 
I asked my respondents, ‘If you were the prime minister, how would you 
encourage women to have more children?’ 
 
I would say definitely that being a part-timer, but with the same rights 
and job security as for men, would help to encourage a woman to have 
one or more children, because in my case I am still lucky to have a great 
job. I might want to go back to work as either a part-timer or full-timer 
after having my child. But there is no place where women working 
part-time can have the same rights and same job security as full-timers, 
which would help encourage women to have more children (Ema, single, 
employed full-time job). 
  
 
The two respondents who were living in the UK had similar responses: 
 
I could not believe that in the UK, part-timers are treated nearly the same 
as full-timers. I would make it like that if I were a prime minister (Sakiko, 
single employed full-time). 
 
 
I would make a gap between full-time and part-time worker like the UK, 
and more protected. It is easier to return to a workplace in the UK, and to 
be a part-timer and be more flexible (Suzuko, single, employed full-time)  
 
It was necessary to use a ‘if’ question to bring this point out, because none of the 
respondents were willing to say at first what they really would like to see happen 
in terms of changes to job security, society and governmental policy in Japan (see 
above).
40
 In Japan part-timers are treated as subordinates of full-time workers, 
‘tools’ to help and support the full-timers. They normally do not have any rights 
to holiday pay or maternity leave, and they frequently do manual work assigned to 
them by the full-time workers (see Chapter 1). My respondents seem to want to 
have the ability to rejoin the labour force after having child to keep their careers as 
                                                 
40 If you were the prime minister, how would you encourage women to have more children? Before I was 
asking this ‘if ‘question, my respondents complained about women’s working patterns and how difficult it is 
to keep a job, and the disadvantages of having a job, but they often used ‘giving up‘ and ‘be silent’. So I 
decided to use this ‘if’ question; I thought I could hear what women really want, and what they need if they 
could change the system, and what makes them struggle: I wanted to find out. So I used this question.  
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a part-time job at first, and want to have the same opportunity as a full-time 
worker to return to full-time eventually. Moreover they are looking for an ideally 
flexible work arrangement. Multinational public accounting firms have been 
trying to meet ethical obligations by allowing for flexible work arrangements 
(Cohen and Single, 2001: 317). In the U.K., ‘flexible work arrangements’ or 
‘family-friendly working arrangements’ began as programs focusing on female 
employees (Dex and Scheibl, 2001: 412). Dex and Scheibl (2001) point out that 
employers in Britain, particularly banks, began to be more creative and flexible in 
an effort to retain skilled women; the policies they adopted were then applied to 
men in an attempt to promote a better work-life balance. These flexible polices 
allow for part-time work and job-sharing (Dex and Scheibl, 2001: 412). Lyness 
and Kroft (2005: 53) noted an increase in policies promoting work-life balance in 
companies with more women in the management ranks. Their greater sensitivity 
to gender equality issues inspires them to adopt policies promoting work-life 
balance, particularly for women (Lyness and Kroft, 2005). In Japan this has the 
opposite effect of Lyness and Kroft’s findings.   
 
Figure 28: My Other Respondents’ Vicious Circle (except Kiyomi) Due to 
Male-Dominated Structures  
 
  
 
This Vicious Circle is my other participants, opposite to Kiyomi’s (see above: 
Figure 26), because of the lack of support and protection to keep a job or go back 
to the labour force. There are two issues caused by the male-dominated structure 
of Japanese society. One is, as Lyness and Kroft’s found, a lack of women’s 
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management positions in Japan (see Chapter 1), and a limited amount of support 
to protect women’s jobs by law. My single respondents (see above quotes) wanted 
to keep a job and wanted the opportunity to go back to their careers after having a 
child, but no flexible working arrangement exists. Second is the lack of husbands’ 
support and the strong breadwinner structure. Both issues make my respondents 
unhappy after marriage (except Kiyomi). Single women are hesitating to marry, or 
are postponing marriage or remaining single, which leads to low fertility.  
 
The Japanese male-dominated society’s tax system penalises women who attempt 
to be independent of their husbands’ support. Women only have access to 
meaningless, non-career jobs; instead, women really want to have flexible 
working arrangements, to be able to keep their careers, and to return to work 
part-time or full-time, receiving equal treatment after their absence. Many 
countries still prevent women from becoming ‘individualised’ by making them 
work on a part-time basis, leaving them to rely on their husbands with no 
independently accounted tax system for women (Lewis, 2002). The welfare state 
has not allowed for women to become fully independent and individualised, 
because there are still no comprehensive protections for women’s rights, 
especially when women are pregnant or already have children. 
 
 
Maternity Rights and Protection 
 
The first maternity leave policy was set up in Germany in 1883 (Burgess and 
Russell, 2003). Other countries gradually followed. When such policies were 
enacted in Britain, they allowed women to stay at home for a longer period of 
time after having children, with full rights to return to their former jobs and 
protection of wages during pregnancy and after giving birth. Recently the U.K. 
extended paid and unpaid leave during pregnancy and after giving birth (Burgess 
and Russell, 2003). The International Labour Organization (ILO) recommended 
more than 14 weeks of paid maternity leave should be given after giving birth 
(2008). Ruhm (1998) mentions that most countries did not follow the ILO’s 
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recommendations until the late 1960s. Table 1 reveals the duration of paid 
maternity leave and other benefits for a select number of countries.  
 
Table 16 : Maternity Leave and Paternity Leave 
 
 Maternity 
Leave 
Entitlement  
(in Weeks) 
FRE41 Paid 
Maternity 
Leave 
 
Max Length 
of Leave for 
Women 
(weeks) 
Paternity 
Leave 
Entitlement 
(weeks) 
FRE Paid  
Paternity 
Leave 
 
OECD 
Average  
18.9 14.5 78  4.8 3.7 
Italy 20 16 44 N/A  N/A 
Japan 14 9.2 68 N/A N/A 
South 
Korea 
12.8 12.8 58 0.4 0.4 
Spain 16 16 172 3 3 
Sweden 10 8.0 70 10 8 
UK 52 12.7 65 2 0.4 
USA 12 0 12 N/A N/A 
 
Source: OECD: Calculating full-rate equivalent of paid maternity, paternity and parental leave 
2011/2012. Children-related leave periods by duration of unpaid leave and the duration of the full-time 
equivalent of the leave periods if paid at 100% of last earning 2011/2012 
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/PF2.1_Parental_leave_systems%20-%20updated%20%2018_July_2012.pdf 
 
 
According to OECD (2006), only the U.S. and South Korea provided unpaid 
maternity leave. However, the OECD research in 2011 and 2012 showed that the 
USA has not changed its policy on maternity leave; however, the length of South 
Korea’s maternity leave is lower than both the OECD average and Japan, but 
South Korea’s FRE paid maternity leave is higher than Japan. South Korea’s 
maternity and protection rights have been increased. In Spain, there is an 
arrangement similar to South Korea: maternity leave entitlement, paid maternity 
leave and even paternity leave are matched exactly, but Spain has a very low 
possibility that women will use the maximum length of their paternity leave. In 
U.K, Maternity Leave Entitlement is longer than in other countries; however, paid 
maternity leave is not lengthy. In Sweden, both parents can work part-time for 6½ 
years to be flexible and share responsibility between women and men. In Japan 
                                                 
41 FRE = Duration of leave in weeks’ payment (as per cent of average wage earnings) received by the 
claimant 
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there is no paternity leave; it is dependent on individual companies’ regulations 
(see Chapter 3), however the aim to share responsibility of child care is called 
‘Papa Mama Kyuka plus’, which means a combination of mother and father’s 
leave. According to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2012), by law, 
women in Japan must take off the 6 weeks before giving birth and 8 weeks after 
giving birth (6 weeks with a doctor’s permission). After those entitlements expire, 
the wife and husband can decide how long the wife can leave and how long the 
husband can, but the total cannot add up to more than a year. If even there are 
entitlements such as paternity leave and encouragement to use it, it is very 
difficult to find men willing to use paternity leave for more than a couple of days 
in Japan (see Chapter 3); it would require dramatic change to convince men to 
take paternity leave. In my research, only one participant’s husband, Kiyomi’s, 
took paternity leave; however, it was only 3 days. Others participants’ husbands 
did not even take any days off for paternity leave, even though most of them are 
working for well known large companies. All single women think that it is very 
difficult to keep a job after marriage or having a child.  
 
I do not think I could stay at this company after I become pregnant, even 
if I want to, because all my colleagues who became pregnant left and 
were not made welcome to stay after having a child. It would be very 
difficult to ask my boss for maternity leave. No one is allowed to have 
maternity leave and flexible time. How can I for this for myself? (Akiko, 
single employed full-time) 
 
 
Akiko also acknowledges that there is a law to protect women; however, it 
depends on environments, atmosphere, and a supportive system at work. Akiko’s 
company is not supportive for women to remain at work (also see Chapter 3). I 
have found in my research that my respondents could not keep a job because there 
are no protections to help women keep a job; even the law is not enough - it seems 
that the male-dominated society is stronger than law. One of my respondents even 
lost a job after being blamed for past mistakes of hers after she announced that she 
was marrying (see Chapter 3). The male dominated society wants to keep younger 
women in the workplace (see Chapter 3). In reality, entitlement is not guaranteed 
by law, it all depends on where women and men work; workers in large 
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companies, teachers, and civil servants all receive more entitlement for 
themselves and their family compared to workers in other fields, which includes 
insurance.  
 
The Japanese insurance system is very complicated (see Chapter 1). All Japanese 
people have national insurance, and there are three different kinds. The insurance 
system decides workers’ entitlements. Self-employed people, unemployed people, 
and families are enrolled in the ‘Kokumin Hoken’ (National Health Insurance) 
plan, totalling approximately 28 % of the population (MHLW, 2011). Most 
employed workers are on the ‘Kokumin Hoken Kiyoukai’ (Japan Health Insurance 
Association) plan; 50 % of population belong to this plan (MHLW, 2011). 
Teachers, civil servants and their families are enrolled in the ‘Kyosai Kumiai’ 
(Benefit Society) plan, accounting for approximately 7 % of the population 
(MHLW, 2011). 15 % are wives who do not pay taxes, however this makes them 
dependent, since they do not pay tax but are covered under tax and pension 
(MHLW, 2011). The basic regulations for all of them are the same; when anyone 
sees a doctor, they must pay 30 %, with the remainder covered by the insurance 
plan, except for children under 12 and people over 65, for whom it is free.  
 
Japanese women are entitled to receive ¥ 390,000 (£3,047) in child birth support. 
However, the average cost of child birth is ¥ 423,957 (£ 3,313) (Japan Society of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology, Medicine, 2010). The actual cost varies from hospital 
to hospital. The least inexpensive place is Kumamoto, which costs ¥ 346,000 
(£ 2,703), and the most expensive is Tokyo, which costs ¥ 515,000 (£ 4,023), 1.5 
times more expensive than the least expensive city (Japan Society of Obstetrics 
and Gynecology, Medicine, 2010). In addition, expenses must be paid out of 
pocket at the time of giving birth; people receive their reimbursements afterward. 
It is large amount of money for low income women and men and families to pay 
up front for childbirth. If single women do not have that kind of money, it is far 
more difficult for them to have children. This is a clear illustration of gender 
inequality and can cause many women to decide they are not able to have children 
(Shirakawase, 2005).  
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Other policies and protection plans vary depending on where someone lives and 
other circumstances. It is usually advised to ask each council to ensure all 
payments are from insurance companies (MHLW, 2012). ‘Kumiai Hoken’ (Health 
Insurance Association) and ‘Kyosai Kumiai’ (Benefit Society) have better social 
security to protect women and children, but different companies offer different 
benefits. This unequal and inconsistent welfare system creates all the more 
pressure for women when they have a child (Japan Society of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, Medicine, 2010). Kiyomi’s case is ‘Kyosai Kumiai’ (Benefit Society), 
and she is well protected; when she retires, she will have a better settlement than 
others (see Chapter 5). Workers in larger companies enjoy higher wages and more 
benefits, but workers in smaller companies face the opposite situation. They worry 
far more about their lives and finances, especially during pregnancy (Kashiwagi, 
2002). Larger companies provide more support for women to be able to have 
children, including flexible hours, more days off, and other support systems to 
extend maternity leave for women to encourage both women and men (see 
Chapter 4). Women who work in larger companies are happier, because of greater 
security and protection (Obuchi, 2008), but most are working in small or 
medium-sized companies with far fewer benefits, creating a greater inequality. 
This inequality of work place makes for a more competitive structure, and 
Japanese parents are focused on education to spend a large amount of money for 
education (see Chapter 5). The number of members larger companies and 
someone enrolled in the and ‘Kyosai Kumiai’ (Benefit Society) insurance plans is 
relatively small compared to the population of Japan, at only around 21 % 
(MHLW, 2012) 
 
Lewis and Giullari (2005) consider it most important for welfare systems to offer 
flexibility and security for women. They state that if the welfare system offers 
more equality between women and men it will positively affect the work balance 
between the two genders, such that it will no longer be paid work on the part of 
the man and unpaid work on the part of the woman. Eventually it will affect 
individual attitudes toward shared work, even unpaid housework shared between 
husband and wife. One of the results of a welfare state is a higher rate of 
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economic activity among women, better child care services, and usually a 
generous state-sponsored support system for both maternity and family leave 
(Szelewa and Polakowski, 2008). However, there is still the question of who is 
taking care of the children while the parents work. 
 
 
Nursery Facilities  
 
It is now taken for granted that any married woman who engages in paid work 
also engages in unpaid work; for example, in the west many single mothers’ ‘jobs’ 
now involve raising a child, while feminists point out that there are few nurseries 
available, and it is the cost of nursery care makes women choose to stay at home 
to raise their children (MacDonald, 1998; Lewis; 1997; Joshi and Davies, 1992). 
In Japan the government has considered establishing a family policy and a welfare 
support system for women. The Angel Plan in 1995 and the New Angel Plan in 
2000
42
 were created to support women who with children, yet those support 
systems proved to have little effect in supporting women (Ikegawa, 2008). My 
respondents did not know anything about those Angel plans. ‘The Japanese 
government likes names and making character logos for everything, but nothing 
changes’ (Kiriko, married with children, employed part-time). I could not stop 
myself laughing; I tried, because it reminds me of ‘Kuromin’ (see Chapter 3 
Chiyomi’s quote) which is a character logo, and like Kiriko, Chiyomi had similar 
negative opinions of that support system. It seems that logos or characters are not 
helping anyway, making my respondents upset enough to hold a negative opinion 
of them.  
 
In Japan, to place a child in a public nursing facility, which is more inexpensive 
(see Chapter 5) women have to have a job first and then apply to the facility. Even 
then, there is no guarantee that, after women have a job and apply for a public 
                                                 
42
 There is a focus on 8 categories: 1) more varieties (for example: short time nursery and longer time 
services, and increase number of nurseries), 2) support women to be back in the labour force, such as a job 
center to help find a job for women, 3) encourage workplaces to understanding that women can have children 
and keep a job 4) offer financial support for infertility, 5) expand playgrounds and facilities for children, 7) 
financial support for raising children (example: more scholarships), 8) encourage each city to have better 
child care.  
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nursery place, they will be accepted because there are not enough facilities in 
Japan. This makes it rather difficult for women because most women quit their 
jobs after marrying or having a child, and yet they have to have a full-time job in 
order to apply for public child care.  
 
It is very difficult for me to work full-time because there are limited 
places to leave a child and day care centres are expensive. Also, I’m not 
sure of the situation of working outside the home. Is it worth it to do that? 
(Saki, married with 3 children, employed part-time). 
 
 
Saki could not apply to use a public nursery because, where she lives requires a 
minimum of 16 working days per month for 4 hours per day. Saki works longer 
than 4 hours per day, but some weeks her company did not need her, so she 
worked 3 days where previously she had worked 2 or 3 weeks. This work record 
caused her application to leave her child in public nursery to be rejected. Saki’s 
friend lost her job, and she was using public nursery; she was told if she did not 
find a job within 3 months, she is not entitled to use a public nursery, so she would 
have to find a private one. The number of public nurseries has been increasing 
alongside women’s increasing participation in the labour force; however, it has not 
been enough to cover women who are working part-time, and it would seem that 
only selected women have access (Takahashi and Kyogoku, 2008: 86). Other 
participants told me similarly: 
 
 
My part-time or Naishoku would be almost the same as expenses for 
nursery, so it is better to chose being a housewife. That’s why I am a 
housewife and being a good mother is better for everybody, a win-win 
situation for everybody except myself. (Kimiko, married with a child, 
housewife). 
  
 
Care services such as government-sponsored child care are much more difficult to 
obtain because women need to work in order to raise a child, and there are very 
few facilities in most of countries still (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). Kimiko is a 
housewife because it is more beneficial, rather than earning a small amount of 
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money and paying for a much more expensive private nursery (see Chapter 5), 
and except her would be happy she is being housewife to take care of care work at 
home, her husband and perhaps her family and husband’s family. To be a good 
mother, one is expected to stay at home, obey their husband, and to take care of 
family, as personified in ‘Yamatonadeshiko’(see Chapter 3). Nagase (1999) argues 
that, in Japan, many women feel guilty working outside the home and feel that 
they are neglecting their families, especially their children. Care work is not 
simply a matter of love or charity; it requires regulation (Orme, 2002). However, 
many women still feel obligated to take on the responsibilities of child raising and 
being a good mother.  
 
 
Responsibilities of Child Care: ‘Good’ Mothers and ‘Bad’ Mothers 
 
There is a relationship between care work, society and public policy (Daly, 2002). 
In European countries there are five recognized types of care: full-time mother 
care, parental care, intergenerational care, substantial mother care and 
professional care (Kremer, 2006). Child care is defined as ordinary everyday 
caring for a child or children, whether done by parents, a day care centre or a child 
minder. ‘Child care policies’ and ‘early childhood education and care’ are 
interchangeable terms here, used to denote policies involving extra familial care in 
addition to home care, upbringing and socialization (Leira, 1992). Nevertheless, 
the family is still important as the main provider of care in Europe, however, the 
countries of Europe have been trying to redefine the division of care 
responsibilities and to share them not only within the family but also among 
national and local governments (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004). Despite this, in UK 
women (especially those with young children and heavy responsibilities) are more 
likely to face restrictions throughout their lives (Tomlinson, 2006)          
 
In Europe, when women think of deciding to work outside the home, it is common 
for them to ask themselves, ‘Who is taking care of the children?’ or ‘Am I a bad 
mother?’ (Kremer, 2006) Is such a decision a bad influence upon children? Many 
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women still feel guilty about working outside the home (Kremer, 2006). Japan is 
similar and many women choose to stay at home after having a child because of 
the guilt involved in not taking care of their children especially up to the age of 
three, to be raised by their mothers, a belief that obligates Japanese women to stay 
at home for care work (see Chapter 1).  
 
I work both outside and at home without any help from my husband. I 
have to calculate and think what is the best for my family, not for myself. 
Since I married my ‘self ’ is gone, for family comes first. I cannot work 
full-time because without help, it would be a big job to organize child 
care. I would have to find the best place to leave the children and so on. 
Too much concern without help is hard. (Keiko, married with 2 children 
and housewife) 
 
 
At first there was more than one issue for Keiko because everything she had was 
for her family and not for herself. What she wanted for herself did not matter as 
much as what was best for the family. She no help from either her husband or state 
programs whatsoever. She was struggling to raise the children herself, and she 
was also worried about being a bad mother. In the west the strain of maintaining a 
family and managing tight resources is made worse when parents are guilty about 
not being able to afford an idealised family situation (Rubin 1994). Keiko added 
that if she does not take care of children, who will? Some participants mentioned 
during the interview that they also worried about being bad mothers, or about not 
being there when their children were small. According to Tomlinson (2006: 365), 
in the U.K. when all women decide to work outside the home, they need to 
consider the balance between family life and work and be strategic in doing so. 
Tomlinson (2006) cautions that all mothers need to be aware of the consequences 
of maintaining their careers while also maintaining a household. Difficult though 
it may be, successfully balancing work and home duties underscores the diversity 
of women and what they are capable of (Tomlinson, 2006). In contrast, men do 
not need to consider Tomlinson’s theories on women’s choice when men work. 
Keiko (married with children, housewife) is concerned about child care when she 
returns to work. She would not have any help from her husband, and not much 
social support, which will make it difficult for her to have a job outside the home, 
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so she is thinking of working at home doing Naishoku to support her family 
financially (see Chapter 3). Most of my participants’ mothers were working 
part-time when they were growing up, and they saw their mother was struggling 
to raise them.  
 
My mother was a very hard worker. She had a part-time job and was 
doing Naishoku at home also. I did not want to follow her marriage style, 
so I went to University, but now I realise that I am going to follow or am 
already following the same as my mother’s married life course: have 
children and go to a part-time job to be a good mother. (Eriko, married 
without a child, housewife) 
 
 
Eriko said she was hoping she would be a bad example of motherhood, to work 
outside while her husband would cook and clean at home; however, after she 
married, her job changed because of the male-dominated structure of her 
workplace, and Eriko realised would not be able to have the same opportunity as 
men to maintain a career even after graduating University (see Chapter 3). She 
was pushed to leave her job and is now pushed to be a housewife, and soon to be a 
part-time worker. Like her mother before her, she is expected to be a wise mother 
and good wife, which is what the male-dominated and patriarchal structure of 
Japan wants and supports. Their strategy is working to keep women from 
maintaining a career.  
 
Moreover, in the U.K. and Japan there are similarities there are high part-time 
worker women (see Chapter 5). In the U.K lower income single mothers must 
carefully weigh the options when considering welfare programs that offer 
financial incentives and resources for child care, which oftentimes make it more 
financially advantageous for single mothers to work on a part-time basis as 
opposed to full-time (Tomlinson, 2006). Japan’s welfare policies are more similar 
to those in the U.K., which provide financial support to mothers, than they are to 
the support offered in Nordic countries.  
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Summary  
 
Child care is meant to help and support parents while they are working, yet child 
care policies reflect the differences between different countries and different 
cultures, genders, classes and races, as well as being subject to a general fear of 
welfare state strictures (Mahan and Sonya, 2002). What kinds of policies can 
bring about gender equality? What do women really want? More specifically, 
what kinds of childcare policies will aid Japanese women in their fertility 
decisions? Will they be able to rely on such policies before deciding to have a 
child? What knowledge do they have about such policies? Those were my 
questions, and I have attempted to women’s attitudes toward fertility decisions as 
influenced by child welfare policies. My respondents, however, did not have very 
much knowledge of child support policies. They exhibited two distinct attitudes 
toward child support policies. One was that they did not know very much about 
them because they were not interested, and besides they knew the limitations of 
what the Japanese government could offer in the way of change. The second 
attitude, however, was more natural: they assumed that children are the parents’ 
responsibility, and thus they did not look for any support policies from the 
government. These women believed that if they could not afford to raise a child, 
then they should not, simply put. If Japanese women think that sharing more 
responsibilities with society will make it easier for them, the male-dominated 
culture will not easily change its attitude toward women needs. It has been 
mentioned that most of my respondents were giving up, or had a negative attitude 
toward their husbands’ support and social support, because it has not changed 
dramatically. Women are still suffering and struggling to make any decision, let 
alone deciding to have a child. Women are already struggling by themselves, so 
why take on more responsibilities by having a child or children?  
 
Children are now thought of in Japan as an expense. More and more parents focus 
on their children’s education, and it takes more money than ever to raise children. 
Although public child support focuses on the care of the child, there are gaps 
between parents’ needs and the care that is offered, so parents think it necessary to 
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make more money to raise their children, and thus more mothers join the labour 
force (Daly, 2002). Lewis (2002) says that it is not only state welfare policies that 
influence women’s attitudes toward independence and reduce their care work; it is 
also important to acknowledge and promote the value of paid work and unpaid 
work including care work at the societal level.  
 
The majority of Japanese women worry and suffer when they are working as part 
of the labour force. For in Japan there are still psychological blinds: women do the 
housework and take care of the family at home, but outside the labour market is 
still male-dominated (Mizuno, 2004). Mizuno (2004) explains that nowadays it is 
important for Japanese women to choose the type of man she wants to have the 
proper attitude toward taking responsibility for sharing the housework at home. 
Yet Japan still continues to be male-dominated and much gender inequality still 
exists, and it has not improved enough to positively change women’s attitudes 
toward making fertility decisions. From this standpoint many women think it is 
better not to marry because, as already mentioned, Japanese women no longer 
receive any benefits from marriage, and most of the women who do want to marry 
only do so in order to have children.  
 
The single respondents had also given up on finding husbands. The number of 
single Japanese men has increased dramatically (see Chapter 3). More Japanese 
men are staying single, but more men still want to marry. It has thus become more 
difficult for Japanese men to marry and have children, yet they have not changed 
their attitudes toward sharing in the housework and toward how women should be 
treated.  
 
In Japan, childcare support is not what Japanese women focus on; they mainly 
want equality with men and job security, believing that marriage and child-raising 
only come with disadvantages. The lack of financial support and the 
male-dominated thought pattern have affected Japanese women’s fertility 
decisions. In Japan this has directly affected the incidence of marriage and fertility 
decisions. In my research, I found that my respondents think it is easy to marry, 
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but difficult to meet an appropriate partner. Japanese women are resisting the 
traditional expectation to marry and have children, or are postponing marrying for 
as long as they can, because of the male-dominated social structure of gender 
inequality (see Chang and Song, 2010). This results in fewer children being born, 
thus affecting the fertility rate.  
 
Nevertheless, interviews demonstrated that Japanese women do not expect much 
change in welfare policies. Yet they have a strong desire to improve their job 
security, especially during pregnancy to access to flexible work arrangement. 
Women are not treated equally: they handle the majority of unpaid work at home, 
earn lower wages, and have less security in the labour force. The aim should be to 
change this; unpaid work should be shared, women should be paid on the same 
basis as men, and more importantly, there should be a social security system to 
protect the entitlements of both women and children (MacDonald, 1998).  
 
During the interviews some of the women compared themselves to some of those 
who were in a worse situation than themselves, in having to adjust to their choice 
of having a child; though they sacrificed their jobs to do so, in the meantime they 
tried to think positively yet privately, for they had lost their self-confidence. I was 
hurt to hear that so many of my respondents were suffering from lack of 
self-confidence, except for one, Kiyomi, who is married and could continue to 
pursue her career. Other than Kiyomi, all married women were in an opposite 
circle to Kiyomi’s much happier circle. And other my single participants were 
worried about reaching anything like Kiyomi’s virtuous circle, so that they were 
postponing marrying or having a child. Many family welfare systems support 
family members such as wives and mothers, but it is more important to have 
support and social security systems for all individuals (MacDonald, 1998). 
MacDonald explains that many countries’ welfare and child support systems 
provide direct income or other support for children, but maternity leave is granted 
only to women who are working a full-time job. As many women have only 
part-time or temporary jobs, they do not have access to maternity leave (1998).  
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My Japanese respondents were unfortunate; they had given up on welfare support 
or any kind of government care. It is above all important to know that there are 
differences among different countries, customs, cultures, belief systems, and 
people’s perspectives. Shim (1990) pointed out that many people believe that the 
Scandinavian countries’ welfare model is the best system, but it must be 
remembered that there are many cultural, theoretical and political differences 
between the Scandinavian countries and other countries, such that the exact 
Scandinavian welfare model cannot necessarily be transferred to those other 
countries. Scandinavian welfare policies for women that enable them to work 
flexible hours and have access to job security have resulted in higher total fertility 
rates and a stable women’s labour force (Rubery et. al., 1994 ; Meulders et. al., 
1994). Although the low fertility rate has been one of the hot topics in the 
National Diet, Japanese men are still unable to change their attitudes and hence 
cannot help change the system, and so it will take a long time to for women to be 
have the same rights as men. There is more to analysing gender and justice issues 
than just focusing on the conditions of women, but recent examinations of 
feminism have revealed the varying and unequal ways in which moral and societal 
principles are implemented (Orme, 2002). 
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Conclusion 
 
After World War II, there was a baby boom in Japan. Approximately 250,000 
babies were born each year until the mid 1950s (Sato, 2008: 11). Between the mid 
1950s and the early 1970s, the TFR was stable at 2 (Sato, 2008: see also Chapter 
1). Since then, the fertility rate has been decreasing and Japan now has a super 
low fertility rate (see Chapter 1). Low fertility rates occur in modern rich 
developed countries mainly because of (1) the changing of the meaning and value 
of having children, and (2) changing attitudes toward marriage (Sato, 2008; Atoh, 
2008; Lin, 2013; see also Chapter 1). In the past, the Japanese patriarchal system 
ensured a higher number of children, but today this is no longer the case. The state 
has been conducting various quantitative studies to review what is causing low 
fertility (see Chapter 1). 
 
For whom is low fertility a problem? It is definitely seen as a problem for the state 
and has become a critical issue, because along with the declining fertility rate in 
Japan, which has caused the population to decrease since 2004, there is now an 
ever more aging society: over 40% of the population has been over age 65 since 
2010 (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2012). By 2055, it is expected that 
the percentage of the population between birth and age 14 will be reduced 
approximately by half (Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 2012). Having 
fewer younger people in a society results in a smaller labour force, which is seen 
as ultimately weakening the economy (Etoh, 2005: 117; Maruo, 2008; Masuda, 
2008). These phenomena have been a major concern for Japanese society, and 
steps have been taken to try to reverse this trend (Etoh, 2005). However, the 
Japanese government’s strategy of simply ‘throwing money at the problem’ has 
not been working to reduce housewifization and has not changed the system. For 
example, women are able to receive extra financial support when they have more 
children, and the beneficial tax breaks cause more women to choose to be 
housewives (see Chapter 6). This financial care and welfare support has been 
helping to perpetuate a male-centered society with a greater degree of 
housewifization (Ochiai, 2008). 
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Is low fertility a problem for women? It might be partially a problem for women. 
Women deal with many issues and get caught up in other problems which may 
affect their decisions to have children, such as gender inequality, not being able to 
keep a decent job or career, and a lack of support from the state, their workplace, 
and their husbands. The women I interviewed said that those issues are greater 
problems for them than not having children or choosing to have fewer children. 
However, all the state and men have done is to blame women who are pursuing 
higher education. More women are becoming independent. Who is having 
children? It is women. The state is not focusing on women’s wants and needs. The 
low fertility rate has not changed because the state is not focusing on trying to 
change the patriarchal culture. Although the state might be aware of the needs and 
desires of women, it is not willing to change the system and risk destroying the 
patriarchal male-dominated societal system. In this social structure, men are 
mainly the sole breadwinners of the household, and the paid work that women are 
able to do is just at a supportive level. In addition to the paid work women do, 
they also have much unpaid work, which men do not share in, resulting in wider 
gender inequality for women (see Chapter 1). Under these conditions women are 
not willing to have more children.  
 
Is low fertility a problem for men? It is more likely a direct problem for men 
because men have to keep their family name, so fewer children mean fewer 
chances to have sons to perpetuate the family name. This may also be seen as a 
problem by men’s parents. Both men and women face potential pressure from the 
husband’s parents to have sons to keep the family name. Not even women 
themselves can truly make their own decisions on the number and gender of 
children they will have. Kiyomi, for example, is happy she has a daughter and is 
satisfied to have only one child; she is not concerned about the gender. Yet, she 
feels pressured by her parents-in-law to give birth to a son in order to maintain the 
name of her husband’s family. Kiyomi, however, wants to be able to keep her 
career and to be promoted. Her dream is to go to the USA and to work toward a 
Ph.D. and to be supported by her university, but the demands of her in-laws are 
working against her. There is still much gender inequality when it comes to 
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women’s fertility decisions, even for Kiyomi. Women find themselves caught in 
many difficult situations, hampering their ability to make their own decisions, 
which is a problem for women. What women want is important, and they should 
feel free to be able to pursue their own desires, but things are simply not like that 
in Japan.  
 
There seems to be gap in Japan between the ideal number of children that women 
would like to have and actual number of children that women do have. My own 
research revealed the same results as several quantitative studies, where the actual 
number of children is fewer and the ideal number of children is three for both 
Japanese women and men (see Chapter 1). I have found that nearly all of my 
respondents would like to have a daughter or daughters. Some of my participants 
said that they grew up in a family with one brother in addition to themselves, but 
said they had always wanted to have a sister. This could be why they would 
ideally like to have two daughters, as well as a son to perpetuate the family name 
of the husband, and thus could be a reason why the ideal number of children that 
women choose is three. Although my questions were geared toward women’s 
responses, some of my respondents mentioned that their husbands’ ideal number 
of children were higher than their own, which means men are not achieving their 
ideal number of children either. It seems Japanese men limit the number of 
children they actually have based on financial and practical reasons, such as 
amount of income and house size (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 5). It should be 
noted that although Japanese women and men are saying their ideal number of 
children is three, it does not affect their decisions. Or it may be that the attitudes 
of women have been changing. Although my research did not show that, women 
seem to prefer to have a smaller number of children.  
 
It might be that women are having fewer children than before because women do 
not have any support from their husbands or from society in general. It is still not 
clear that women are having fewer children even after marrying, because some 
quantitative studies have shown that Japanese married women have more than one 
child. Other quantitative studies have asserted that more women are choosing to 
have only one child or none (see Chapter 1). After conducting my research, I can 
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say that low fertility is a very deep and complex issue, and it needs to be 
researched more and studied from different angles. In my research, Kiyomi said 
she has been postponing her decision to have another child until she achieves her 
goals, but by then it might be too late. Similarly, other women may miss the 
opportunity to have children for similar reasons. Some women might not even 
want to have any children. 
 
What would encourage women to have more children? Many of my respondents 
told me that providing more support in the form of social programmes and work 
benefits, including allowing part-time workers to enjoy the same benefits and job 
security as full-time workers, would be very helpful. Women having to leave their 
jobs and lack of support in raising children are problems the state does not help 
enough with. I also asked how many children they would like to have if finances 
were not a concern. Many women stated that the actual the number of children 
would depend upon their husbands. This did not mean that their husbands would 
determine how many children they would have, but rather meant how much 
support and help they could expect from their husbands in raising children. I have 
also found that Japanese men are not changing their patriarchal attitudes, 
necessitating women to assume all the responsibilities of keeping up the 
household and raising children (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 3). In short, even 
though Japanese men also want to have more children, just as Japanese women do, 
they neither want to make any adjustments nor assume any domestic 
responsibilities, desiring only to keep their patriarchal kingdoms intact. My 
research suggests the low fertility rate is perhaps a consequence of men’s behavior 
(see Chapter 1 and Chapter 3).   
 
In analysing the causes of low fertility in Japan, many quantitative studies found 
that most households still have a single breadwinner, either a husband whose 
earnings are enough for the entire family to live on, or a woman who prefers to 
take care of children herself. As a result, the number of women in the labour force 
has not been increasing compared with Western countries or other Asian countries 
(Akagawa, 2004; Yu, 2009). On the other hand, more highly educated women 
either choose to remain single, or to postpone marriage and childbirth, causing 
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some researchers to place blame on women’s choice and to criticize their 
individualism (Suzuki, 2008; Hara, 2008). Moreover, if we only consider 
quantitative research, some may reach the erroneous conclusion that Japanese 
women do not want to work after marrying or while raising a child, preferring to 
rely on men (see MHLW, 2010; 2012).   
 
However, my qualitative research reveals women may not able to keep a full time 
career after marriage and childbirth, either mentally or physically. Women face 
tremendous cultural pressure and social guilt for not taking care of children when 
they are small; it is traditionally perceived that the natural inclination of women is 
to take care of the house and children (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 3). Women who 
do keep a full time job after marrying are given fewer responsibilities and less 
important jobs, and often face a negative reception and atmosphere at the 
workplace. Some of my respondents were forced to leave their workplace; others 
left because of the dead end nature of their jobs or because of the difficulty of 
combining domestic work and paid work for women without support and help 
from their workplaces and husbands (see Chapter 3).  
 
There are very few legislatively protected women’s rights in the labour force. 
Japanese women cannot physically keep a job because there is no help from 
husbands with domestic work. The tendency to view gender inequality as natural 
makes it easier for men to ignore it, and they continue to benefit from the 
patriarchal-oriented labour system (Lorber, 2010). The responsibilities that 
women are expected to handle, often ‘invisibly’, as well as the expectation to 
remain committed to the marriage, are indicative of ‘a legacy of male dominance’ 
(Hackstaff, 1999: 214). Japan also has a very entrenched working culture with 
very long work hours (see Chapter 1). Thus, I found that many Japanese women 
gave up their financial independence to become a part of their husbands’ families 
and subsequently had no other options left. They would have preferred to keep 
their jobs, to be able to work outside the home and to be independent, to use their 
knowledge, education and skills, and not to lose any time or to miss opportunities 
in the labour force. 
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There are similarities among low fertility countries in Asia but also differences. In 
Japan and South Korea, over half of women become housewives after marrying or 
having children (Lin, 2013). However, after childbirth and a certain time of child 
raising, more Korean women are participating in the labour force as full-time 
workers, compared to Japanese women (Ochiai, 2008). There is also a similar 
pattern in Hong Kong and Taiwan where more women are participating in the 
labour force on a full-time basis (Lin, 2013; Yu, 2009; Cheung and Holroyd, 
2009). Comparing Seoul to Tokyo, the number of women in Seoul who are 
working after having children is twice that of Tokyo (Lin, 2013: 42). In Asian 
countries such as South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan there are a greater number 
of nurseries and child care facilities and a better availability of support systems, 
and more family members such as grandparents, and more communities to support 
and take care of children than in Japan (Ochiai, 2008; Yu, 2009; Atoh, 2010). In 
Japan, women do not have access to inexpensive public nurseries unless they have 
full-time jobs. If a woman leaves one job, she must find another full-time job to 
be able to use public nurseries. This system makes it difficult for women to have 
access to nurseries, which means more women are choosing to be part-time and 
not to be fully independent (see Chapter 6). In Japan, the number of people living 
with parents after marrying has been decreasing, and today more young people are 
working in large cities far away from their parents, which makes harder for 
grandparents to take care of grandchildren (see Chapter 5). In Chinese territories 
including Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, more women are financial 
providers compared to other Asian countries (also see Lin, 2013). Moreover, 
especially in Hong Kong, professional women are hiring immigrants to do 
housework (Lee, 2003; Sim, 2010).  
 
However, in Hong Kong and Taiwan, fertility has been declining (see Chapter 1). 
Simply being able to keep a job does not make women want to choose to have 
more children and in itself is not a solution to low fertility. It might be that women 
prefer to have smaller families (Morgan and Taylor, 2006; Ochiai, 2008; Yu, 2009) 
or increasingly women are not choosing to have a child at all. This is not clear and 
needs to be addressed and studied more closely. My research also suggests it is 
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unclear whether independent women like Kiyomi would desire to have more 
children, even if they had a supportive work place, husband, and family. Even for 
Kiyomi, she is not completely independent and free to make her own decisions 
because of pressure from her parents-in-law. Asian countries need to focus less on 
maintaining the patriarchal social structure and should start focusing more on 
what women need (see Chapter 6). 
 
Mason and Jensen (2003: 5) have observed that it is important to realise that the 
way people assess the value of marriage can change. For example, if women’s 
economic opportunities improve, it may decrease the value of marriage when 
viewed through a more traditional prism of sociocultural sensibilities. In Western 
countries, as women’s economic independence increases, the division of labour as 
the essential element of satisfaction in marriage is de-emphasised, shifting the 
focus more on sexual and emotional satisfaction or total income (Mason and 
Jensen, 2003: 6). In Japan, however, women are still stuck with the traditional 
division of labour and are unhappy with this and with the emotional side of their 
marriages. Japanese women still have a long way to go in being able to fully 
participate in the labour force. They are still thought of and treated as 
supplementary help. Compared to Western countries, Japanese women’s 
economic independence is still low.  
 
It would be very difficult for Japan to adopt a more Nordic-style system in which 
women could keep their jobs to support themselves (see Chapter 6) because of 
such strong family ties and the male-dominated patriarchal society structure. It 
would be too much to ask for instant equality on parity with men, but even small 
steps toward changing women’s rights might change the attitude of women and 
men toward equality. It seems simple and reasonable to say that women should be 
able to keep their jobs, yet this is very hard to achieve in a male-dominated 
society like Japan. Now more than ever, however, Japan needs more labour power, 
to make to keep the economy stable. Men cannot continue to discount the 
importance of women’s participation in the labour force and for them to be able to 
use their skills and knowledge in the long term as men do. In Hong Kong and 
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Taiwan, more women participate in the labour force, resulting in a greater balance 
of power offsetting some of the problems of low fertility (Yu, 2009). Wasting 
Japanese women’s potential by limiting their participation in the labour force 
results in a weaker labour force. Women’s talents should not be wasted. Women 
could and should be able to choose their own life course. As a feminist researcher, 
I am not indicating that women’s reproduction is a necessity, but a right, and 
women should be able to choose if they want to have children or not while 
remaining in the labour force if that is their choice.  
 
One bright spot in my interviews was Kiyomi, the only one of the married 
participants who was able to maintain a full-time career after marrying and having 
a child, and who is happy. She has nearly everything of which other women could 
only dream. Her parents were supportive of her as she pursued a higher education, 
and her workplace is very understanding and treats men and women equally. Her 
husband is also very helpful, and he even shares household and childcare 
responsibilities with her, and encouraged her to keep her career after having 
children. The other married respondents, in contrast, had an opposite experience. 
Married participants told me that their husbands changed after marrying. Before 
marrying, the men treated their girlfriends very well, and would do anything to 
pretend they would be supportive for their women. After marrying, the 
relationship dynamic would quickly evolve (or de-evolve, as it were) into a more 
traditional ie family structure which was more advantageous for men (Ochiai, 
2008). Historically, this structure provided financial security for women (see 
Chapter 4), but today, in contemporary Japan, it tends to make women feel stuck 
in marriage, while men feel more secure.  
 
The single respondents all saw their married friends become unhappy after 
marrying, which caused them to become negative toward marriage. However, 
single women in Japan face a great deal of pressure to marry, and are very aware 
of the limited time they have to marry and have children. Moreover, after 
marrying, women have to live for their families and focus on them, and are not 
able to enjoy themselves with so many responsibilities. Japanese women want to 
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avoid divorcing because of both their children and their parents (Hertog, 2008). 
When single women see and hear about those married women’s experiences, it 
might in turn lead to the postponement of marriage or even no marriage, resulting 
in fewer or no children. Some of my respondents mentioned that once they pass 
the age at which it is desirable to have a child, they can see neither any point nor 
any advantages to marriage (see Chapter 4). Japanese women and men think 
marriage equals children, which is an advantage to being married (see Chapter 1). 
It is also important to note that in Western countries, when women can be 
financially independent, more women might choose to have children outside of 
marriage and to be a single parent. This could serve to inspire and encourage 
Japanese women to do the same. Perhaps eventually in Japan more cohabitation or 
unmarried mothers would be supported by the state and their workplaces, and 
removing the stigma and discrimination of being a single mother might help to 
increase the fertility rate (see also Atoh, 2008). At present, however, this is almost 
unthinkable in Japan.  
 
One of the limitations of my research was that my respondents were only women. 
I do not know if men truly fail to acknowledge gender inequality, but according to 
my participants, men either do not care, or do not seem to want to change; their 
parents, culture and experiences have defined inequality as the norm. In most 
developed countries, more men are sharing financial and child care and domestic 
care responsibilities with women. Do Japanese men want to share the 
responsibilities of the household and finances? My research has indicated that 
they find it easier to work only outside the home and to relegate the housework 
and budgeting to women. In Japan, there is a culture of long working hours. 
However, I found in my research that even when the state tried to reduce men’s 
working hours, men are still not participating in household duties to help support 
women, and are using their extra time for leisure activities (see Chapter 1, Chapter 
3 and Chapter 6). I feel that Japanese men are using women more now than in the 
past. It used to be that men felt ashamed if they could not provide enough money 
for the family. However, some of my respondents told me that their husbands said 
that they could not give the women more than their employers pay (see Chapter 5), 
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and that they had to work meaningless part-time jobs in addition to all the 
domestic and care work at home, while the men changed nothing and worked the 
same number of hours. Japanese male-dominated society pushes many women to 
stay at home, to be more controlled and to lose their confidence. When women are 
forced to abandon their own ambitions and dreams, it takes a significant 
emotional toll. I thought about this more and more as I conducted interviews, 
analysed them and wrote my thesis, causing me to feel anger toward the 
male-dominated society and patriarchal social structure.  
 
One thing that is important to remember is that Japanese women will eventually 
have to take care of both their own parents and parents-in-law. My respondents 
did not talk about it so much, perhaps due to their young age, but one day it will 
be their responsibility to take care of them. Family ties are strong in Japan, and 
there are not enough facilities to care for older people, so they must be taken care 
of by their families. The fewer children there are, the more responsibility each 
child will have to care for their parents when they become older. Most of the 
responsibility for elder care lies with women, which widens the gender inequality 
gap (Ochiai, 2008; Ishii, et., al 2012). Not only do women have to take care of 
their parents, but also their own children, making it difficult to hold on to their 
careers. 
 
Japan is now at a turning point. Japanese women are having fewer children, 
although the male-dominated society would still prefer women to have more. 
Women should be able to have what they want for themselves, not what men want 
to give us. As various quantitative studies have shown, it is not beneficial for 
women when men try to give women what men think women need. Women’s 
points of view need to be heard and to be taken into account, and we need more 
qualitative studies for that. Even well-known population demographer Peter 
MacDonald, who has been studying low fertility for decades in several countries 
including Japan, says he has realised using only quantitative research can limit 
how we understand fertility decline. He says that conducting qualitative research 
is important in order to understand the individual reasons behind women’s 
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everyday decisions (MacDonald, 2000). I would hope that future qualitative 
research studies would be geared not only toward fertility decisions, but would 
also help to gain greater knowledge of gender inequality, and how that inequality 
directly influences women’s fertility decisions. 
 
If I had not conducted qualitative research, I would not have discovered many 
things. For example, many women might be financially comfortable after 
marrying, even though it means their loss of freedom, and they will often leave 
their jobs and will stay at home, isolated from society. Saki (married with children, 
employed part-time) said, ‘I feel I’m living in a small world’. Married women 
have lost the completely different life they once led before marrying. These 
women will naturally lose their self-esteem, but this factor is not studied or 
mentioned enough in Japanese society. Examining only quantitative research 
ignores the feelings of women that are revealed by qualitative research. To put it 
simply, such studies do not focus on Japanese women’s identity, self-confidence, 
and self-esteem. Japanese women’s feelings and depression have long been 
ignored.  
 
Using qualitative research proved to be beneficial. I heard many surprising stories 
and uncovered some compelling opinions from the stories of the women I 
interviewed. Some of the women revealed insights I had never thought about. One 
was from a single woman who mentioned that she was truly afraid of 
experiencing the pain of giving birth, while others stated they did not want to go 
through the process of raising a child. I never expected that women, especially 
single women, could be so afraid of going through the birth process. I was able to 
understand a woman’s becoming more anxious and worried about having her 
child after becoming pregnant, but the attitude of Japanese women seems to be 
different from that of women in other countries in that they are anxious and 
worried about the process while they are still single. Some single participants 
mentioned that they were worried about the risks of giving birth at a late age, and 
said that if they had to wait that long, they could not see any benefit in marrying.  
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The reasons for lack of qualitative research in Japan might be due to complicated 
privacy and cultural barriers. According to McKinley (2005), in his experience of 
trying to conduct research in Japan, he found that qualitative research is almost 
impossible, due in no small part to language and cultural barriers. Even Japanese 
people themselves experience cultural differences amongst different regions. 
McKinley experienced difficulties in trying to gather respondents’ opinions and 
feelings, especially with sensitive questions. However, there are some 
non-Japanese researchers who have conducted sensitive qualitative research such 
as Nancy Rosenberger and Ekaterina Hertog (see Rosenberger, 2001; Hertog, 
2008). Hertog interviewed Japanese single mothers and uncovered many 
interesting findings, which left me surprised and impressed. 
 
Even though it can be difficult, it is possible to do qualitative research in Japan, 
even if the researcher is not a native Japanese speaker. However, throughout my 
research, I built relationships with participants and communicated with them as 
much as I could. Conducting the pre-interviews and main interviews with my 
participants proved to be not too difficult, and I used vignettes when there were 
sensitive questions or when respondents grew silent. I honestly would not say it 
was easy to conduct qualitative research, as I was a new researcher at first. As I 
progressed, the interviews went very well, and I gathered many rich stories, more 
than I had anticipated.  
 
I wished I had had more time for my research. I did not want to waste women’s 
stories, but I felt frustrated and felt as though my research would be endless. I was 
not able to chronicle all of the Japanese women’s stories. I had to make the 
difficult decision to choose which stories were more important than others. As a 
researcher, I was very fortunate to have access to so much data. However, as a 
student, those abundant opportunities sometimes felt overwhelming.  
 
Hopefully, this study could be used and expanded more in the future, encouraging 
researchers to conduct qualitative research and to add their findings to the 
growing base of knowledge. For example, at one time low fertility was blamed on 
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women, with many negative opinions surrounding them. Low fertility caused an 
imbalance in society with a greater aging population, resulting in fewer workers in 
the labour force and a weaker economy. Every country, including Japan, is 
focusing on trying to strengthen its economy, but if they want to make the country 
stronger, they cannot ignore the unequal treatment of the female half of the 
population. Many Japanese women are equally as educated, trained and skilled as 
men, and such a robust pool of talent should not be wasted; marginalizing women 
in the labour market exacerbates the labour shortage resulting from low fertility. 
At the beginning of my research even I asked myself: is low fertility women’s 
fault? No, the answer is quite the opposite. I have found that the male-dominated 
patriarchal system has a negative impact on women’s decision-making, which 
indicates low fertility. 
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Appendix I 
 
Questions for pre-interview 
 Tell me about your background. 
_______ Age 
_______ Where are you from? 
_______ Marital status (e.g. single, married, divorced, etc.) 
_______ Do you have any children? 
_______ Education background 
_______ Family background (e.g. wealthy or poor) 
_______ How many people are in your family? 
 Could you please describe the relationship between your mother and yourself? 
 How do you and your mother differ in these areas? 
_______ Education background 
_______ Work 
_______ Expectations 
 Are you single or married? If you are single, do you have a steady boyfriend? 
If yes: 
Could you tell me about your partner?  
_______ Length of relationship 
_______ Satisfaction  
_______ Partner’s education 
_______ Partner’s profession 
If no: 
Could you please describe your ideal relationship?  
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_______ Last relationship 
_______ Satisfaction  
 
 If you are married, could you tell me about your husband? 
_______ Length of relationship before marrying  
_______ Length of relationship after marrying  
_______ Where did you first meet? 
_______ Husband’s education background 
_______ Husband’s profession 
_______ Satisfaction level of marriage 
_______ Description of ideal relationship 
 
 Could you describe to me your attitude toward fertility? 
 
If you want to have children: 
_______ How many  
_______ Why 
_______ Ideal number  
_______ Actual number in reality 
 
If you do not want to have children: 
_______ Could you tell me the reasons why? 
 What kind of contraception do you use? 
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Appendix II 
Interview Question 
Could you please describe what you consider to be upper class?  
Interview questions for each group:  
 
Single with steady boyfriend Single with no steady boyfriend 
 Does your boyfriend have a job? Full-time or Part 
time?  
 Is your image of marriage positive or negative? 
 How did you meet your partner? 
 Could you describe the relationship between you 
and your boyfriend? 
 Could you tell me the advantages of being single? 
 Could you tell me the disadvantages of being 
single? 
 Do you want to get married?  
 Could you describe your ideal marriage? 
 Could you tell me the advantages of being married? 
 Could you tell me the disadvantages of being 
married?  
 After getting married, what is your ideal share of 
housework? 
 Would you like to have any children? 
 How many children do you intend to have? 
___ideal number 
___actual number 
 Could you tell me ideal timing of having first child? 
 What are the challenges of having and raising 
children?  
 Having a child, do you think how much affect 
income? 
 What is your opinion of “shotgun weddings”?     
*1 
 What kind of contraception do you use? 
 How do you feel about contraceptive oral pills? 
 
 How important for you is it to have a good sex 
relationship?    *2 
 What is your opinion of abortion? 
*3 
 
 Is your image of marriage positive or negative? 
 Could you tell me the advantages of being 
single? 
 Could you tell me the disadvantages of being 
single? 
 Do you want to get married? 
 Could you describe your ideal marriage? 
 Could you tell me the advantages of being 
married? 
 Could you tell me the disadvantages of being 
married?  
 After getting married, what is your ideal share 
of housework? 
 Would you like to have any children? 
 How many children do you intend to have? 
___ideal number 
___actual number 
 Could you tell me the ideal timing of having 
your first child? 
 What are the challenges of having and raising 
children?  
 How much do you think having a child would 
affect your income? 
 What is your opinion of “shotgun weddings”? 
 What kind of contraception do you use? 
 How do you feel about pills?  
 How important for you is it to have  agood sex 
relationship? 
 
 What is your opinion of abortion? 
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Married with children Married without children 
 How did you meet your husband? 
 Does your husband work? Full-time or Part time?  
 Is your image of marriage positive or negative? 
 Could you tell me the advantages of being 
married? 
 Could you tell me the disadvantages of being 
married? 
 Could you tell me the differences between the 
reality of marriage and the ideal marriage? 
 Are you happier now than being single? 
 Could you tell me the advantages of being single? 
 Could you tell me the disadvantages of being 
single? 
 Could you tell me ideal timing of having first 
child? 
 How many children do you have? 
 How many children do you intend to have? 
___ideal number 
___actual number 
 What are the challenges of having and raising 
children?  
 What was and is your ideal of sharing of 
household? 
___ideally 
___reality 
 How much do you think having a child would 
affect your income? 
 What is your opinion of “shotgun weddings”? 
 What kind of contraception do you use? 
 How do you feel about contraceptive oral pills? 
 How important for you is it to have a good sex 
relationship? 
 What is your opinion of abortion? 
 How did you meet your husband? 
 Does your husband work? Full-time or Part 
time? 
 Is your image of marriage positive or negative? 
 Could you tell me the advantages of being 
married? 
 Could you tell me the disadvantages of being 
married? 
 Could you tell me the differences between the 
reality of marriage and the ideal marriage? 
 Are you happier than being a single? 
 Could you tell me the advantages of being 
single? 
 Could you tell me the disadvantages of being 
single? 
 Would you like to have any children? 
 Could you tell me when the ideal timing of 
having your first child was? Any differences 
between ideality and reality? 
 How many children do you intend to have? 
___ideal number 
___actual number 
 What are the challenges of having and raising 
children?  
 What was and is your ideal of sharing of 
household? 
___ideally 
___reality 
 How much do you think having a child would 
affect your income? 
 What is your opinion of “shotgun weddings”? 
 What kind of contraception do you use? 
 How do you feel about contraceptive oral pills? 
 How important for you is it to have good sex 
relationship? 
 
 What is your opinion of abortion? 
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 Remembering back to your own childhood, what kind of experiences would 
you like to give your child? 
 If you did not have to be concerned with finances, how many children would 
you like to have? 
 How do you or will you manage marriage, work and having children? 
 If you know or remember any family and child support policies, could you tell 
me about them please? 
 If you were the prime minister, how would you encourage women to have 
more children? 
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Appendix III 
 
 
Vignettes 
 
 
*1 
 Opinion of having a child before marriage. 
 
Example A: Miss B is 16 years old. She is a student. She has become pregnant. 
What should she do? 
 
Example B: Miss A is 32 years old. She has a great career. She loves her job. She 
has a boyfriend, but their relationships is not serious. She has become pregnant. 
What should she do? 
 
Example C: Miss C is 19 years old. She is working for a factory. She has become 
pregnant. What should she do? 
 
 
*2 
 Importance of a good sexual relationship 
 
Example D: Mrs. A has a great husband. But Mrs. D is not sexually satisfied with 
her husband and their sex life. What should she do? 
 
 
*3 
 Abortion 
 
Example E: Miss A is 32 years old. She has a steady boyfriend. She has a 
wonderful career. She has become pregnant and is planning to have an abortion. 
 
Example F: Miss B is 40 years old. She is married. She has three children. She has 
become pregnant. She is planning to have an abortion. 
 
Example G: Miss C is 18 years old. She has become pregnant. She is planning to 
have an abortion.  
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Appendix IV 
 
 
 Sample Tax Calculation  
 
Example:  
 
A wife who has two children earns (annual mean income of women working full 
time) ¥ 2,679,000 (£ 20,930)
43
 
A husband earns (annual mean income of men working full-time) ¥ 6,410,000 
(£ 50,078) 
 
 
Basic Deduction is ¥ 380,000 (£ 2,969) 
Income Deduction ¥ 650,000 (£ 5,078) 
Total: ¥ 103,000 (Tax Free allowance) (£ 8,047) 
 
National Insurance ¥ 100,000
44
 (£ 781) 
National Pension ¥ 280,000
45
 (£ 2,188) 
Total: ¥ 380,000 (£ 2,969) 
 
Wife’s income Tax:¥ 2,679,000 –(¥ 103,000 +¥ 380,000)×10%46 =¥ 219,600 
(£ 1,716) 
 
Wife’s Council Tax:47 ¥ 2,679,000 –(¥ 103,000 + ¥ 380,000)×10%- ¥ 4,000 (City 
Tax) = ¥ 215,600 (£ 1684) 
 
Wife’s After Tax earning: ￥2,679,000-(￥219,600+￥215,600+￥380,000)= 
￥1,863,800 (£ 14,560) 
 
*The wife loses her entitlement of (Dependents support from husband’s company) 
¥ 212,400 (£ 1,659). 
Child Support (Dependents support from husband’s company) ¥ 96,000 (£ 750)48 
×2 children= ¥ 192,000(£ 15,000). In this case the husband has to pay an extra 
20%
49
 more council tax from his wages. This family might lose housing support 
from the company (see Chapter 5).  
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 The Japanese National Tax Agency in 2012. 
44 Depends on workplace; see chapter 1.  
45 Recruitment from the government for full-time workers.  
46 Below \ 1,950,000 is 5%, between over \ 1,950,000 to ￥3,300,000 is 10%, between \ 3,300,000 to 
\ 6,950,000 is 20%, between \ 6,950,000 to \ 9,000,000 is 23%, between \ 9,000,000 to \ 18,000,000 is 33% 
and above is 40%.  
47 Can be different in cities which use guidelines from the Japanese Tax Agency.  
48 Mean child support Can be different in cities which use guidelines from the Japanese Tax Agency in 2012.  
49 Under \ 5,000,000 extra 10% over is 20%.  
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